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Classical Series

THE PHAEDO OF PLATO

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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟϹ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

THE PHAEDO OF PLATO

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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TO

R. D. ARCHER-HIND

PREFACE

This edition of the *Phaedo* is designed for the student of Greek rather than the student of philosophy. For the student of philosophy English scholarship has given us two editions of the *Phaedo*, those of Professor Geddes and of Mr. Archer-Hind, the former stimulating and full of poetical suggestions, whilst the latter may be regarded as almost the final word in the interpretation of this dialogue, combining the finest scholarship with a knowledge and appreciation of Platonic philosophy second to that of no living Platonist. But the scope and method of both these editions put them out of reach of the schoolboy, and the present edition is inspired by the belief that the *Phaedo* is worth reading as a masterpiece of literature to others than professed students of philosophy. I have twice read the *Phaedo* with the Sixth Form of the Manchester Grammar School, and came to the conclusion that

though the dialogue inevitably introduces the boy to some entirely new ideas—in itself no disadvantage — it does not in the main present difficulties which an intelligent boy cannot cope with. Writing with this object, I have given my attention mainly to the interpretation and the language of the dialogue, discarding the discussion of philosophical ideas, except so far as was necessary to elucidate the meaning. In the Introduction I have attempted to give in the simplest possible form an account of the Platonic Ideas, some understanding of which is necessary to make the dialogue intelligible.

My debt to Mr. Archer-Hind is one which I cannot adequately express: I knew the *Phaedo* first through his edition, which was thoroughly in my 'system' before I began to write. In particular, I have to thank him for his courtesy in allowing me to use *in toto* his summary of the argument, which appears at the head of the chapters in my notes: the summary is taken verbatim from his edition, with the exception of chapter xlviii., where my interpretation differs from his. From other editions I have borrowed little: what I have taken from Professor Geddes I have acknowledged in each case, whilst I have used the German edition of Wohlrab as a store-

house of Platonic quotations. The text of this edition is based on that of Mr. Archer-Hind, the variants from which are noted in the commentary. I have deliberately avoided an apparatus criticus or an account of the MSS. of the *Phaedo*, partly because the textual difficulties are few and of no great importance, partly because my experience suggests that boys make little or nothing of a list of MSS. and variant readings.

In conclusion, I would express my thanks to Mr. E. Barker, Fellow of Merton College, for his kindness in reading the proofs of my Notes and in making numerous valuable suggestions; and to Mr. H. Sidebotham, Scholar of Balliol, for the same service to my Introduction.

H. W.

CONTENTS

	PAGES
Introduction	xiii–xxxix
Text	1–105
Commentary	107–246
Index	247–251

INTRODUCTION

A. The Composition and Scope of the *Phaedo*

§ 1. *The position of the* Phaedo *among the Platonic dialogues*

The *Phaedo*, in spite of the fact that a considerable portion of it is occupied with subtle dialectical arguments on abstruse metaphysics, has been close to the hearts of thoughtful men of all ages. References to it in subsequent literature are numberless; and the youngest of us has heard how Cato, when the overthrow of the Roman Republic made death preferable to life, fortified his resolution and cheered his last hours by reading this noble work. Dealing with a subject the loftiest and most universally interesting, the soul's immortality, enriched with the imagination of a poetical mind and adorned with all the graces of style of the most finished master of Greek prose, portraying moreover the majestic death-scene of the greatest, the most human and most courageous of Greeks, it is small wonder that this dialogue has attracted the admiration and affection of generations of men.

The date of composition of the *Phaedo* cannot be fixed with any great precision: it contains no historical allusion which would help to determine it. Nor is the point of any special interest, except to observe that its metaphysical doctrine marks it as belonging to the earlier period of Plato's philosophical development.

The writings of Plato are all inspired by the teaching of Socrates: the *Phaedo* belongs to a group of dialogues inspired directly by his death—the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedo*. The *Apology*, the only Platonic composition not in the form of dialogue, professes to give Socrates' defence on the charge of impiety, but is in reality a glorification of the life and character of Plato's master against his detractors. The *Crito* tells how Socrates refused to disobey the laws by escaping from prison when the opportunity was provided by Crito. The *Euthyphro* discusses the meaning of 'piety,' for the violation of which Socrates was condemned to death. The *Gorgias* is in the main an indictment of the 'Rhetores' and of the whole political life of Athens, breathing the bitterness natural to one whose master had been put to death by the Athenian democracy. The *Phaedo* purports to give an account of Socrates' last days in prison, and his conversation with a number of friends on the immortality of the soul.

§ 2. *The setting of the* Phaedo

Phaedo is represented as telling the story to his friend Echecrates of Phlius a short time after Socrates' death (v. note on *χρόνου συχνοῦ* 57 B). We are told that Plato himself was not present (*Πλάτων δέ*,

οἶμαι, ἠσθένει 59 B): yet we may be sure that every detail of the final scene was made known to so close a friend of Socrates, and we need feel no hesitation in accepting as historical the purely narrative part of the dialogue—e.g. the list of those present, the dismissal of Xanthippe, the manner of taking the poison, Socrates' dying words: ὦ Κρίτων, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα, 118 A. Intrinsic probability, as well as the absolute naturalness of the incidents mentioned and the absence of deliberate dramatic effect, points to the conclusion that the setting of the dialogue is true to fact.

§ 3. *The subject of the* Phaedo *: complex character of the Platonic dialogue*

If the question be raised, 'What is the subject of the *Phaedo*?' the obvious answer that rises to the lips is 'the proof of the soul's immortality.' Superficially the answer is correct, and conveys that view of the dialogue which gives it its main interest to the average reader: it is further borne out by the alternative title to the *Phaedo*, "περὶ ψυχῆς." But it is the Platonic manner to weave two or three strands into the texture of his compositions. In the *Republic*, which has the alternative title "περὶ δικαίου." the attempt to define 'justice' leads Plato to frame an 'Ideal State.' In the *Sophist*, again, the ostensible motive of the dialogue, the definition of the sophist, involves an elaborate exposition of the dialectical method of διαίρεσις, 'division of genus into species,' and incidentally there is introduced the metaphysical problem of ὄν and μὴ ὄν, Being and Not-being, which to Plato at any rate is not subordinate in importance to either of the other two motives.

Looking at the *Phaedo* from this same point of view we can trace three distinct themes or motives of the dialogue.

The argument arises out of an apparent paradox. Socrates asserts (1) that in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, (2) that the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Challenged by Kebes to explain this inconsistency, Socrates replies ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, 63 E. 'Well, you shall be my jury: and I would like now to make good to you my position, that a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy seems to me to be justified in feeling confidence at the approach of death, in the sure hope that in that other world after death he will win the greatest blessings.' To prove this Socrates shows that the aim of the philosopher throughout life is to make the soul independent of the body, i.e. of its weaknesses and passions, and that accordingly death, the entire emancipation of soul from body, is the complete realization of the philosopher's aim. Kebes now points out that this is assuming that the soul will continue to exist after death: Socrates admits the objection, and proceeds to prove that the soul is immortal. Formally, then, it is clear that the main thesis is that quoted above from 63 E, that the philosopher is justified in contemplating death with equanimity, with its corollary, that 'the man who would fain be ready to meet death with cheerfulness must lead the philosopher's life.' It is this corollary which gives the dialogue its 'ethical' character (its full title is Φαίδων, ἢ

περὶ ψυχῆς, ἠθικός): and to this ethical exhortation Socrates reverts so soon as the soul's immortality is, or seems to be, established; cf. 81 A and 107 C εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει, 'since the soul is immortal, it requires attention obviously not only for the sake of that period of time to which we give the name of "life," but for the sake of all time, and the danger of neglecting it would now seem to be a very terrible one.'

One of the first arguments Plato uses to prove the soul's immortality is the theory that all learning is 'recollection,' ἀνάμνησις, 72 E sqq.; the soul, according to this theory, has had an existence previous to this life, and has had knowledge of the 'Ideas' (v. Introd. B), a knowledge which it loses at the moment of birth and is constantly recovering during life by being reminded of the Ideas by the visible objects of the world, which are their images. This doctrine of ἀνάμνησις rests on the Theory of Ideas, and at the end of the ἀνάμνησις argument Simmias admits εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις, 'our argument finds an excellent refuge in the position that the existence of the soul prior to our birth rests on the same assurance as the existence of this Being of which you are now speaking.' Here we come in sight of the great principle on which the final and convincing proof of immortality is based, the kinship of the soul with the Ideas, and the essential truth of the existence of these Ideas. The final proof, put in its briefest form, is this: 'the de-

finition of soul involves the Idea of Life; now no Idea can admit its opposite, nor can any form of existence which embraces an Idea in its definition admit the opposite of that Idea: therefore soul cannot admit the Idea of Death, the opposite of Life, which is involved in the definition of soul.' This is the third strand in the texture of the *Phaedo* —the principle that the Ideas are the source of all existence and all knowledge.

Thus the dialogue has three motives—(i) that which is formally the main thesis, 'that the philosopher, and only the philosopher, is warranted in facing death cheerfully'; (ii) to make good this position Socrates is led to prove that the soul is immortal; (iii) the proof of the soul's immortality involves an exposition of the doctrine of the Ideas as the principle of 'Causation' in the universe. The natural bent of Plato's genius towards metaphysical speculation suggests that this last motive was no subsidiary one, but rather that one of the three which lay next his heart, and on which he felt the most absolute assurance. At the same time he is too great an artist to destroy the unity of the dialogue by losing sight of the original motive in the more absorbing dialectic on the Ideas: to this original motive he constantly reverts, and the 'myth' at the end of the *Phaedo* has its proper place in this artistic unity, enforcing the moral of the dialogue, 'to lead the philosophic life,' by a description of the beauties of that 'purer world' to which the liberated soul of the philosopher wings its way after death, with a companion picture of the underworld to which the unpurified soul is doomed for a season; and the same moral is driven home, by the indirect method natural to an artist, by the practical example of

Socrates' unfailing courage, cheerfulness, and even playfulness in the hour of death.

B. The Platonic Theory of Ideas

§ 1. *Plato's position difficult to define precisely*

The argument of the *Phaedo* assumes in the hearer an acquaintance with the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas: 74 A φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: 'we say that there is such a thing as "equal"—I am not speaking of log equal to log, stone to stone, or anything else of the kind—but beyond all these something quite different, equality itself'; and the dialogue cannot be made intelligible without some attempt to explain the doctrine as simply as so unfamiliar and metaphysical a question will permit. This task is rendered somewhat more difficult by the fact that Plato is not a dogmatic philosopher, with a hard and fast, carefully elaborated system: his works, as might be expected of one who is breaking new ground, show a constant development of thought, and his position on this, as on other subjects, is very different in his later writings from that developed in the earlier. The *Phaedo*, as has been indicated above, belongs to the earlier phase of Plato's metaphysic, and in it he regards the Ideas from the same point of view as in several other dialogues which form the earlier group, comprising, besides the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Meno*, *Cratylus*, and possibly the *Theaetetus*: this view is subsequently criticised and amended in such dialogues as the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*, and reaches its

most complete development in the *Timaeus*. With these later developments we are not concerned, but only with the doctrine of the Ideas as evolved in the *Phaedo*.

A further complication arises from the difficulty of determining with anything like precision how much of Plato's thought is his own, and how much is due to Socrates. By a familiar literary convention, partly from an artistic instinct and partly as a tribute to the master who had inspired him, Plato in almost all his dialogues puts his thoughts into the mouth of Socrates. A comparison, however, of the Platonic dialogues with Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, or 'notable sayings of Socrates,' suggests that the great original thinker is Plato himself, and that he is indebted to Socrates not so much for his doctrine as for his method of dialectic, question and answer.

§ 2. *The Socratic λόγοι: a theory of 'knowledge'*

In the particular case of the Theory of Ideas we can trace back to Socrates a germ, certainly, of the doctrine, but a germ as widely removed from the Platonic development as the seed from the flower. Socrates' main interest as a teacher was ethical, and he started with the fundamental proposition that 'virtue is knowledge': Xen. *Memorabilia* III. ix. 5 ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι· τά τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἁμαρτάνειν. Knowledge, then, being the one thing needful, it remained to determine what was the object of knowledge, what was the really

knowable. The earliest Greek thinkers, the physical philosophers of Ionia, were all impressed with the shifting and transitory nature of the visible phenomena of the material universe; and the dictum of Heraclitus, *πάντα ῥεῖ*, found its logical counterpart in the sceptical position of the Sophist Protagoras, *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*. This was a maxim which the ethical teacher could not accept—it is the subversion of all ethical principle or theory; and Socrates, looking about him for something stable and knowable among the shifting phenomena of the world and amid the diversity of men's judgments and opinions, found it in what we might call indifferently 'definitions,' 'universals,' or 'concepts,' *λόγοι*: cf. *Phaedo* 99 E *ἔδοξέ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν*. He would take a group of men's judgments (as Socrates was mainly concerned with human judgments, and not with physical phenomena, it will be as well to take the former as a type), e.g. various acts which men call *δίκαιον*; he would then by his dialectical process strip from these acts and judgments upon them all that was accidental, individual, unessential, and by this inductive method attempt to frame a definition, or *λόγος*, of *τὸ δίκαιον*, what we should call the 'conception of justice': these universals alone, he maintained, can be known.

§ 3. *Plato developed this theory of 'knowledge' into a metaphysical theory of 'Being'*

Up to this point we have simply a 'logical' theory, a theory of knowledge; the great step taken by Plato is to develop this theory of knowledge into a theory of ontology, a theory of 'Being.' If

these universal concepts, such as τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ καλόν, and the like, are the only things that can be known, it follows, from the Platonic point of view, that they are the only things that really 'exist.' Plato accepts the Heraclitean πάντα ῥεῖ, but instead of deducing from it the conclusion that nothing can be known, he maintains that there is an existence, beyond and above the phenomena of the material world, which can be known, which is the true and proper object of knowledge—the world of Ideas: the Socratic λόγοι, or mental 'concepts,' take to themselves in the Platonic system an independent existence, they are an invisible world comprehended not by the senses but by the pure intelligence. These Ideas are called by various names,—οὐσία, 'essence' or 'real Being,' εἶδος or ἰδέα, 'Form' or 'Type,' or again by such phrases as αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον or αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι δίκαιον, 'that which justice really is,' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, and the like. For every group of things which have a common attribute, there exists a corresponding 'Idea': Socrates, Plato, Kebes, Simmias, being ἄνθρωποι, imply an αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος; the horses we see in the world imply an αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἵππος; square tables, round tables, three-legged tables imply an αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι τράπεζα; various beautiful objects an αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι καλόν, various just acts an αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι δίκαιον, various equal objects an αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, and so forth; every group of objects which have a common name, or judgments which have a common predicate, imply a corresponding Idea. It has been observed that Plato is not a philosopher of cut and dried tenets, and we are not to imagine that Plato had analysed in detail every conceivable aspect of this theory of Ideas and framed an answer to every imaginable criticism: it is significant that when he wishes to

express the relation between 'Idea' and 'particulars' his language is not precise—100 D οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ (a particular object) καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ (the Idea of beauty) εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένου. The whole theory, indeed, is tinged with poetry, and Plato's rich poetical imagination clothes the Ideas with an almost living personality: they exist in a pure world apart, and form a sort of hierarchy, the lord of them all being the highest Idea, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: in their society dwell the souls that have not been born (v. note on ἀνάμνησις, beginning of ch. xviii.), and to their company return the souls of men who have lived the true philosophic life.

The phenomena of the visible world, then, according to Plato, have no real independent existence of their own; they are mere images—εἰκόνες—of the Ideas, by their resemblance to which they recall to us those Ideas which we 'have known long since and lost awhile.' Ontologically the Ideas are the 'cause' of the phenomena of the world: Socrates is small, great, just, or beautiful, 'because,' and only in so far as, he participates in the Ideas of smallness, greatness, justice, or beauty. A somewhat different aspect of the same thing appears in the discussion of the νοῦς theory of Anaxagoras (chs. 46–47), though it is not there formally associated with the theory of Ideas. There Socrates is represented as complaining of disappointment with Anaxagoras, who, after assigning νοῦς as the ruler of the universe, did not, as Socrates expected, explain everything by proving that 'it is best that it should be so,' but went out of his way to find other αἰτίαι of various kinds by the methods of science. Here we have an indirect but clear allusion to the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the supreme

Idea of Good, which is elaborated in the *Republic* and elsewhere. This ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, besides being the supreme and final object of knowledge, is also the supreme and final cause of all things, as being at once the source and the end and aim of their existence (v. note on μετὰ φρονήσεως 69 B). Thus the ontological and teleological views of existence are brought into line, both culminating in the supreme 'Idea of Good.'

C. Characters of the Dialogue

Phaedo, the narrator of the whole story, was a native of Elis: in the war waged by Athens and Sparta against Elis (401 B.C.) he was taken prisoner and brought as a slave to Athens. He must have been soon ransomed (by Kebes, according to Aulus Gellius), for in 399 B.C. we find him an intimate member of the Socratic circle and a special favourite of Socrates: he would appear, from the allusion in 89 B εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας, to have been quite young at the time of Socrates' death. After that event he returned to his native town, where he founded the Elean school of philosophy. As a philosopher he is classed with the more famous Euclides of Megara by the satirist Timon of Phlius—

> ἀλλ' οὔ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου
> οὐδενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος, ὅτις γε μέν, οὐδ' ἐριδάντεω
> Εὐκλείδου, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ.

The Megarian school were known as ἐριστικοί and διαλεκτικοί: they developed the Socratic method of dialectic by question and answer.

Echecrates of Phlius is well chosen by Plato as

the auditor of Phaedo's narrative: little is known of him, save that he is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius as one of the last of the Pythagoreans, and as having heard Philolaus, the Pythagorean lecturer at Thebes, who is mentioned in 61 D. As a Pythagorean he would be likely to listen with sympathy to the unfolding of the doctrine of the Ideas, for Aristotle tells us that the Pythagorean theory of numbers had much in common with the Platonic theory of Ideas.

SOCRATES, the protagonist of this as of most of Plato's dialogues, is too familiar a figure to need introduction. It will suffice to indicate how in the course of the dialogue Plato brings out some of his most salient characteristics: his piercing glance from beneath the bushy eyebrows—*ἐπιβλέψας* 63 A, *ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας* 117 D: his irony, in his allusion to the quality of Euenos' poetry (60 D), in his advice to that somewhat effeminate person to 'follow him as quickly as possible' (61 B), and in his question *οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔηνος;* (61 C): his unfailing courage and tranquillity in the face of death, as evidenced by his spending his last hours in his favourite occupation of philosophic discourse, by his parting instructions concerning his children and his burial (115 B), and finally by his reproof of his friends' extravagant sorrow (117 D): his patience and gentleness in hearing and weighing the interjections of his hearers (89 A, 103 A): his piety in fulfilling a possible interpretation of his recurring dream by 'writing poetry,' in calling on the god to aid their argument (95 B), and in enjoining upon Crito to pay to Aesculapius the customary offering of a man recovered from sickness (118 A): his playful humour, as witnessed, possibly, by this last command to Crito, by his desire to pour a libation from the

poison, and by his mockery of his own grandiose language (115 A). Had we no other record of Socrates than this, we should be left with a clear picture of that great man, not complete in every detail, yet with sufficient definition of character to win our love and admiration.

Simmias and Kebes, the two interlocutors of Socrates throughout the dialogue, are inseparably associated in our minds. Both were *νεανίσκοι* at the time of Socrates' death (89 A): both were Thebans who had attended the lectures of Philolaus, and both became devoted adherents of Socrates. We read in the *Crito* (45 B) that Simmias had brought with him sufficient money to effect the release of Socrates, and that Kebes was likewise ready to do all in his power for the same end. Of Simmias Socrates says in the *Phaedrus* (242 B) that no one except Simmias had caused the production of more dialogues than Phaedrus—*Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου*: both are recorded to have written philosophic dialogues themselves. Yet, though so closely associated, their different characters are clearly marked in the *Phaedo.* Simmias is credited by Socrates with earnestness in argument—*οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἁπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου* 86 D: yet his main contribution to the dialogue, the suggestion that the analogy between *ψυχή* and *ἁρμονία* is fatal to immortality, quickly breaks down before the dialectic of Socrates, and earlier on (76 D) Simmias was forced to admit, on another objection he raised, *ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.* Again, after the final proof of immortality, Simmias, though he can find no flaw in the argument, feels some uneasiness—*οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην*

ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων: a touch of vagueness and hesitancy is traceable in all he says. Kebes has none of these misgivings as to the fallibility of the human reason: he is hard to convince—καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις (77 A)—but once his reason is convinced, he is quite satisfied: his characteristic quality is πραγματεία (63 A), he is keen on the scent of an argument—ἀεὶ λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ (63 A), quick to detect a flaw. It is Kebes who starts the most fertile objections, who asks why suicide is unlawful (61 D), calls upon Socrates to explain his paradox about welcoming death (62 C)—contrast this with the somewhat superficial charge of inconsistency in 103 A—, raises the question of immortality (70 A), brings up ἀνάμνησις (72 E), and in 87 A requires that Socrates should not be satisfied with the soul's 'superior durability,' but should demonstrate its absolute imperishableness, if our uneasiness at death is to be allayed: he is the seeker for truth after Socrates' own heart.

CRITO plays no important part in the dialogue: he is the chief interlocutor in the *Crito*, where he tries to persuade Socrates to escape from prison. He was a wealthy Athenian, no philosopher, but a warm friend and admirer of Socrates, for whom he stood bail at his trial (115 D): to him Socrates entrusts his last behests (116 B). His relation to Socrates is admirably summed up by Diogenes Laertius—οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοστοργότατα διετέθη πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ οὕτως ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτοῦ ὥστε μηδέποτε λείπειν τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν.

APOLLODORUS, who is mentioned as breaking out into uncontrollable weeping when Socrates drank

the hemlock (117 D), appears also in the *Symposium* (173 D), where from his enthusiastic temperament he is called ὁ μανικός: he is twice referred to by Xenophon as a devoted admirer of Socrates, but ἄλλως εὐήθης.

The rest, who are merely mentioned as present, are CRITOBULUS son of Crito, HERMOGENES, who also appears in the *Cratylus*, EPIGENES son of the orator Antiphon, AESCHINES, ANTISTHENES, the founder of the 'Cynics,' CTESIPPUS, mentioned again in the *Euthydemus*, and MENEXENUS, after whom one of Plato's dialogues is named: these were Athenians. Finally there were the Theban PHAEDONDES, and the two Megarians, EUCLIDES, founder of the Megarian school, and his friend TERPSION.

D. ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROSE DIALOGUE

THUCYDIDES records a historic remark of Pericles to the effect that Athens drew to herself the produce of the whole world—ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων (Thuc. ii. 38); the same remark might be applied with equal truth to the field of literature, where Athens had the genius to appropriate the various forms invented in the different quarters of the Greek world. History she borrowed from Ionia, Rhetoric from Sicily, Comedy, according to tradition, from Epicharmus of Sicily and Suzarion of Megara, whilst in Tragedy she fused together the Ionian Epic and the Dorian Dithyrambic chorus. The philosophic dialogue might seem to be a form of literature in which she could

fairly claim originality. Yet tradition as to Plato's sources of inspiration carries us into curious by-ways of Greek literary history, to a writer who is little more than a name to us, Sophron of Syracuse, who wrote what were known as *μῖμοι*. The 'mime' or farce was a popular form of entertainment with the folk of S. Italy and Sicily, who possessed a strong natural gift for humorous and grotesque impersonation: it was a short dramatic sketch of ludicrous incidents and characters from everyday life. It was from this mime of S. Italy and Sicily that the Romans developed their 'fabula Atellana,' or 'Oscum ludicrum,' and their old dramatic 'satura,' whose legitimate descendants are some of the earlier satires of Horace. Sophron of Syracuse, the most prominent Greek writer of mimes, lived in the middle of the fifth century B.C., and tradition has it that Plato, on his visit to Syracuse, was presented by Dion with a copy of his works, which so interested him that he slept with it under his pillow (cf. Hesychius, *Sophron*). The satirist Timon of Phlius says plainly that Plato learned from Sophron the art of writing dialogues—*τὸ Σώφρονος βιβλίον ἀφ' οὗπερ ἐμιμήσατο γράφειν τοὺς διαλόγους*: and the two men are associated in a somewhat cryptic sentence in Aristotle's *Poetics* ch. i. § 7 *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους*. So little is known of Sophron that it is a vexed question whether he wrote in prose or verse: a scholiast's note says of him *οὗτος γὰρ μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν ῥυθμοῖς τισι καὶ κώλοις ἐχρήσατο, ποιητικῆς ἀναλογίας καταφρονήσας*, which Professor Mahaffy interprets to mean that he wrote a sort of rhythmical prose something like Walt Whitman's 'so-called poems.' Two other Greek writers are mentioned

by tradition as lineal descendants of Sophron and his mimes—the recently discovered Herondas, who wrote *μιμίαμβοι* in the Iambic Scazon metre, and Theocritus, who is said to have copied certain of his Idylls directly from Sophron: but this can hardly be taken as proof that Sophron wrote verse. Professor Gilbert Murray so thoroughly acknowledges the kinship of Plato to Sophron as to speak of some of Plato's earlier dialogues, such as the *Laches* and *Hippias Major*, as mimes. If we attempt to extract the kernel from this tradition about Sophron, it is obvious in the first place that Plato was not determined by the example of Sophron to adopt the dialogue as his form of composition: there can be no doubt that that form was indicated to him by the method of Socrates, whose teaching was all conducted by conversation, question and answer, what afterwards became famous as the method of Dialectic—*διαλεκτική*, literally 'conversation.' As Socrates was to be the mouthpiece of Plato's thought, it was almost necessary from the literary point of view that he should give his compositions a form which would recall to his readers the historic Socrates and his method of teaching. Dialogue once determined upon, it was clearly desirable that it should be as dramatic as possible, and we can well believe that Plato would study with attention the closest models he could find to dramatic prose dialogue. These he found to his hand in Sophron and his compatriot Epicharmus, and they were the more to his purpose as both had a good deal to say on contemporary philosophy—Epicharmus in particular was imbued with those Pythagorean tenets that gained so strong a hold on Sicily and S. Italy: indeed a Sicilian rhetorician, Alcimus, quoted by Diogenes

Laertius (iii. 12. 9 sqq.), wrote a book to show that Plato borrowed all his philosophic doctrines from Epicharmus! It is this study, then, of Sophron and Epicharmus as models of dramatic style that would seem to be meant by the tradition associating Plato with the mime.

The Dialogue, in addition to its literary propriety for a record of Socrates' teaching, has some obvious advantages as a vehicle for philosophic discussion. Its dramatic character lends variety and life to the dead monotony of a discourse: and Plato in particular showed a skill which none of his imitators have rivalled in imparting dramatic reality, as well as dramatic form, to his dialogues by giving characters as well as names to his 'dialogi personae.' The dialogue further enables difficulties and objections, which require solution, to be raised in a perfectly natural manner. In particular the form of dialogue so often used by Plato, as for example in the *Phaedo*, where the conversation is reported by one who was present to one who was not, enables the writer to give artistic colour to the setting, to indicate the tone in which each thing is said and the impression made on the speaker's audience, and to introduce those interludes in the conversation which are so skilfully used by Plato to mark a stage in the development of the argument, or the approach of a critical point (cf. in the *Phaedo* 69 E, 77 E, 84 C–85 D, 88 C, 107 A). In his longer works, more particularly where he is dealing with a big and difficult subject (e.g. in the later books of the *Republic*), Plato abandons the dramatic form and lapses into monologue: this would appear to have been the method of the lost dialogues of Aristotle, for Cicero, writing in that style, says 'scripsi Aristoteleio more.'

The philosophers of the various Socratic schools almost all wrote dialogues; of these little but the names survive, so that in extant classical Greek literature Plato stands alone in this form of composition. Five centuries had passed before there arose another great writer of prose dialogue, Lucian of Samosata (second century A.D.), who wrote dialogues modelled on Plato in style, but with the comic element outweighing the philosophic. In Latin Cicero is Plato's most famous imitator: in our own language we have the dialogues of Addison, the philosophic discussions of Bishop Berkeley, closely modelled in form on Plato, and, best known of all, the *Imaginary Conversations* of Walter Savage Landor.

E. The Trial and Condemnation of Socrates

§ 1. *Anomaly of the Condemnation*

It is one of the ironies of history that the man whose last hours were spent in discoursing on the immortality of the soul and exhorting his youthful hearers to a virtuous life, and who faced death cheerfully in the assurance that it was to take him into the presence of 'good and wise gods' (63 B), should be lying under sentence of death on a charge of 'impiety' and 'corrupting the young.' That this charge could possibly be brought against Socrates by his worst enemy is hard enough to understand: that a majority out of five hundred and fifty intelligent jurymen should have condemned him to death on such an indictment seems almost to pass the bounds of belief. Nor do we solve the puzzle by hastily condemning the jury that sentenced him of ignorant fanaticism: fanaticism was the thing furthest re-

moved from the Athenian citizen at the end of the fifth century B.C. We shall do better to consider whether any justification, or at any rate explanation, of so unmerited a sentence is to be found either in the life and teaching of Socrates himself, or in the peculiar circumstances, social and political, of the time when he was brought to trial.

§ 2. *Socrates ranked in public opinion as one of the Sophists*

Our main source of information with regard to the trial is Plato's *Apology*, purporting to be the speech made by Socrates in his defence, and no doubt historically accurate as a record of the main lines of argument actually adopted by Socrates. In that speech Socrates mentions that the indictment was twofold: he was accused of (i) 'disbelieving in the gods in whom the city believed, and introducing new deities'; (ii) of 'corrupting the young'—ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. He distinguishes between his actual accusers, Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon, and those other accusers who had been prejudicing public opinion against him for years past. Many years before, the oracle of Delphi had declared that 'there was no man wiser than Socrates'; and Socrates, with the pious impulse to prove the truth of the oracle's statement, straightway set himself to test the wisdom of those who had a reputation for it in Athens—statesmen, orators, poets, handicraftsmen, and the like. In the course of his investigation he proved to his own satisfaction that their boasted wisdom was ignorance; they knew nothing but

thought they knew a great deal, whereas he was wiser than they in recognising that he knew nothing. Socrates' whole life was devoted to persuading his fellow-citizens to look into their own minds, to test their opinions and beliefs, to be dissatisfied with mere tradition, mere 'thinking that they understood,' to empty their minds of prejudice and make-believe, and to get down to some bed-rock of secure conviction on which to build up an edifice of true knowledge. Such a mode of life, in addition to rousing the personal hostility of the exposed professors of knowledge, was apt to identify Socrates in popular opinion with the Sophists, who proclaimed themselves able to 'make the worse argument appear the better,' and the outcome of whose teaching was that nothing is knowable. The logical result of the method and doctrine of the Sophists was the dictum of Protagoras, 'man is the measure of all things,' i.e. that what a man believes is true for him, that there is no such thing as absolute truth. Nothing could have been further from the spirit of the Socratic teaching properly understood: but owing to similarity of method and to his constant determination to examine everything to its foundation and not to accept tradition, he became identified in public opinion with the Sophists, whose teaching was subversive of morality, and hostile to the most venerable traditions of Athens. The Sophist Protagoras, only a few years before Socrates' trial, had been condemned to death for impiety at Athens on account of his sceptical views: some twenty years earlier, Diagoras of Melos had been proscribed at Athens for atheism, and the comic poet Aristophanes in the *Clouds* (423 B.C.), a play which holds Socrates up to ridicule as the type of the Sophist, indicates the affinity

of Socrates to Diagoras by calling him 'Socrates the Melian.' It would carry us too far afield to discuss how Aristophanes came so to misjudge Socrates: but there can be little doubt that the *Clouds* marked out the latter as Sophist in public opinion to the end of his days.

§ 3. *The charge of 'Impiety'*

Some slight colour was lent to the charge of 'introducing new deities' by the frequent allusions Socrates made to what he calls τὸ δαιμόνιον, a divine voice within him, which from time to time warned him to refrain from some course he was contemplating. As to the other part of the first count in the indictment, the charge of 'not believing in the city's gods,' Xenophon puts it on record in the *Memorabilia* (I. iii. 1) that Socrates conformed to the city's laws in the matter of sacrifices and worship— ἥ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρῄνει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. Yet the charge may very likely be true, if taken in its literal sense of 'not accepting all the traditions of the Greek mythology as current among the Athenians.' An instructive passage in Plato's *Phaedrus* (p. 229) throws some light on the attitude of Socrates with regard to the popular mythology. 'Being asked whether he believes the Attic legend of Boreas and Orithuia, he replies that he should indeed be only following the example of many ingenious men if he rejected it and attempted to explain it away; but that such speculations, however fine, appeared to him to betoken a mind not very happily constituted: for the subjects

furnished for them by the marvellous beings of the Greek mythology were endless, and to reduce all such stories to a probable form was a task which required much leisure. This he could not give to it, for he was fully occupied with the study of his own nature. He therefore let these stories alone, and acquiesced in the common belief about them—'χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν' (Thirlwall). Socrates spoke either of ὁ θεός or οἱ θεοί indifferently: the Platonic Socrates is no doubt a monotheist; the historic Socrates probably troubled himself little about the distinction, holding that 'the proper study of mankind is man.' But the charge of atheism, taken in its spirit rather than its letter, was never more inappropriate to any man than to Socrates.

§ 4. *Corruption of the Young*

It was undoubtedly this second count in the indictment that told most heavily against Socrates. The conviction underlying the verdict in the minds of the jury was that the effect of Socrates' teaching had been to encourage the young in ὕβρις, in a want of respect for things venerable. In the *Clouds*, mentioned above, the young pupil of Socrates is represented as insolent to his aged father, and we can well believe that in some unfortunate cases young men who were not very wise, and who got hold of the wrong end of the Socratic teaching, were puffed up with a conceit of their own wisdom, and thought they knew something better than their fathers had known. A democracy is not above being jealous of political free-thinking, and though Socrates was in the best sense thoroughly patriotic and loyal to

the Athenian democracy, he criticised freely some of her institutions, notably the election by lot of magistrates, which most Athenians regarded as the Palladium of their political liberty. It is significant that two of his most distinguished pupils, Xenophon and Plato, were warm admirers of the Spartan constitution. Xenophon, before the condemnation of Socrates, had served in Asia under Cyrus, the arch-enemy of Athens, and a few years later was actually fighting under his hero, the Spartan king Agesilaus, against the Athenians at Coronea, and was in consequence exiled from Athens. But the enemies of Socrates could point to worse examples than Xenophon of what they maintained to be the results of his teaching. One of his favourite pupils had been Alcibiades, a notorious instance of *ὕβρις*, who had been sentenced to death for impiety in connection with the mutilation of the Hermae (415 B.C.), and who had worked more mischief for Athens during the closing years of the Peloponnesian War than any other single man. Nor was even he the worst offender: Critias, the leading spirit of the worst excesses of the Thirty Tyrants, had been in his early days a companion of Socrates. At the time of the trial Athens was only beginning to recover from the misery created by the tyranny of the Thirty: it was a moment when Athenians were likely to look askance at any who had ever been associated with the Tyrants, or who were under suspicion of not being wholly in sympathy with the restored democracy. It is significant that the most reputable of the three prosecutors, Anytus, had been the comrade in arms of Thrasybulus, the champion and hero of the restoration. Socrates to-day needs no defence against the imputation of being in any degree responsible

for the iniquities of Alcibiades or Critias: but it is obvious that their misdeeds must have aggravated the prejudice against him in the minds of those who only knew him from the outside, and that the years immediately following the Tyranny of the Thirty offered a favourable opportunity to those who wished to work him mischief.

§ 5. *Socrates' attitude during the Trial*

Enough perhaps has been said to indicate some palliation for the verdict of 'guilty' brought in againt Socrates: the majority for condemnation was a very narrow one, and it is certain that had Socrates adopted a conciliatory attitude in his defence, he would have been acquitted. Instead of that Socrates manifested the most complete indifference as to the issue of the trial, assuring the jury that if set free with a warning to 'mend his ways,' he should refuse to do so, preferring to obey 'the god' rather than the jury. This same attitude of indifference Socrates maintained when the question arose what was to be the sentence. The prosecutors proposed death as the penalty, and in a case like this, an *ἀγὼν τιμητός*, where no fixed penalty was assigned by law, it rested with the convicted defendant to propose an alternative penalty, an *ἀντιτίμημα* to the *τίμημα* of the prosecution: between these two the jury were bound to choose, the law forbidding them to adopt any compromise. Socrates began by proposing that he should be feasted daily in the Prytaneum as a public benefactor: he was ultimately induced by his anxious friends to propose a fine of thirty minae: beyond that he would not go. In face of such a contemptuous counter-proposal the jury had practically

no choice but to sentence him to death, so that for the death-sentence Socrates alone was responsible, as he would have been the first to admit. The Athenian jury little imagined that their verdict would go far to cancel all the glorious achievements of Athens in the judgment of posterity to the end of time. Socrates was indeed least worthy of death of all men: still let us do the jury the justice of admitting that their verdict, and even their sentence, was not quite the irrational outburst of intolerant fanaticism that it has so often been made out to be. Socrates forgave his judges: let us imitate his large-mindedness.

[The best account and refutation of the charges against Socrates is to be found in Plato's *Apology* and in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, bk. i. chs. 1–3.]

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

[ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἠθικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ, Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ

I. *Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει* St. p. 57
ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ᾗ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. *Αὐτός, ὦ* Ἐχέκρατες.

ΕΧ. Τί *οὖν δή ἐστιν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν* Ἀθήναζε, *οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφῖκται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν, ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές* B
τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε

δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ
ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

58 ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύ-
θεσθε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις, καὶ
ἐθαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς
πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν
ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες,
συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης
ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον
Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν
Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς
B δὶς ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ᾤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε
καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὔξαντο,
ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἑκάστου ἔτους
θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἣν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ
νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ
πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεω-
ρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ
καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα
ἀποκτιννύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται
τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε
ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι
C ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας,
ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν
πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ
λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ

ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

II. ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ D πολλοί γε.

ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

ΕΧ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον E παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῄει· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἁνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ 59

δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῄει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καί τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὁτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως,
B Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧ. Ἔτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων· Πλάτων δὲ, οἶμαι, ἠσθένει.

C ΕΧ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧ. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος <οὐ> παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες φῂς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

III. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς D πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἕωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἑκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεῴγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῴ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῇμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωιαίτερον συνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ [ἡμέρᾳ] ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας, E ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρωιαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἥκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἕνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν

δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἧκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν
60 ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δέ Ξανθίππην, γιγνώσκεις γάρ, ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δή σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν
B τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα, ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δύ' ὄντε. καί μοι
C δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ

ᾖν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

IV. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας
με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας D
ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὔηνος πρῴην, ὅ τί ποτε διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ, εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπέ, τί χρὴ λέγειν. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι
ἐποίησα ταῦτα· ᾔδειν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη· E
ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ
ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρα- 61
κελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος· νῦν δ'

ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ
ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι,
εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον
ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπει-
θῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ
εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα
B ποιήματα καὶ πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω
δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὗ ἦν
ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας
ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς
εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ
αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὓς
προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην τοὺς
Αἰσώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

V. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ
ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς
C τάχιστα. ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύ-
ουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἷον
παρακελεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ;
πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν
οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν σοι
ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· οὐ φιλό-
σοφος Εὔηνος; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
Ἐθελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὔηνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως
τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι
ἴσως βιάσεται αὑτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν
εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη
D ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ
λοιπὰ διελέγετο. ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης·
Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν

εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ
ἀποθνῄσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἕπεσθαι; Τί δέ,
ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες;
Οὐδέν γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν
καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν
οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοώς, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν.
καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα E
ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν
περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν
οἰόμεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο
ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

VI. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν
εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ
Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διῃτᾶτο, ἤδη
δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν
ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα 62
γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν
σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάν-
των ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς
βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι,
θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτοις τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν,
ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ
Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἴττω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῇ
αὑτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη B
ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι

ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι· ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ
C οὕτως; Ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτιννύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

VII. Ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν,
D ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν

ἄνθρωπος τάχ᾽ ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον
εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο
ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ E
τι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν
φεύγοι, ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ
εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως,
ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ νῦν δὴ
ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν
ἀποθνῄσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν.
ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε
τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας 63
εἰς ἡμᾶς Ἀεί τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς
ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι
ὅ τι ἄν τις εἴπῃ. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας Ἀλλὰ μήν,
ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ
αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι
ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους
αὑτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο
αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν
λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολεί-
πων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, B
θεούς. Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς
λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι
ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ
Σιμμίας.

VIII. Φέρε δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώ-
τερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς
δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ
Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ
θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα

καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους
τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ
C θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε
ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ
ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς
δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι,
εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διισχυρισαίμην
ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως
ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ᾽ εὔελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετε-
λευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται,
πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.] Τί
οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων
τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ
D κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε
δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα
σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἅπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς
πείσῃς. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ
Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστιν ὃ βούλε-
σθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ
μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι
φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ
θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ
E οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ
μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν
τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης,
Ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυ-
τοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δὶς δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ
δέῃ, καὶ τρίς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδειν, ἔφη
ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι [πάλαι] πράγματα παρ-

ἔχει. Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς
δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι,
ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων
ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα 64
οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ· πῶς ἂν
οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ
Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

IX. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν
ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς
ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ
ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο
ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν
ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος
δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ πάλαι προεθυ-
μοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας
γελάσας Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ B
πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας
γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς
τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν
παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ
φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελή-
θασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ
ἀληθῆ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ
σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε
θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου
θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴπωμεν
γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες C
ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ

γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο
τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλ-
λαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς
μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ'
αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν
ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ'
αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ
τοῦτο; Οὔκ ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Σκέψαι δή, ὦ
ἀγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί.
D ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι
περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου
ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σίτων καὶ ποτῶν;
Ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Τί δέ;
τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ; τὰς
ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι
ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων
διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πό-
τερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον
E μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος.
Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου
πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ'
ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; Ἔμοιγε. Ἆρ' οὖν πρῶτον
μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος
65 ἀπολύων ὅ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων
ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δήπου, ὦ

Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

X. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν B
τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν· ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, C
εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ D

δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία. Καὶ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλ' ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ
E ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειε καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὅ τι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι
66 μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅ τι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ἆρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XI. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων B
παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως
φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα
ἄττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός
τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν
μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυρ-
μένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ
μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν·
φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν
γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν
ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι C
προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος
θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων
καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπί-
πλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς
ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν
ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους
καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ
τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ
τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι
γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι
διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· D
καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας
πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον πάντων
ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ
καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς
ζητήσεσιν αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον θόρυβον
παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ
δύνασθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε

καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ
E αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ
τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε
καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν
τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ
οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν
καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν
κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε γὰρ
67 αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ
σώματος, πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν,
οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι,
ἐὰν ὅ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι
μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ
ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθα-
ρεύωμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀπολύσῃ
ἡμᾶς. καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι
τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ
τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι᾽ ἡμῶν
B αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές. [τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως
τὸ ἀληθές.] μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι
μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ. τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία,
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ
δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς· ἢ οὐ
δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ
Σώκρατες.

XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα
ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ
ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι,
κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία
ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ

γε ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ
ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρί, ὃς C
ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ
κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει,
ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν
ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν
καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ
τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι,
καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν
παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὑτήν,
ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; D
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος
ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ
σώματος; Παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Λύειν δέ
γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα
καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ
μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων,
λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἢ
οὔ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον,
γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν
τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω
ζῆν, κἄπειθ' ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; E
[οὐ γελοῖον;] Πῶς δ' οὔ; Τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη,
ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκειν
μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώ-
πων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ
διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν
δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν,
τούτου δὴ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακ-

τοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι
68 ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν—ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως—ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἱέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύ-
B ξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἅιδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνῄσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ᾖ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλά
C τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν

καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ
τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλιγώρως
ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἆρ᾽ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις
προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦ-
σίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. D
Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τήν γε τῶν
ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι
εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα,
ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ
ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν
αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομέ-
νωσιν; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ
δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι.
καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον
εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; E
οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ
σώφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον
εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ
πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην·
φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ
ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ᾽
ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολα- 69
σίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι· ἀλλ᾽
ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῶν
κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ
νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι᾽ ἀκολασίαν
αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι. Ἔοικε γάρ. Ὦ μακάριε
Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν
ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς

λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ᾖ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ B οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ᾖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ ᾖ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ᾖ κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, C καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, ναρθηκο- D φόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προὐθυμήθην γενέσθαι· εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς προὐθυμήθην καί τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε

ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ,
ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγώ,
ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς
εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε
δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ᾽ ἀγανακτῶ,
ἡγούμενος κἀκεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις E
τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίροις [τοῖς δὲ
πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]· εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν
πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς
Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

XIV. Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα
ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· Ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν
ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ 70
τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος
οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ [διαφθεί-
ρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται], ᾗ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ἀποθνήσκῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος
καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς δια-
σκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι
οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ. ἐπεί, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ᾽
αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων
τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νῦν δὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν B
ἐλπὶς εἴη καὶ καλή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ
ἐστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ
ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι
τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα
δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη,
λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ
ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει δια-

μυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; Ἔγωγε οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι, ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὔκουν γ᾽ ἂν C οἶμαι, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κωμῳδιοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

XV. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτ᾽ ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν D ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ E ξυλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν, ἆρ᾽ οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα

ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται; Ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου 71 τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ B τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XVI. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, C ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ

ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία
ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο
δυοῖν ὄντοιν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν
ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι,
ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέ-
σεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν
καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύ-
δειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
D ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις
αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ'
ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ
ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ
ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; Ἔγωγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ
ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ
γιγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς,
ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος; Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν
ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης,
E τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται,
ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν
Ἅιδου. Ἔοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν
τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἥ γ' ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὖσα
τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δήπου,
ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς,
ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν
γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ
ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν
τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην;
Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἴπερ
72 ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν

εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων· τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

XVII. Ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης,
ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς
ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα,
ἀλλ' εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου B
μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι
πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο,
οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα
ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ
παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν
χαλεπόν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον
εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι
μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος,
οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' <ἂν> λῆρον τὸν C
Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο,
διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, [καθεύδειν]. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν
πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ
Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα.
ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθνῄσκοι μὲν
πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ

ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἆρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ D μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνῄσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.

E XVIII. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ 73 ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. Ἀλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς

ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι· ἐπεί τοι ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως B ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι δὴ τῇδέ πῄ σοι ἂν σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δή, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; Ἀπιστῶ μέν σοι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν, πῇ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῇδ' ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. C ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δέ τινα τρόπον τόνδε· ἐάν τίς τι [πρότερον] ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἆρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Οἷον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, D ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ

ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα;
τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαν
τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ
ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι
E νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ
τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι,
ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου
καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· ἔστιν ἵππον
γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην
ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι; καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα
γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνυ γε.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ
74 Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

XIX. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα
συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίων,
εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. Ἀλλ᾽
ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνῄσκηταί τίς
τι, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐν-
νοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα
εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ
οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν,
ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ
B ἴσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι
νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἦ καὶ
ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ
ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ

ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοή-
σαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι
φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ' οὐ λίθοι
μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν
ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί
δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη,
ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ C
Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ' ὅς,
ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς
μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ
τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου
τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς
τε καὶ εἴληφας; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
[Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου;
Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν·
ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο
ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον,
ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.] D
Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ
τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς
ἴσοις· ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ
αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον
εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη,
ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν
ἐννοήσῃ, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ
ὁρῶ, εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ E
καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ'
ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο
ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν
αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;

Ἀνάγκη. Τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὔ, περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασί γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ 75 πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρός γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν B αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅ τι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις C εἴχομεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἔδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. Ἔοικεν.

XX. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ

τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα
καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ
μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον
ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ
τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλόν τι ἢ καὶ
περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ D
ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι, καὶ
ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς
ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον
ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ
γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μέν
γε λαβόντες ἑκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας
ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ
ἀπολωλεκέναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ
Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάντως δήπου, E
ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες
πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον
δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας
ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἅς ποτε καὶ
πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν
οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο
δέ που ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν
λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό
γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα 76
ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ
τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλη-
σίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον· ὥστε, ὅπερ
λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε

αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXI. Πότερον οὖν αἱρεῖ, ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπιστα-
B μένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι.—Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὔ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μὲν τἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ᾖ ἀνθρώ-
C πων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀναμιμνῄσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ᾽ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι
D ὁ χρόνος. Εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε

αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

XXII. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, [ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες E ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως] ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἆρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε; Ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν 77 οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καί, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται. Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλ' οἶμαι

B οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν
γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή.

XXIII. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν
ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὃ
νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως
μὴ ἀποθνῄσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαν-
νῦται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος
ᾖ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ
ξυνίστασθαι ἄλλοθέν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ
εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ
ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ
C αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; Εὖ λέγεις,
ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ
ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι
ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι
ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσται
ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις
ἔχειν. Ἀποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε
καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε
συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ
ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι
πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν
μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ
D εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένῃ μηδαμόθεν
ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι
γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν
ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν
γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε
καὶ νῦν.

XXIV. Ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ
Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύ-
σασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι
τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν
ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ
διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις E
μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι
ἀποθνήσκων. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, Ὡς
δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν·
μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως
ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα
φοβεῖται· τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ
δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.
Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ
ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε. Πόθεν
οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν 78
ἐπῳδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπο-
λείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης,
ἐν ᾗ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ
τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ
διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν, μήτε
χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ
ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι ἀναγκαιότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε
χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ'
ἀλλήλων· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίως εὕροιτε
μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν B
δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ
ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ
μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

XXV. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ <οὔ>· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, C ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ᾗπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀξύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξύνθετα, ἃ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἴωμεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν D λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, [τὸ ὄν,] μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ

*ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τοιού-
των, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις* **E**
*ὁμωνύμων; ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐ-
ναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις
οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτά;
Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει.
Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἅψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν* **79**
*ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ
ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ
ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ'
ἐστὶν ἀειδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; Παντά-
πασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.*

XXVI. *Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη
τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές; Θῶμεν,
ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον,
τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά; Καὶ
τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. Φέρε δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο
τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ
ψυχή; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιό-* **B**
*τερον τῷ εἴδει φαῖμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον
τὸ σῶμα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι
τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀειδές;
Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.
Ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴει;
Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς
λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; Οὐχ ὁρατόν.
Ἀειδὲς ἄρα; Ναί. Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ
σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ.
Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.* **C**

XXVII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν,
ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται
εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ
ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο
γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι'
αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἕλκεται
ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ
ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται
καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων
ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ
D καθ' αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ
καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ
ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ
ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ
καθ' αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί
τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ
ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ
τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;
Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ
Σώκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει
E καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγο-
μένων ψυχὴ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον;
Πᾶς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμα-
θέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι
ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ
μή. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

XXVIII. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν
80 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν
δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει,

τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι, καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν; Δῆλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ. Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ B καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ᾗ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

XXIX. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἆρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, C ἔφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, [τὸ σῶμα,] καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν,

ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου
D ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἔνια δὲ
μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῇ, ὀστᾶ τε καὶ
νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν· ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ
ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον
ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ
ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν
καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα
καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν
ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη
τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν,
E ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε
δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ
μᾶλλον ὧδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάτ-
τηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε
οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκοῦσα
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη
[αὐτὴ εἰς αὑτήν], ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο—
τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσο-
φοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα [ῥᾳδίως]·
81 ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; Παντά-
πασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ
ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν
τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένῃ
ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ
ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγ-
μένῃ, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημέ-
νων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν

θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

XXX. Οὕτω νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν B δέ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν C αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον; Πάνυ γε. Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά D τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται. Εἰκός γε, ὦ

Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὔ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται,
E ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα.

XXXI. Ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι· ἢ οὐκ
82 οἴει; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τἆλλα, οἷ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον δή, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ
B καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Τί; οὐ τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἢ

που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους. Εἰκός.

XXXII. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ C θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὦ ἑταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὔ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ὦ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι, D οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σῶμά τι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτῃ τρέπονται ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενοι, ᾗ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.

XXXIII. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία E ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἱργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ

μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὑτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἱργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ξυλλήπτωρ εἴη τῷ
83 δεδέσθαι,—ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὑτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὑτῇ,
B ὅ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅ τι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητόν τε καὶ ἀειδές. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ'
C αὐτῶν ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἤ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς

ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπί τῳ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα <τὰ> ὁρατά· ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δή; Ὅτι D ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἶμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἵα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἅιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ E τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXXIV. Τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν· ἢ σὺ οἴει; Οὐ 84 δῆτα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένην· ἀλλὰ γαλήνην

τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου
B τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῖν, ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ.

C XXXV. Σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὼ ἤρετο· Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ
D διελθεῖν, εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον <ἂν> λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τἀληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ

ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν,
μή σοι ἀηδὲς ᾖ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν.
καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἠρέμα καί φησιν,
Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς
ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν E
ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ'
ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ
δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν
βίῳ· καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλό-
τερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἳ ἐπειδὰν
αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ᾄδοντες
καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ 85
μάλιστα ᾄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ
τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι, οὗπερ εἰσὶ θεράποντες. οἱ
δ' ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὑτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου
καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καί φασιν
αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης
ἐξᾴδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον
ᾄδει, ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῷ ἤ τινα ἄλλην λύπην
λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἥ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν
καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δή φασι διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα
ᾄδειν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα
ᾄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλ- B
λωνος ὄντες μαντικοί τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες
τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται
ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ
ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτός που
οἶμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς
τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον' ἐκείνων τὴν
μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυ-

μότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε ἕως Ἀθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες C ἕνδεκα. Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ᾗ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός. δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξε- D λεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἃ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.

E XXXVI. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς. Ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ᾗ δὴ

καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά 86 τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι· οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε B καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ ξυγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην· ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι, πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν,—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν C ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει

ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ
καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις
καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι,
τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν
χρόνον παραμένειν, ἕως ἂν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ
D κατασαπῇ. ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί
φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν
τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ
πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

XXXVII. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ
τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι,
ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώ-
τερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ
φαύλως ἔοικεν ἁπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ
μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι
πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ
E τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώ-
μεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἢ
συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσᾴδειν,
ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ
σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]. Λέγω δή,
ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς
87 πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταὐτὸν ἔγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι
μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε
τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ
χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν,
πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθα-
νόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔσται, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε.

ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ ξυγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυ- B χρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σῴζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω· εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, κἀγὼ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἄν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοἰμάτιον ὃ ἠμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοίη αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῴη πότερον C πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δέ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὅ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἃ λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὔηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, D καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα ἄνθρωπός

ἐστιν ἱματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ᾽ ἀσθενέστερον.
τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ᾽ ἂν ψυχὴ
πρὸς σῶμα, καί τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ
αὐτῶν μέτρι᾽ ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν
ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέ-
στερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν
φαίη ἑκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα
κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βιῴη·
εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβό-
E μενον ἀνυφαίνοι, ἀναγκαῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ὁπότε
ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα
τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν
ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ᾽
ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ
σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο. ὥστε τούτῳ
τῷ λόγῳ οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν, ὡς,
ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ
88 ἔστιν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι
[ἢ] ἃ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ
μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ
εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν
καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ
ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖ-
σθαι αὖθις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι,
ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν·
δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ
πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ
τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν
ἀπόλλυσθαι· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην

τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει B ὄλεθρον, μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτῳοῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἐστὶ ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

XXXVIII. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων C αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἄπιστα ᾖ.

ΕΧ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται· τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα D πιθανὸς ὤν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο· καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνῄσκει

ἡ ψυχή. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης E μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κἀκεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῄς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πρᾴως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην 89 ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὃ πεπόνθειμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧ. Πῶς δή;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζή- B λου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκ ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα C αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ᾽ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἴην

καί με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷός τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν. Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη.

XXXIX. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγω. Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ D
μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅ τι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ E
θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι σὺ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που

μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν
ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς
90 σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ
πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ. Ὥσπερ,
ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων·
οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ
σφόδρα μικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδύν, ἢ αἰσχρὸν
ἢ καλόν, ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι
ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν
ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ
ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
B Οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη,
πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους
φανῆναι; Εἰκός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ,
ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ
ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ
λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς
λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ
δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ
C ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· καὶ μάλιστα δὴ
οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες
οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγο-
νέναι τε καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε
τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον
οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς
ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ
χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,
ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων,

ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις D τισὶ λόγοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

XL. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς E τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου· ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι 91 περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα

B δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἡ δὲ δὴ ἄγνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται. παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν
C ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

XLI. Ἀλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ
D κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ᾖ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἆρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ

Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;
Συνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον E
οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ
ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ᾽ οὔ; Τοὺς μέν,
ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ᾽ οὔ. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ
ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν
μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως
ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν
εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι;
Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς 92
ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς
οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ
αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἴ
μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ
Σωκράτης, Ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε
Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις,
τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν
δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει B
γε αὑτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία
συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν
συντεθῆναι· ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ
Σώκρατες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά
σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν
ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός τε καὶ
σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ
τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ
σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὃ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον
καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι
ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων C

ξυνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται.
οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνᾴσεται;
Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς,
πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνῳδῷ εἶναι
καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ
Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ ξυνῳδός,
ἀλλ' ὅρα· πότερον αἱρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν
μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν;
Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅδε
μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ
D εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς
πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν
εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις
ξύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ
φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν
γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ
περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι'
ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη
γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν
εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία
E ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν. ἐγὼ
δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ
ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε,
διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέ-
χεσθαι λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία.

XLII. Τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε;
93 δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει
προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα
ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ
μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο

παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ; Συνέφη.
Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαί γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων
ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἕπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει.
Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι
ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἤ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς
αὑτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ;
οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστη
ἁρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῇ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. B
Οὐχί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ
ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι,
μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ'
ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων;
Πάνυ γε. Ἦ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε
καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας
ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον
καὶ ἧττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχήν; Οὐδ'
ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός·
λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν C
καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν
καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;
Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν
ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι
ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν;
πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρ-
μοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν,
καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὔσῃ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν,
τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ
ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ
Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἄττ' ἂν
λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προωμο- D

λόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἧττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ' ἧττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν [ἁρμονίας] εἶναι· ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἁρμονίαν οὖσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως; Ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὅ τι πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; Τὸ ἴσον. Οὐκοῦν ψυχή, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἧττον ἄλλη ἄλλης
E αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχή ἐστιν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἥρμοσται; Οὕτω. Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἆρ' ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη; Οὐδὲν πλέον. Μᾶλλον δέ
94 γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρμονία ἐστίν· ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῴων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἦ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι,
B καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ

ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

XLIII. Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὅ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα παθήμασιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογή- C
σαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτήν, ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ᾄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῷτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἕπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπό- D
ζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
E τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

ἆρ' οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν; Νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς
95 ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

XLIV. Εἶεν δή, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονε· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν· τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅ τι ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον, εἴ
B τι ἕξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὦ 'γαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ
C δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι

ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάρσος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῂς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ᾔδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ D
γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῴη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρει δὲ δή, φῄς, οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρός γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα E
ἐστὶν οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.

XLV. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ

φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν
96 διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν λέγεις χρήσει. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν τὰ
B τοιάδε, ἆρ᾽ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ
C περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως

οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ
ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν
καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ
ᾤμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ D
ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων
ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ
ὀστέοις ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἑκάστοις
προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα
ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι
τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν· οὕτως τότε
ᾤμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ
Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾤμην γὰρ
ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος
παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ, μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ E
κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων
ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ
πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ
τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ
ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δή, ἔφη ὁ
Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω που,
ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων
του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι
ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις προσθῇ ἕν,
ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ
προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν
τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ 97
εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν,
ἓν ἄρα ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἤστην τότε δύο,
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία

αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς, ἐάν τις ἓν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο
B γίγνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὅ τι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅ τι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.

XLVI. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου
C τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα [κοσμεῖν] καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ
D εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ

βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦ-
τον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι
ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος
ἄσμενος εὑρηκέναι ᾤμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας
περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξα-
γόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ
γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ
φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν E
ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν
ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη
εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν
αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀπο- 98
φαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος
αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω
παρεσκευάσμην, ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελή-
νης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, τάχους τε πέρι
πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν
ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει.
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾤμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ
νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν
ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν
ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει· ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα B
τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον
ᾤμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι
ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς
ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βί-
βλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον,
ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ
χεῖρον.

XLVII. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ᾠχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον [οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] εἰς
C τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καί μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων,
D τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαί που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος,
E ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύ-
99 σωσιν· ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πάλαι

ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττῃ. ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων, B ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι C δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει,

μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ
δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν
D οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν
δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ
πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν
ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

XLVIII. Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, μετὰ
ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν
εὐλαβηθῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον
ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι· δια-
φθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ
ἐν ὕδατι ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα
E αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ
ἔδεισα, μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην
βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ
ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι
αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους
καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων
100 τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον
τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι
μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἀλλ'
οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος
ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον
εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν,
τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων, ἃ δ'
ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι
σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν

οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

XLIX. Ἀλλ’, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν B
καινόν, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ’ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, C
ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων. Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις, ἐάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλόν, οὐδὲ δι’ ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς; Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν· ἀλλ’ ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ δι’ ὅ τι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, ἢ D
χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία

εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου
E ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναί. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω
101 τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος, οἶμαι, μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ
B ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ

μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα C
ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐῴης ἂν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, D
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν. [εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ·] ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ E
οὐκ ἂν φύροις ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν.

ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ' εἴπερ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων,
102 οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

ΕΧ. Νὴ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

L. ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ
B ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα, Εἰ δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἆρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῇς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἔγωγε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται
C οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν. οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ

Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὢν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν D σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ E σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι 103 ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεταί μοι.

LI. Καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν B τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν C ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἆρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν; ὁ δ' <Οὐκ> αὖ, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔ τι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει. Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἁπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

LII. Ἔτι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ

ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἔγωγε. Ἆρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ D θερμὸν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα οὖσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, E λέγεις. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεὶ ὅταν-περ ᾖ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖσδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν, ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Ἆρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ 104 τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεί, διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι, ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριὰς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος· ἆρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὑτῆς ὀνόματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ

τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ οὗπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριὰς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, B ὥστε οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός· καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἀεί· συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ; Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. Ὃ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τἀναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἣ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι ἀπολ-C λύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

LIII. Βούλει οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἷοί τ' ὦμεν, D ὁρισώμεθα ὁποῖα ταῦτά ἐστιν; Πάνυ γε. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε εἴη ἄν, ἃ ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὑτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου ἀεί τινος; Πῶς λέγεις; Ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσθα γὰρ

δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχῃ,
ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ
περιττοῖς. Πάνυ γε. Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή,
φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ, ἣ ἂν
τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι. Οὐ
γάρ. Εἰργάζετο δέ γε ἡ περιττότης; Ναί.
Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναί. Ἐπὶ
τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε
ἥξει. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ E
τρία. Ἄμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς. Ναί.
Ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία
τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον,
οἷον νῦν ἡ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὖσα ἐναντία
οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον
ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ 105
τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἀλλ'
ὅρα δή, εἰ οὕτως ὁρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον
τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ
ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν
αὐτὸ ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερο-
μένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξεσθαι. πάλιν
δὲ ἀναμιμνῄσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις
ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται,
οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον·
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον,
ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται. οὐδὲ τὸ B
ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν
τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἕπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως.
Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἕπομαι.

LIV. Πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ᾽ ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με, ᾧ ἂν τί [ἐν τῷ] σώματι ἐγγένηται, C θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ, ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ᾽ ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα, εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ᾽ ὅ τι βούλομαι. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὧι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν D ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; Ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ᾽ ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

LV. Τί οὖν τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν; τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν E μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν. ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται,

τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ
οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ
ψυχή; Ἀθάνατον. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ
ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα
γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ
Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ
εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν; 106
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον
ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ
χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῄει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὖσα
σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ'
αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα.
Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὡσαύτως, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ
τὸ ἄψυχρον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ
ψυχρόν τι ἐπίοι, οὔποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ'
ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὸν ᾤχετο.
Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη
περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον B
καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν
θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴῃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον
μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται
οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται,
ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ
δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης.
ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἄν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ
περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου,
ὥσπερ ὡμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ'
ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι C
οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται·
τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ

εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ
D ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται.

LVI. Ὁ δέ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί᾿, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον
E καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἤ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, τὸ δ᾿ ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπιόν, ὑπεκχωρῆσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης,
107 ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου. Οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ᾿ εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν,

εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι· ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἤ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ᾽ B ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ᾽ ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

LVII. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽ ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον C διανοηθῆναι ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ᾽ ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη D ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι.

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἷ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι·
E τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου
108 Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῆν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ' οὔτε ἁπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἕπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν
B εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καί τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων

ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ, ἕως ἂν δή τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, C ὧν ἐλθόντων ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἑκάστῃ τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἵα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι.

LVIII. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, D λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἅ σε πείθει· ἡδέως οὖν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ᾽ ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ᾽ ἂν οἷός τε εἴην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ. τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς E γῆς, οἵαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ. Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐγώ, ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν

109 μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης
ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι
αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ
ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν·
ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ
τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἧττον οὐδαμόσε
κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. πρῶ-
τον μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς
γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά
τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι
Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ
B τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ
βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ
ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις
τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν
γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας
καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνερρυηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ
καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν
γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ,
C ἐν ᾧπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν
τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων
λέγειν· οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ
ξυρρεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν
οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ
οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ
τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν
οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ
ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα
τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ
βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ

τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς D
εἴη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς
τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων
τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου
ἀκηκοὼς εἴη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο
καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἔν τινι
κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ
τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ
ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταὐτόν,
ὑπ᾽ ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἵους τε E
εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ᾽ ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα·
ἐπεί, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ᾽ ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς
γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν <ἂν> ἀνακύ-
ψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης
ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως
ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις
ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι
ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς
φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ. ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ 110
καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε
διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ
τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἅλμης, καὶ οὔτε
φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε
τέλειον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδέν ἐστι, σήραγγες
δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί
εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽
ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν ἄξια·
ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον
φανείη διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν, B
ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ

τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.

LIX. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῷτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ
C οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρῶνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἁλουργῆ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς ὕδατός τε καὶ
D ἀέρος ἔκπλεα ὄντα χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἕν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὔσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τήν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ
E τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω. τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον τούτου

εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει 111 καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῷα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἠπείρῳ οὔσας, καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ B ὥρας αὐτῆς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ᾗπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας C συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι

ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

LX. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυ-
κέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ
εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην
πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπτα-
μένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ
βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον
ἔχειν τοῦ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ᾽ οὓς καὶ
βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ
D πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς
ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαί τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ
στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ᾗ
πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ῥεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους
ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν
ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν
ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς
μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ
E καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ
ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες
ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους
τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ
ἑκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ
πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ
ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα
διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἕν τι τῶν χασμάτων
τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ
διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι᾽ ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο
112 ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

τῆλε μάλ᾽ ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·

ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίγνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι' οἵας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ῥεύματα, ὅτι B πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν ποιεῖ· ξυνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὁρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ξυναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν. ὅταν τε οὖν [ὁρμῆσαν] ὑποχωρήσῃ C τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπῃ δεῦρο δὲ ὁρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἑκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ D μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω

ᾗ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ᾗ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἃ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω
E καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δέ ἐστιν ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὔ· ἄναντες γὰρ πρόσω ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

LXI. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ῥεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ῥέον [περὶ] κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὠκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέ-
113 ρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων ῥεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οἷ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καί τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς εἰσπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καιόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ·
B ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ] ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης,

οὐ συμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι· περιελιχθεὶς δὲ
πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ
Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν
Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα
ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου
δὲ αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον
πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα
δ' ἔχοντα ὅλον οἷον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομά- C
ζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ
ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν
ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ
ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ
ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ
Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ
τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος
κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον
ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ
ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

LXII. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν D
ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἷ ὁ
δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικά-
σαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ
οἱ μή. καὶ οἳ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι,
πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ
αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται
εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθ-
αιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας
ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν
τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἳ δ' E
ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν

ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. οἳ δ᾽ ἂν ἰάσιμα μέν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ
114 μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιῶσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ᾽ ἱκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται
B ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἳ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλατ-
C τόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν

καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς
οἰκιζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ
ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ
παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις
ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον
δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι.
ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν,
ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονή-
σεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ
ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

LXIII. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι D
οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν
ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽
ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις,
ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα,
τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι
οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος·
καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ
δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ
τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ
ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας E
ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους
εἴασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας καὶ
πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς
δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας
τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὑτῆς
κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ
ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, οὕτω περιμένει 115
τὴν εἰς Ἅιδου πορείαν, ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν
ἡ εἱμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ

Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαῦθις ἔν τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἱμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδόν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

B LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅ τι ἄν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; Ἅπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιῆτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελῆτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε, ὥσπερ κατ' ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογή-
C σητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἴεταί με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ
D ἐρωτᾷ δή, πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι

πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἦ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἦ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, E ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾷον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὁρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καιόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοὐμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἄν σοι φίλον 116 ᾖ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.

LXV. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἵπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' B αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς σμικροὶ

ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἧκε παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. ἐλθὼν δ᾽ ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἧκεν ὁ τῶν ἕνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ᾽ αὐτόν, Ὦ C Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πρᾳότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα D φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῄει. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὡς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῄει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῷστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δή, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ

ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, E
ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς
ὄρεσιν καὶ οὔπω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ
οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν
παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόν-
τας εὖ μάλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίους ὧν
ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου·
ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως
γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν,
οὓς σὺ λέγεις, οἴονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα
ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω·
οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν 117
ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ,
γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι
ἐνόντος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως
ποίει.

LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ
παιδὶ πλησίον ἑστῶτι, καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ
συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἧκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλ-
λοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα
τετριμμένον· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρω-
πον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων
ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη,
ἢ πιόντα περιιέναι, ἕως ἄν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς
σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως B
αὐτὸ ποιήσει. καὶ ἅμα ὤρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ
Σωκράτει· καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἵλεως, ὦ
Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε
τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρω-

που, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πώματος
πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι; ἔξεστιν, ἢ οὔ;
Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον
C οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ'
ὅς· ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί
τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε
εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὔχομαί τε
καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ. καὶ ἅμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα
ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως
ἐξέπιεν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς
οἷοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ
εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ'
ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ
δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαιον ἐμαυ-
τόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ
τύχην, οἵου ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρου ἐστερημένος εἴην.
D ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ
οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη.
Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ
οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε
ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα
ὅντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, πλήν γε
αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε,
ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου
ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα
πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ
E χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ
καρτερεῖτε. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ᾐσχύνθημέν
τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελ-
θών, ἐπειδή οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη,

κατεκλίθη ὕπτιος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κἄπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι 118
ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πηγνῦτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο, Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

LXVII. Ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

COMMENTARY

CHAPTER I

57 A–59 C, *cc.* i. ii. Prologue. Echekrates, the Phliasian, begs for information respecting the last moments of Socrates. Phaedo assents, and, after explaining the circumstances which delayed the execution, gives a list of the friends who were present at that last meeting, where sorrow and gladness were so strangely mingled.

1, 4. **αὐτός** : *αὐτός* is used both in the question and in the **57 A**
answer to give authority to the ensuing narration ; it is quite beside the point to read into the question 'admiration' and into the reply 'pride,' as the scholiast does.

5. **τί . . ἐστιν ἄττα εἶπεν** ; by an idiom frequent in Plato the predicate in a question of this kind is singular although the subject is plural : cf. 58 C *τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα ;* 93 C *τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν ; Gorg.* 508 C *σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα* : the singular is less precise than the plural—'of what character ?' so here 'what was the subject of his discourse ?' Contrast 102 A *τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα* = 'what was the course (rather than the "subject") of your subsequent conversation ?'

8. **Φλιασίων** : the position of *Φλιασίων* after *πολιτῶν* is to be observed : *Φλιασίων* is added by way of explanation to *τῶν πολιτῶν*, which means 'my fellow-townsmen,' and should be so translated : 'no one of the citizens of Phlius' would be simply *οὐδεὶς τῶν Φλιασίων*. Stallbaum compares *Apol.* 32 B *καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα· Meno* 70 B *καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι.* Phlius, the home of Echecrates and the scene of this narration, was a small town in NE. Peloponnese, near Sicyon : here

apparently Phaedo rested on his return from Athens, after Socrates' death, to his native Elis. It is hardly worth while to inquire, because quite impossible to decide, what interfered with communication between Athens and Phlius at this time: certainly not, as Stallbaum suggests, the Elian War, which was over by 400 B.C., nor the Corinthian War (Hermann), which was some years later.

ἐπιχωριάζει Ἀθήναζε: the idiomatic Greek pregnant use of 'place towards which' with a 'verb of rest implying motion': cf. 61 E *ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν*: 116 B *στὰς παρ' αὐτόν*: '(comes and) stays at Athens.'

10. **χρόνου συχνοῦ**: the gen. expresses 'time within which,' chiefly in negative sentences: it is to be connected with the Homeric gen. of 'place'—e.g. *Il.* xvii. 372 *νέφος δ' οὐ φαίνετο πάσης γαίης οὔτ' ὀρέων*—which is itself a branch of the partitive genitive. The length of time suggested by *χρόνος συχνός* is relative to the point in question; here it need mean no more than a few weeks, 'for some time.'

B **ὅστις ἂν . . . οἷός τ' ἦν**: this might be called the 'potential indicative with *ἄν*,' implying, though not consciously to the speaker, a suppressed protasis, *εἰ παρεγένετο*; for the full construction cf. *Apol.* 38 D *ἴσως μ' οἴεσθε ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἑαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾤμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.*

13. **εἶχεν**: the subject is the implied *ὁ ἀγγείλας ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι.*

58 A 27. **ἐκείνους**: 'illos,' 'those so well known in the familiar legend.'

B 30. **θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν**: *θεωρία* is here a 'sacred embassy': *θεωρός* (*θεάομαι*) was a 'spectator of games,' and the word was specially used of 'public representatives' sent to a festival: cf. Dem. 380. 20 *τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς θεωροὺς εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι.*

32. **πέμπουσι**: 'sollemniter mittunt: proprium in hac re vocabulum' (Wohlrab): cf. *πομπή*, a solemn procession.

36. **δεῦρο**: 'to Athens': cf. below 69 B *οἱ ἐπιχώριοι*, 'Athenians.'

C 38. **ἀπολαβόντες**: '*ἀπολ.* est intercludere, intercipere, a proposito itinere excludere: cf. Dem. *de Chers.* 98 *νόσῳ καὶ χειμῶνι καὶ πολέμοις ἀποληφθέντος ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἰκάδε*' (Heindorf).

CHAPTER II

4. **οἱ ἄρχοντες**: sc. *οἱ ἕνδεκα*, who superintended public executions.

8. **προθυμήθητι**: 'be so kind as to': possibly the word D suggests the zealous effort to recall accurately every detail of the scene.

16. **τοιούτους ἑτέρους**: cf. 80 D *τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον.* *τοιοῦτος* is used idiomatically in Plato to avoid repeating a phrase: cf. 79 C *καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ . . ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη*, where *τοιούτων* = *πλανωμένων καὶ ταραττομένων.*

19. **θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος**: 'I was strangely E affected by the scene.'

21. **εὐδαίμων γάρ**: 'here the key-note of the dialogue is struck. Its express object is to show *ὡς εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι*: and at the very outset we are introduced to Socrates as a living illustration of his own belief' (Archer-Hind).

23. **τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων**: variously explained as a gen. of the cause, or gen. of reference defining the application of the verb or adj.; cf. *Crit.* 43 B *πολλάκις σε εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾴως φέρεις.*

ὡς ἀδεῶς ἐτελεύτα: the idiomatic use of *ὡς* or *οἷος*, to express the cause = *ὅτι οὕτως, ὅτι τοιοῦτος*: cf. *Crit. l.c.*: 89 A *ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο*: 117 C *ἀπέκλαιον . . τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἵου ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρου ἐστερημένος εἴην.* It is usually called the interrogative, but may it not be an indirect exclamatory use of *ὡς, οἷος*? Compare the relation of the subjoined sentences—

Direct: *τίς ἐστιν οὗτος;* (interr.).
Indirect: *ἠρόμην τίς εἴη οὗτος.*
Direct: *οἵου ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρου ἐστέρημαι*—(exclam.).
Indirect: *ἀπέκλαιον . . οἵου ἀνδρὸς . . ἐστερημένος εἴην.*

25. **ἄνευ θείας μοίρας**: 'without a divine call' (Jowett), a reference, no doubt, to Socrates' well-known belief that throughout life he had been under the special guidance of the gods, being frequently warned against some intended action by what he calls *τὸ δαιμόνιον.*

27. **εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος**: throws the utmost emphasis on the pronoun *ἐκεῖνον*: 'he above all men': cf. 63 C, 66 A, 67 B.

29. **παρόντι πένθει**: an awkward juxtaposition of datives, 59 A paralleled by *Phaedr.* 234 C *τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι*, 'to one who takes a rational view.' *παρόντι* is masc. and indefinite (sc.

τινι), as in e.g. *ξυνελόντι λέγειν* and *τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι* (supra), and the dative depends not on *εἰκός* but on *εἰσιέναι* understood.

οὔτε αὖ ἡδονή: this very rare use of *οὔτε* without a preceding *τε* or *οὔτε*, which is not noticed by any of the commentators, is partly due to its being separated from *οὐδὲν πάνυ ἐλεεινόν* by the clause *ὡς εἰκός κτλ.*, partly to the fact that *ἔλεος* and *ἡδονή* form a 'pair' of emotions natural to the circumstances, which if put side by side would be expressed by *οὔτε ἔλεος οὔτε (αὖ) ἡδονή.*

30. **ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὄντων**: this idiom usually denotes a 'profession,' the occupation of a lifetime: cf. 84 A *ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα*: 68 C *ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν*: *Rep.* 581 E *ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα*, and not as here the occupation of a limited period: even *Prot.* 317 C *καίτοι πολλά γε ἤδη ἔτη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ* is not an exact parallel.

31. **τοιοῦτοί τινες**: referring back to *ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὄντων*: cf. note on 58 D.

32. **ἄτοπόν τι . . τις ἀήθης**: observe the force of *τι* and *τις*, suggesting something hard to define: Lat. quidam, nescio quis.

37. **ὁτὲ μὲν . . ἐνίοτε δέ**: the regular Attic form would be *τοτὲ μὲν . . τοτὲ δέ*, or *ἐνίοτε μὲν . . ἐνίοτε δέ*: here, in addition to the not uncommon combination of different forms in the *μέν* and *δέ* clauses, we have the substitution of the relative *ὁτέ* for the demonstrative *τοτέ*: this is common in late Greek, but extremely rare in Attic: we may compare the occasional use of the relative pronouns for the demonstrative with *μέν* and *δέ* in Attic: e.g. Dem. 248. 19 *καὶ πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας ἃς μὲν ἀναιρῶν εἰς ἃς δὲ τοὺς φυγάδας κατάγων.*

38. **διαφερόντως**: cf. 117 D.

39. **Ἀπολλόδωρος**: for these persons see Introd. C.

B 50. **ἦν δέ**: $=$ *παρῆν δέ*; for the omission of the preposition when a compound verb is repeated cf. 60 B *τὸ σκέλος ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα . .*, 71 E *οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν; . . ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι;* 84 D *διεξιέναι . . διελθεῖν*, 104 D *ἀπεργάζηται . . εἰργάζετο*, 108 E *ἐξαρκεῖ . . ἀρκεῖ.*

52. **Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἠσθένει**: how are we to understand *οἶμαι*? Plato, if he was absent, must have known what kept him away: still, in the mouth of Phaedo, *οἶμαι* is dramatically appropriate, as helping the reader to forget Plato and think of Phaedo as the speaker. The mention of Plato's absence has its significance for the dialogue. Plato, while on the one hand wishing to give authority to his narrative by putting it in the mouth of an eye-witness (Phaedo), would yet seem to disclaim

personal responsibility for the literal historical accuracy of the story: there is obviously a good deal that is Plato's own thought put into the mouth of Socrates.

CHAPTER III

59 C–60 C, *c.* iii. On the morning after the return of the sacred vessel from Delos, the friends meet earlier than usual at the court-house near the prison. After some delay they are admitted and find Socrates relieved of his fetters and in company with his wife and child. Xanthippe, unable to control her grief, is led out; and Socrates chafing his cramped leg falls to moralising on the intimate union of pain and pleasure, which he says would have made a good subject for Aesop.

3. **φοιτᾶν**: the word commonly used of regular visits, e.g. of **D**
children to school; cf. Ar. *Eq.* 1235 *παῖς ὢν ἐφοίτας εἰς τίνος διδασκάλου;* so in 60 E of a haunting dream, *πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον.*

5. **ἐν ᾧ καί . .** : the *καί* simply marks 'coincidence.'

8. **διατρίβοντες**: to 'pass the time,' especially in 'conversation,' for which *διατριβή* is found in *Apol.* 37 D *ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους*: here it = *διαλεγόμενοι.*

15. **ἥκειν**: it is worth notice how regularly this is the word **E**
used of an 'expected arrival.'

18. **περιμένειν**, to 'wait for' something, to wait patiently; cf. 116 A. *ἐπιμένειν*, on the other hand, is to stay in the same place or position; cf. 80 C *ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον*: *Meno* 93 D *ἐπέμενε γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς* (v. Riddell, § 127).

20. **παραγγέλλουσιν**: not to Socrates, but to the prison officials; 'give orders,' commonly used of giving orders to an army. *ὅπως ἄν* is used here of 'purpose,' 'to the end that,' 'to the effect that'; cf. *Gorg.* 523 D *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ . .*: Isaeus vii. 27 *διεκελεύεθ' ὅπως ἄν, εἴ τι πάθοι πρότερον, ἐγγράφωσί με.*

25. **γιγνώσκεις γάρ**: does this mean 'you know her char- **60 A**
acter,' or simply 'you know whom I mean'? Probably the latter, as *γάρ* implies some thought not expressed—'I need only mention her name, for . .'

τὸ παιδίον: cf. *Apol.* 34 D *εἰσί μοι καὶ υἱεῖς τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία*, and infra 116 B: *τὸ παιδίον* is probably the youngest son Menexenus, the eldest being Lamprocles and the second Sophroniscus (Diog. Laert.).

27. **ἀνευφήμησε**: = ἀνῴμωξε, a meaning which the word obviously has in Soph. *Phil.* 783 ἄπας δ' ἀνευφήμησεν οἰμωγῇ λέως. Jebb, in his note on this line, suggests that 'the notion is that of a cry which expresses religious awe,' εὐφήμει being a word in use at religious rites: the same use is found also in Eur. *Or.* 1335 ἀνευφημεῖ δόμος.

32. **ἀπαγέτω**: according to tradition Xanthippe was something of a shrew—cf. the amusing anecdote told in Xen. *Sympos.* ii. 10, where Socrates says: 'I keep Xanthippe as athletes keep a bad-tempered horse: νομίζουσιν ἢν τοὺς θυμοειδεῖς ἵππους δύνωνται κατέχειν ῥᾳδίως τοῖς γε ἄλλοις ἵπποις χρήσεσθαι.' Still ἀπαγέτω is not to be taken as said in any impatient or unkindly spirit, though it may serve to remind us how different was the Athenian attitude towards women from our own: Socrates preferred to trust his last thoughts to his friends rather than his wife. The wife of an Athenian was in no true sense his 'companion'; for a woman's eloquent protest cf. Eur. *Medea* 230–251.

33. **τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος**: sc. ἀκολούθων, pedisequi, 'personal attendants.'

34. **κοπτομένην**: 'beating her breast'; cf. Latin 'plangere,' and Milton's imitation: 'Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail Or knock the breast' (*Samson Agonistes* 1721).

B 37. **ἄτοπον**: a very favourite word of Plato's; Thomas Magister ἄτοπον· οὐ μόνον τὸ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξον.

40. **τὸ ἅμα μὲν . . ἐὰν δέ τις . .**: most MSS. have τῷ ἅμα μέν, dative of 'manner' or 'cause,' 'by refusing to come together,' or 'by reason of the fact that they refuse'; the Bodleian has τὸ ἅμα μέν, which is perhaps more idiomatic, τό being in loose apposition to the subject of πέφυκε, 'the fact, I mean, that they refuse.' Observe that the μέν clause is subordinate and concessive: it does not contain a separate proposition, but, as so frequently in Greek, the μέν and δέ clauses taken together make one proposition: 'that, whereas (or 'although') the pair refuse to come to a man together, yet, if a man pursue . .' A very striking example of this, and one that repays analysis, is Dem. *de Cor.* § 179 οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, οὐδ' ἔγραψα μέν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ, οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μέν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ τοὺς Θηβαίους . . ; cf. too § 13 of the same speech: οὐ γὰρ δήπου Κτησιφῶντα μὲν δύναται διώκειν δι' ἐμέ, ἐμὲ δ' εἴπερ ἐξελέγξειν ἐνόμιζεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐγράψατο: cf. 84 A.

ἐθέλειν: the lively imagination of the Greeks readily

attributes volition to inanimate objects: cf. 75 A πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν ἴσον: so 74 D βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο . . εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων: ἐθέλειν is again used in 102 D, E; and in 102 E we have ἐκεῖνο δ' οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι.

44. **κορυφῆς**: the commentators almost all pass this over without explanation, except a reference to repetitions of the same idea in later writers; e.g. Julian *Or.* viii. 240 ἔοικεν ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη τῆς αὐτῆς κορυφῆς ἐξῆφθαι: Aul. Gellius *N. A.* vi. 1 'namque itidem sunt . . dolor et voluptas: alterum enim ex altero, sicut Plato ait, verticibus inter se contrariis deligatum est;' so too Menander, of ἀγαθόν and κακόν, δένδρα δύ' ἐκ ῥίζης μιᾶς. Prof. Geddes translates 'united at one end,' but could Plato use κορυφή so, without anything more definite? Again does not the personification in the supposed fable (πολεμοῦντα) suggest something more definite and personal for κορυφή? What of 'verticibus inter se contrariis,' Aulus Gellius' translation? This seems to suggest 'a head with two faces.'

[Mr. Archer-Hind confirms this interpretation in a letter which he was kind enough to write me on the subject. He says: 'I should conceive of ἡδύ and λυπηρόν as represented in the form of two human figures with a common head and faces set Janus-wise, something like the double people of the *Symposium*, save that the latter were united all down the trunk. As to the word κορυφή, possibly Plato began with the vaguer sense "top," and, as the personification was developed, arrived at head in συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς: not but that Plato uses κορυφή for "head" without more ado, e.g. in *Timaeus* 67 A ὅσον ἡμῶν μεταξὺ κορυφῆς τοῦ τε ὀμφαλοῦ κεῖται; 91 E τά τ' ἐμπρόσθια κῶλα καὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς εἰς γῆν ἑλκόμενα ὑπὸ ξυγγενείας ἤρεισαν προμήκεις τε καὶ παντοίας ἔσχον τὰς κορυφάς.']

Prof. Geddes very justly observes: 'the first words of Socrates, though seemingly casual, are, in a manner, the key-note to the whole. By a subtle and beautiful instinct both in regard to dramatic propriety and poetic suggestiveness, Plato introduces the great Thinker as just undergoing release from his chain, whereby more is suggested than meets the ear. "How closely knit are things that seem most asunder—pain and pleasure! How near is pain to pleasure, and pleasure oftentimes to pain! In the midst of pleasure we are in pain: in the midst of pain straight comes pleasure! May it not be—the heart whispers to itself—that in the midst of death's pain we may be not far from a new life's pleasure, that in the unbinding of the prison cord I may see the unbinding of my earthly chain, and I can flee like a bird away?" Cf. *Timaeus* 81 E regarding death: ἡ ψυχὴ λυθεῖσα κατὰ φύσιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς

ἐξέπτατο· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' ᾗ πέφυκε γιγνόμενον ἡδύ.'

C 45. **Αἴσωπος**: notice the subtle art with which Plato leads up to his subject with conversational ease. The mention of Aesopus suggests Euenus' question: the message to Euenus leads to Socrates' thesis that the 'true philosopher welcomes death,' and from this springs the whole dialogue.

50. **ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν**: *οὖν* is to be taken closely with *ὥσπερ*, 'just as in fact'; cf. *Apol.* 21 D *ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι*: Aesch. *Ag.* 1171 *τὸ μὴ πόλιν μέν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχει, παθεῖν*: *Cho.* 888 *δόλοις ὀλούμεθ', ὥσπερ οὖν ἐκτείναμεν.* Observe that *αὐτῷ μοι* goes not with *ἔοικεν*, but with *ἥκειν*, 'just as, in fact, in my own case.' *φαίνεται* is redundant, due to the intervening clause *ἐπειδὴ . . τὸ ἀλγεινόν.*

CHAPTER IV

60 D–61 C, *cc.* iv. v. *Kebes:* This reminds me that Euenos and others desire to know what led you to compose verses during your confinement in prison? *Socrates:* It was not with any thought of rivalling Euenos as a poet, but because I have been frequently warned in a dream to practise 'music.' This I always understood as an encouragement to persevere with philosophy; but in case music in the popular sense is meant, I thought it well to be on the safe side. So I took the fables of Aesop, because I knew them best, and turned them into verse. Tell this to Euenos and bid him farewell and follow me as soon as he can.

2. **εὖ γ' ἐποίησας**, 'I thank you for reminding me': a common idiom; cf. Eur. *Med.* 472 *εὖ δ' ἐποίησας μολών.*

D 4. **ἐντείνας**: a comparison of the various metaphorical uses of this word suggests that the metaphor is not specially that of 'stringing an instrument'—though one passage, *Prot.* 326 B *εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες ποιήματα*, might seem to point that way—but rather 'to put in a fixed position': cf. *Meno* 87 A *εἰς κύκλον ἐντείνειν τρίγωνον*: *Phil.* 38 E *τὰ πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φώνην*, 'to put thoughts into words'; Plut. *Solon* *τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχείρησεν ἐντείνας εἰς ἔπος ἐξενεγκεῖν* used, as in our passage, of giving words their 'fixed place' in a metrical system, 'to put into verse.' The same idea underlies all these examples, including *Prot.* 326 B supra.

τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον: *προοίμιον* is the prelude to a long poem, or frequently the prelude to a religious celebra-

tion, and so 'a hymn,' as here: cf. the metaphorical use of *προοιμιάζομαι*, 'to say by way of preface' (praefari). The opening line of Socrates' *προοίμιον* is preserved by Diog. Laert.:

Δήλι' Ἄπολλον, χαῖρε, καὶ Ἄρτεμι, παῖδε κλεεινώ.

In 61 B Socrates gives as his reason for dedicating the hymn to Apollo the fact that it was his festival at the time—*οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία.* But nearly all *προοίμια* were to Apollo, as the god of song, and besides this Socrates seems to have felt some special dependence on Apollo: so in the *Apol.* he mentions an oracle of Apollo, pronouncing him the wisest of the Greeks, and he would seem further to have associated what he calls *τὸ δαιμόνιον* (v. note on *ἄνευ θείας μοίρας* supra) with Apollo, god of oracles; for, though he does not say so explicitly, his language in *Apol.* 40 A suggests it: *ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ* (note the word) *ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν*: and again he calls it *τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον.* Who is *ὁ θεός* if not Apollo? I cannot do better than close with an extract from Prof. Geddes' note on this passage—'the allusions in various parts of the dialogue to the relation of Socrates to Apollo his liege lord (*δεσπότης* 85 A) are both frequent and beautiful, such as the reference in 61 A to philosophy as *μεγίστη μουσική*, that in 85 B to himself as a servant of Apollo—singing his last strain like the dying swan, the bird of Apollo—and also the last word (118 A) regarding the offering to the son of Apollo. All these links of connection with Apollo are worthy of observation, as pointing to an instinctive feeling in the minds of the audience silently associating the death of Socrates with the setting of the God of Day, as if that sunset was to bring with it a double darkness'—would it be fanciful to add 'as if the death of Socrates was to be followed by a new life, as sunset is followed by sunrise'?

6. **Εὔηνος**: of Paros, sophist and poet: we are told in *Apol.* 20 B that he taught *ἀρετὴ ἀνθρωπίνη καὶ πολιτική* at the modest fee of five minae, and a similarly disparaging allusion to him occurs in the *Phaedrus*: we can hardly fail to see irony in 60 D *οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι βουλόμενος ἐποίησα ταῦτα· ᾔδειν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη.*

8. **ποιήσας**: in the technical sense of 'writing poetry.'

16. **ἀφοσιούμενος**: this is the original meaning of this E
interesting word, 'to perform a religious duty,' 'to clear one's conscience': cf. Hdt. i. 199 *ἀποσιοῦσθαι τῇ θεῷ*, 'to make expiation': *ἀποσιοῦσθαι λόγιον*, Hdt. iv. 203, 'to obey an oracle.' From this is derived, by a natural process, the subsequent

meaning of 'doing a thing perfunctorily': Isaeus 67. 20 *οὐδ' ἀφοσιούμενος ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τ' ἄριστα παρασκευαζόμενος.*

εἰ πολλάκις: 'if perchance,' a common phrase in Plato: so too *μὴ πολλάκις*: the idea of 'probability' or 'possibility' suggested by *πολλάκις* seems to come from its original meaning of 'frequently,' through the natural step 'as often happens,' and so 'as may well be the case.' A few lines below we have *εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις*, where the *ἄρα* seems not so much to be part of the formula, but to point back to the previous *εἰ πολλάκις*, 'if, after all, by any possibility': cf. the Latin 'si forte,' 'si qua forte.' Note that *εἰ . . . ἐπιτάττοι* is virtual O.O. for *εἰ . . . ἐπιτάττει*, and observe how the force of *εἰ* here seems to hover between 'if' (conditional), and 'whether' (interrogative), i.e. 'speculating as to whether . . .'

61 A 23. **παρακελεύεσθαι**: observe the force of the different compounds: *παρακ.* 'to exhort to do,' *ἐπικ.* 'to encourage in doing': Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 3. 27 *τοῖς τὸ δέον ποιοῦσιν ἐπικελεύειν.* *διακελ.* has a distributive sense, 'to encourage each his favourite': cf. Hdt. ix. 5 *διακελευσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναικί.* *τοῖς θέουσι διακ.* was a proverb, though perhaps hardly so used here: cf. Cic. *ad Fam.* xv. 15. 3 'currentem, ut aiunt, incitare,' 'to spur a willing horse.'

27. **ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς**: the best commentary on this is the beautiful passage in Plat. *Laches* 188 C *ὅταν . . . ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περί τινος σοφίας, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει, χαίρω ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἁρμόττοντά ἐστι· καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος, οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα.* According to Strabo, the Pythagoreans called philosophy *μουσική*. In interpreting this phrase, as well as *δημώδης μουσική*, we must bear in mind that *μουσική* is not merely what we call music, but embraces 'artistic and literary culture,' and so poetry. In Greek education *μουσική* is contrasted with *γυμναστική*, the 'training of the mind' with the 'training of the body,' so that all that is not *γυμναστική* is *μουσική*, 'mental training': cf. Plato *Rep.* 376 E *τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὑρημένης; ἔστι δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.*

B 39. **μύθους**: *μῦθος* is 'fiction' or 'fable,' *λόγος* 'narrative of fact': cf. *Gorg.* 523 A *ἄκουε δή, φασι, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν.* Plutarch tells us that Pindar was

criticized by Corinna ὡς ἄμουσον ὄντα καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα μύθους, ὃ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἔργον εἶναι συμβέβηκε: and further on ὁ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδὴς ἐοικὼς ἀληθινῷ. Ar. *Poetica* 1451 b 4 distinguishes 'history' from 'poetry,' τούτῳ διαφέρει τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο.

CHAPTER V

61 C–62 C, *cc.* v. vi. *Simmias:* Euenos is not likely to take such advice as that. *Socrates:* Yes he is, if he is a real philosopher; not that he ought to take his own life. *Kebes:* This seems inconsistent; you first say that the philosopher will be glad to die, and then that he may not kill himself: why may he not? *Socrates:* I only know what I have been told. According to one account we are in custody here and may not make our escape. This is a hard saying; but there is a more obvious reason, that we are the property of the gods, who are as justly indignant if we destroy ourselves, as you would be should one of your slaves do so.

2. **ἐρρῶσθαι**: say to him ἐρρῶσο: cf. χαίρειν λέγε.

ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα: surely Socrates is not here, as Heindorf (omitting ὡς τάχιστα) suggests, speaking of the philosophic life as θανάτου μελετή: this would be a quite unplatonic anticipation of what is to follow. The words are not even a διλογία (Stallb.), but bear just their natural sense and no more, 'bid him follow me as quickly as possible.'

4. **οἷον παρακελεύει**: nearly all the editors print this as a C question: οἷον is exclamatory (cf. 117 D οἷον ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι, where the same editors inconsistently print without a question mark).

11. **τούτου τοῦ πράγματος**: sc. τῆς φιλοσοφίας, to be understood from φιλόσοφος.

12. **οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι**: Plato is not seriously concerned with this incidental and superficial discussion of suicide: he gives his reasoning as second-hand (61 D ἐξ ἀκοῆς λέγω, and here οὔ φασι), and elsewhere expresses a different conclusion: e.g. *Laws* 873 C τί χρὴ πάσχειν . . ὃς ἂν ἑαυτὸν κτείνῃ . . μήτε πόλεως ταξάσης δίκῃ μήτε περιωδύνῳ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθεὶς μηδὲ αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχών;

14. **οὕτως ἤδη**: οὕτως here resumes the participle καθεζόμενος, 'and in that attitude'; cf. 83 B ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ D οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν: 86 E ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν

αὐτοῖς, ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσᾴδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου.

20. **Φιλολάῳ**: a distinguished Pythagorean of Croton or Tarentum: practically nothing certain is known of him, and the extant fragments attributed to him are of very doubtful authenticity. Claudianus Mamertus speaks of him as 'oppido obscure dissertans,' and perhaps *οὐδέν γε σαφῶς* points to this obscurity of manner, which was characteristic of the Pythagoreans as a sect.

23. **φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν**: an alternative form of *οὐ φθονῶ λέγειν*, in the sense of 'I do not grudge the telling,' i.e. 'I shall be more than pleased to tell you.' *φθόνος*, besides its original meaning of 'envy,' has the derived sense of 'grudging churlishness.'

E 25. **ἐκεῖσε**: a common euphemism for 'the other world': cf. 63 E *εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθά*: 117 C *τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε.*

μυθολογεῖν: we have in 70 B, and again in *Apol.* 39 E *διαμυθολογεῖν* used almost as the equivalent of *διαλέγεσθαι*, with the connotation of 'serious conversation.' Is the *δια-* omitted here because of the previous *διασκοπεῖν*, or has the word here a special reference to the 'telling of a myth'? If so, the two words accurately describe the *Phaedo*: when reason and dialectic have done all they can, imagination calls in the aid of a myth.

28. **μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν**: cf. *Olymp.* ix. 20 *νόμος γὰρ ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ μηδένα φονεύειν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ*: cf. 89 C, 116 E.

CHAPTER VI

62 A 8. **ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται**: this sentence has been more variously interpreted than any other in the *Phaedo.* The construction is complicated by the repetition of the phrase *θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φανεῖται*: this repetition has no bearing on the meaning of the sentence, it is merely a conversational idiom to resume the main thread of the sentence—'it may, I say, seem strange,' cf. above 60 C *ἔοικεν . . φαίνεται.* Without this confusing phrase the sentence would run *ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν*: with the sentence in this form, *ὅσιον* is of course parallel to *βέλτιον*, predicate to *οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει.*

We must first of all fix the meaning of *τοῦτο*: this, as Stallbaum saw, is the principle *μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι*, the question 'is suicide ever justifiable'? This is obviously the point under consideration, and to give any other meaning to *τοῦτο* seems to me impossible, in spite of the authority of distinguished scholars who have suggested various interpretations of *τοῦτο*. What then is *ἁπλοῦν*? It is interpreted for us by Plato's own words—*οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς . .*: it means 'categorical,' 'absolute,' 'not admitting of conditions or exceptions': 'it may seem strange to you that this rule (viz. the rule forbidding suicide) unlike all others is absolute.'

The rest of the sentence is clear, once we realize that the clause ends not at *ζῆν*, but at *εὖ ποιεῖν*: '*ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν*' is quite subordinate logically, is indeed a mere preliminary to the next clause *οἷς δὲ βέλτιον . . εὖ ποιεῖν*, where *δέ* = Lat. autem in such a sentence as 'mirabile est si pax aut bellum sit eligenda, pax autem non sine dedecore sit accipienda': what it really means is this—'you may think it strange that, in cases where death is preferable to life (granting that there are such cases), a man may not do himself a good turn . .' *ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα* refers to the phrase *ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς*: i.e. 'as a rule, circumstances alter cases: is this the only exception (*μόνον τῶν ἄλλων*)?'

The whole sentence, then, should be translated—'perhaps you will be surprised if this rule unlike all others is an absolute one—if the same thing does not happen to man in this as in all other cases: that to some men, under certain circumstances (*ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς*), death is better than life, and where death is better, you may, I say, think it strange if men may not do themselves a good turn.'

This interpretation agrees in the main with that of Mr. Archer-Hind, who, however, takes *ἁπλοῦν* differently, and makes *οὐδέποτε . . ζῆν* independent of the succeeding *οἷς δὲ βέλτιον . .*

16. **ἴττω Ζεύς**: Kebes is carried away into using his native Boeotian (for Attic *ἴστω*): in Ar. *Ach.* 911 the Boeotian uses the complete Boeotian form *ἴττω Δεύς* = 'Heaven knows' (lit. let Zeus know).

20. **ἐν ἀπορρήτοις**: 'in the mysteries,' a reference most B probably to the Orphic mysteries, a system half mystical and religious, half philosophic, which taught certain doctrines as to the origin of the world and of man, and inculcated the necessity of a pure life to win happiness after death. The Orphic religion centred round the god Dionysus, and attributed its creed to the mythical poet Orpheus. This system had a great

influence on the serious thought of the Greek world in the sixth century B.C., and from it the Pythagoreans seem to have derived some of their tenets.

21. **φρουρᾷ**: this was an Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine, that the body is the soul's prison: cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 400 B *σῆμά τινές φασι τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι . . δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσι· τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα.* Cicero, in the *Cato Major*, seems to suggest a less probable interpretation: 'vetatque Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere,' according to which *ἐν φρουρᾷ τινι* would mean 'on a sort of sentinel duty.' Note the effect of *τινι* in softening the metaphor—'velut in carcere quodam.' Cf. Virg. *Aen.* vi. 730-734—

> igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo
> seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
> terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra.
> hinc metuunt, cupiuntque; dolent, gaudentque; neque auras
> dispiciunt clausae tenebris et carcere caeco.

27. **κτημάτων**: this seems to suggest, like *ἀποδιδράσκειν* above, a slightly different idea from *φρουρᾷ*—that of a slave: for the word *κτῆμα*, 'chattel,' applied to a slave cf. Eur. *Med.* 49 *πάλαιον οἴκων κτῆμα δεσποίνης ἐμῆς.* In Plato's *Laws* 803 C man is called a *παίγνιον* of the gods.

C 30. **μὴ σημήναντός σου**: *μή* because it is conditional—*εἰ μὴ σὺ σημαίνοις.*

34. **πρὶν . . ἐπιπέμψῃ**: this use of *πρίν* with subj. without *ἄν*, common in Homer, is found not infrequently in the dramatists, but rarely in prose authors.

CHAPTER VII

62 C–63 E, *cc.* vii. viii. If this be so, replies Kebes, it seems inconsistent to say that the wise man will be glad to die. For only a fool would desire to run away from wise and good masters and guardians, such as the gods are to us. To this Simmias agrees, and upbraids Socrates for being too ready to leave his friends. Well then, answers Socrates, since I am thus arraigned, I must try to defend myself before you more persuasively than I did before the jury. As he is beginning his defence he is interrupted by Kriton: the attendant, says he, has been warning me that talking is apt to hinder the operation of the poison. Never mind, replies Socrates; only let him be prepared to repeat the potion as often as may be required.

3. **ῥᾳδίως**: with *ἂν ἐθέλειν*.

5. **θεόν**: cf. above 62 B *τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι*: Plato, speaking D
popularly, uses *θεός* and *θεοί* indifferently.

11. **αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι**: this of course is not the usual *αὐτὸς . . αὑτοῦ* with the comparative, which signifies 'more than ever' (e.g. *αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἀναιδέστερος ἐγένετο*): *αὑτοῦ* depends on *ἐπιμελήσεσθαι*: the double pronoun, *αὐτὸς . . αὑτοῦ*, is an example of the tendency of Greek to express both sides of a relation.

23. **πραγματείᾳ**: in 64 E *πραγματεία* and in 99 D, 100 B 63 A
πραγματεύομαι are used to denote 'serious occupation,' 'that to which one devotes one's self,' 'business': here it is more abstract, a quality of character: 'insistence,' 'diligence.'

ἐπιβλέψας suggests a fixed, penetrating glance.

27. **τι . . λέγειν**: 'there is something in what he says': cf. the opposite *οὐδὲν λέγειν*, 'to talk nonsense,' 76 D.

30. **αὑτῶν**: there is some slight MS. authority for *αὐτῶν*, which would at first sight seem more natural: but *αὑτῶν* is supported by such passages as 114 E *κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὑτῆς κόσμῳ* and 108 C *φέρεται (ἡ ψυχὴ) εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν*: in the former of these passages *αὑτῆς* would seem to be from *αὐτός*, 'self,' and in the latter *αὐτῇ* is apparently the ordinary 3rd person pronoun: in our present passage it is difficult to decide; perhaps *αὑτῶν* from *αὐτός*, 'self,' is preferable, though in that case *αὐτῶν* certainly seems more natural.

31. **εἰς σὲ τείνειν**: a metaphor from archery—'is aiming at you.'

CHAPTER VIII

5. **ἄλλους**: viz. the *χθόνιοι θεοί*, 'the gods of the lower B
world.' Mr. Cope takes *ἄλλος* in the idiomatic Greek sense of 'contrast with what is to follow,' translating *θεοὺς ἄλλους . . καὶ ἀνθρώπους* 'not only gods . . but also men': but the natural meaning here is confirmed by *Laws* 959 B *παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον*, where no word contrasting with *θεούς* follows.

8. **παρ' ἄνδρας τε**: in the natural course *καὶ θεούς* would C
follow, but the sentence is broken up by the clause *καὶ τοῦτο μέν . .*, so that the *καί* is replaced by *ὅτι μέντοι*.

13. **οὐχ ὁμοίως**: sc. *ὡς ἂν εἰ μὴ ταῦτα ἡγούμην*.

14. **εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι**: 'that the dead have an existence': one thesis which the dialogue proposes to prove.

17. **αὐτὸς ἔχων**: 'keeping to yourself.'

D 24. **τί . . ἄλλο . . ἤ**; very common in Plato for 'simply': it is to be distinguished from *ἄλλο τι ἤ*, which means 'is it not the case that . . ?'

28. **μᾶλλον** seems to have the somewhat rare sense of 'too much,' *μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος*.

29. **τοιοῦτον**: sc. *θερμόν*, from *θερμαίνεσθαι*: cf. 58 D note.

63 E–64 A. After the interruption Socrates re-states the thesis which he has to defend: that the philosopher will meet death with good courage, in the confident hope that he will enjoy the greatest blessings in the other world.

E **εἰ δὲ μή**: observe that if the verb with *εἰ* were expressed, it would be *εἰ δὲ προσφέρει*, not *εἰ δὲ μὴ προσφέρει*: *εἰ δὲ μή* has become a stereotyped phrase for 'otherwise.'

34. **σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδειν**: *τι* modifies *σχεδόν*, the object of *ᾔδειν* being understood—viz. 'that you would say something of the kind.'

37. **ἀποδοῦναι**: notice the force of the compound *ἀπο-δοῦναι*—to give something that is due or expected.

CHAPTER IX

64 A–67 B, *cc.* ix.–xi. The philosopher's whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death; how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher's aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the body is for ever thwarting his endeavours: (1) by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all communion with the body; its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her.

1. **κινδυνεύουσι γάρ**: 'it may be that they . .,' 'I am inclined to think that they . .': often used in Plato as almost =*φαίνονται ἐμοί*. *γάρ* is not to be translated; it is regularly used to introduce a statement which has been promised or anticipated in the previous sentence. **64 A**

2. **τοὺς ἄλλους**: 'the rest of mankind.'

4. **ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι**: a good illustration of the difference between the present and perfect tenses: *ἀποθνήσκειν* is the 'process of dying,' that is to say 'the process of emancipating the soul from the bodily passions': *τεθνάναι* is the state of death, the final condition of total emancipation. Cicero renders the phrase 'tota vita commentatio est mortis.'

18. **γελασείοντα**: *γελασείω* is 'to be inclined to laugh': **B**
another termination with the same meaning is *-άω*: e.g. *θανατάω* (in this same section) 'to desire death': cf. Lat. -urio, as in esurio.

13. **τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν**: notice this use of *μέν* without a succeeding *δέ*, to contrast them with the rest of mankind: he seems to refer to his own countrymen, the Thebans, and to be hinting at the proverbial stupidity of the Boeotians (cf. *Βοιωτία ὗς*), here exemplified by their taking the words *ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἀποθνήσκειν* in their literal, outward sense, being blind to their inner, spiritual signification.

15. **σφᾶς γε**: *σφᾶς* is here the indirect reflexive (sc. *τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν*), its proper use in Attic prose.

29. **ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ**: if *ᾖ* is to be retained, it is perhaps **C**
best to take it as deliberative: 'is it to be,' i.e. 'are we to take it as being anything else than . . ?' Cf. *Rep.* 603 C *μή τι ἄλλο ᾖ παρὰ ταῦτα;* *Phileb.* 15 D *πόθεν τις ἄρξηται;* Would it not, however, be possible to explain this as the interrogative form of the common Platonic idiom, *μή* with subj., meaning 'perhaps it is so': e.g. *ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς ᾖ*, 'but perhaps this is true': put interrogatively this would be *ἆρα μὴ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς ᾖ*, 'may it be that this is true?' I find after making this suggestion that Goodwin (*Moods and Tenses*. p. 393) quotes this passage as an example of the interrog. form of the Platonic idiom.

38. **θεραπείας**: this might almost be translated 'pampering' **D**
or 'indulgence': cf. the Latin 'curare cutem,' which has the same connotation of 'excessive attention paid to the body,' 'indulgence.'

40. **διαφερόντων**: 'superior,' 'conspicuously beautiful': cf.

the adv. *διαφερόντως*, 'especially,' 'more than the average': it suggests 'difference' in the sense of 'superiority.'

42. **καθ' ὅσον μή**: *μή* because the proposition is universal, not applying to a particular instance: cf. below 65 A *ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων*.

E 47. **ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ**: 'with the whole of these three chapters should be compared *Timaeus* 87 C–90 D. It would be an error to suppose that Plato, with all his contempt for the body, was a friend of asceticism. In the passage of the *Timaeus* above mentioned he says that a due balance should be maintained between soul and body: a vigorous soul ought to have a vigorous body for its vehicle. Accordingly the body should be kept in good health and condition for the sake of the soul: for no less emphatically than in the *Phaedo* he declares that all is to be subordinate to the free exercise of intelligence: see especially 90 A foll.' [Archer-Hind.]

65 A 53. **τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις**: here Socrates suggests another popular interpretation of his maxim that the philosopher practises death, viz. that a life without bodily pleasures is indeed 'a living death,' *βίος ἀβίωτος, οὐκ ἄξιον ζῆν*: cf. for the sentiment Soph. *Ant.* 1165—

τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς
ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ' ἐγὼ
ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν.

54. **μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν**: here the relative *ᾧ* is to be supplied in a new case: *μηδέ = καὶ ὃς μή*: cf. 81 B.

55. **ἐγγύς τι τείνειν**: the figure of speech seems to be geographical in its origin: cf. Hdt. *τὸ πρὸς Λιβύην ἄλλο οὖρος τείνει*, 'another mountain range stretches . .'; cf. *Rep.* 548 D *ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουὶ τείνειν*: *Theaet.* 169 A *σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν*: 'verges close on death.'

56. **αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσι**: 'which are experienced (by the soul) through the means of the body': 'which depend upon the body.'

CHAPTER X

1. **φρονήσεως**: we have Plato's own definition of *φρόνησις* in 79 C: *ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γένηταί καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται*; cf.

too 66 D and 70 D. It is attained by the use of *αὐτὴ ἡ διάνοια*, 65 E.

3. **συμπαραλαμβάνῃ**: both prepositions have somewhat the same effect on the verb: *συμ-* 'along with,' 'as an ally,' *παρα-* of 'outside assistance.'

5. **ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοή**: for the uncertainty of the 'impressions B of sense' in the Platonic philosophy cf. Introd. B.

6. **οἱ ποιηταί**: Olymp. p. 23 *ποιητὰς λέγει Παρμενίδην Ἐμπεδοκλέα Ἐπίχαρμον*; cf. Parmenides—

> *μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω*
> *νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν*
> *καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον*
> *ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.*

Empedocles—

> *ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἄθρει παμπαλάμῃ πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,*
> *μήτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκουήν,*
> *μήτ' ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον, ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,*
> *μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅπῃ πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι·*
> *γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον.*

Epicharmus—

> *νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.*

The same sentiment is found in Heraclitus, the author of the saying *πάντα ῥεῖ*: *κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων* (or *βορβόρου ψυχὰς ἔχοντος*, 'limo animos obducente'): and in Anaxagoras *ὑπὸ ἀφαυρότητος τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οὐ δυνατοί ἐσμεν κρίνειν τἀληθές.*

θρυλοῦσιν: a word used of what is 'often repeated,' 'is in everybody's mouth': cf. *τὸ θρυλούμενον*, the 'common topic' —'quod in ore omnium est.' *ὑμνεῖν* is somewhat similarly used: cf. *ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ὑμνεῖν*, 'to harp on the same string': Lat. 'decantare.'

15. **λογίζεσθαι**, 'the process of reasoning,' 'the exercise of C pure reason': cf. below 65 E *διανοεῖσθαι*: they are the verbs of *λόγος* and *διάνοια*, 'reason': Lat. 'ratiocinari.'

18. **παραλυπῇ**: here, as in *συμπαραλαμβάνῃ* above, *παρα-* suggests 'intrusion of an alien element': 'intrudes to distract it': cf. 66 D *παραπῖπτον*, 65 E *παρατιθέμενος*, and in exactly the same sense *Timaeus* 50 E *τὴν αὑτοῦ παρεμφαῖνον ὄψιν* 'intruding upon the vision.'

19. **μηδέ τις ἡδονή**: *μηδέ*, not *μήτε*, because it is not one of the series; the series is of three, (1) hearing, (2) sight, (3) pain

or pleasure: the two last make a pair, and the pair is the third of the series.

22. **μὴ κοινωνοῦσα**: *μή* because of *ὅταν*.

23. **τοῦ ὄντος**: observe how the position of these words at the end of the sentence gives them emphasis—'that which really exists': *τὸ ὄν* is contrasted with *τὰ φαινόμενα* in the Platonic philosophy, and is virtually here 'the Ideas' (v. Introd. B): it is another way of saying *τῆς ἀληθείας* (65 B).

D 28. **δίκαιον αὐτό**: for the meaning of this phrase cf. Introd. B.

φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία: *μέντοι* has not here its ordinary adversative meaning 'however,' but is used to express an emphatic affirmative: cf. 68 B *οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη; Πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς*, and in 73 D, 74 B, 81 D.

E 35. **τῆς οὐσίας**: *ἁπάντων* depends on this: 'the essence' or 'real nature of all things': *οὐσία* is defined in 78 C *αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία, ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι*, and in 92 D *ἡ οὐσία, ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν*.

ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν: this is the definition of *οὐσία*—'essence,' viz. that which each thing really is. Avoid translating it 'whatever the particular thing may be,' as though it explained *ἁπάντων*. *τυγχάνει* here, as so often, refers to something which is not 'accidental,' but rather 'the essential feature of the situation.' To illustrate this I cannot do better than quote Mr. Verrall's excellent note on Eur. *Medea* 608 *καὶ σοῖς ἀραία γ' οὖσα τυγχάνω δόμοις*. 'In the habitual irony of Attic speech "accidental" frequently means "essential": to say that a thing "happens to be such" may, if pronounced suitably, be merely a way of saying that the quality predicted is the most important which the thing possesses. Hence the common use of *τυγχάνειν ὤν* for "to be in reality" or "in spite of contrary appearances."' *Andr.* 142 is a good example—

δεσποτῶν δ' ἐμῶν φόβῳ
ἀσυχίαν ἄγομεν· τὸ δὲ σὸν
οἴκτῳ φέρουσα τυγχάνω.

i.e. in spite of my enforced silence I really felt compassion. In our own passage this use of *τυγχάνω* appears to be a well-established Attic idiom, its original ironical suggestion being lost.

38. **αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι**: for *αὐτὸ ἕκαστον* v. note on 74 D *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν*: *διανοηθῆναι* is here used in its special sense of 'intellectual apprehension' (cf. note on 65 C): 'to apprehend

intellectually the essence of each object of his investigation' (Archer-Hind).

41. ὅστις . . ἴοι: in general clauses of primary tense, the 'universal' relative usually has ἄν with subjunctive, but wherever the main verb is for any reason optative, the verb of the relative clause is regularly attracted into the optative: cf. the Homeric ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι.

51. **ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν**: '*ἀλήθεια* is objective truth, *φρόνησις* the mental *πάθημα* which apprehends it' (R. D. Archer-Hind). 66 A

52. **ἆρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν**: a slight anacoluthon: the sentence is grammatically complete at *κοινωνῇ*, the end of the *ὅστις* clause: but owing to the length of the relative clause, the original apodosis—*ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειε καθαρώτατα*—is repeated in an altered form—*ἆρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν . . ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;*

54. **ὑπερφυῶς . . ὡς**: observe the attraction of the adverb: it is idiomatic Greek for *ὑπερφυές ἐστιν ὡς*, cf. 99 D: so *θαυμαστῶς ὡς* 92 A, 95 A. Latin has the same idiom 'mire quam,' for 'mirum est quam.'

CHAPTER XI

2. **παρίστασθαι**: 'occur,' 'be suggested': for the active in the sense of 'suggest,' 'put into the mind' cf. Dem. *de Cor.* § 1 *πρῶτον εὔχομαι . . τοῦτο παραστῆσαι τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν.* B

4. **ἄττα**: for *τινα*; *ἄττα = ἅτινα.*

ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις: to understand the point of the metaphor we must realise the exact meaning of *ἀτραπός*: it is derived from *α-* (negative, and *τρέπω*, viz. 'that which has no turning,' and usually signifies a 'short cut' (e.g. over a mountain, as opposed to a high road which follows the windings of the hill-side): cf. Hom. *Od.* xiv. 1 *αὐτὰρ ὁ ἐκ λιμένος προσέβη τρηχεῖαν ἀταρπὸν χῶρον ἀν' ὑλήεντα δι' ἄκριας*: so in Hdt. vii. 215 and Thuc. iv. 36 it is used of the mountain track by which Hydarnes led his band over the heights above Thermopylae, when the attack by the main road, or *ὁδός*, failed. It is used metaphorically in Ar. *Nub.* 76—

νῦν οὖν ὅλην τὴν νύκτα φροντίζων ὁδοῦ
μίαν ηὗρον ἀτραπὸν δαιμονίως ὑπερφυᾶ:

'he has found a track which will take him straight to his goal.' So here, the philosopher's 'goal' is the separation of the soul from the body: his regular *ὁδός* is 'the abstention during life

from bodily pleasures' (which is called 'practising death'): death itself is a 'short cut' which carries him straight to his 'goal.'

5. **ἐκφέρειν** continues the metaphor of *ἀτραπός*—'brings us to our goal'; cf. Soph. *Ai.* 7 *εὖ δέ σ' ἐκφέρει κυνὸς Λακαίνης ὥς τις εὔρινος βάσις*: *Oed. Col.* 1424 *ὁρᾷς τὰ τοῦδ' οὖν ὡς ἐς ὀρθὸν ἐκφέρεις μαντεύμαθ'*: Plato *Crat.* 386 A *ἤδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει.*

7. **μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ**: sc. *μετὰ τοῦ σώματος*: for the use of *τοιοῦτος* cf. above 58 D.

οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα: cf. 105 D *οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται.* *οὐ μή* with the 1st or 3rd person of the subjunctive (usually aorist, but occasionally present), and secondarily with the 1st or 3rd person of fut. indic., is used as a strong negative in fut. time: cf. Goodwin *Moods and Tenses* § 89 (smaller edition). In his larger edition, Appendix II, Goodwin suggests a very probable theory of its origin. He traces it through the Platonic *μή* with subj. (cf. note on 64 C), expressing 'fear that a thing may be so,' e.g. *μὴ φαυλὸν ᾖ* (*Crat.* 425 B) 'I fear it may prove to be bad' or 'possibly it may prove to be bad,' back to the old Homeric *μή* with subj. expressing 'fear and a desire to avert the object of fear': *Il.* xvi. 128 *μὴ δὴ νῆας ἕλωσι* 'may they not seize the ships' (as I fear they may): *Il.* ii. 195 *μή τι χολωσάμενος ῥέξῃ κακὸν υἷας Ἀχαιῶν.* This use appears occasionally in the Tragedians, with sometimes the idea of 'fear,' sometimes of 'probability' predominating: Eur. *Or.* 776 *μὴ λάβωσί σ' ἄσμενοι*: *Herc. Furens* 1399 *ἀλλ' αἷμα μὴ σοῖς ἐξομόρξωμαι πέπλοις.* This form of sentence admits of two forms of negative: (1) *μὴ φαυλὸν ᾖ* may become *μὴ οὐ φαυλὸν ᾖ*, i.e. 'perhaps it is bad' may become 'perhaps it is not bad,' where the *οὐ* negatives what follows *μή*, i.e. *μὴ οὐ-φαυλὸν ᾖ*: (2) *μὴ φαυλὸν ᾖ* may become *οὐ μὴ φαυλὸν ᾖ*, i.e. 'it may possibly be bad' may become 'it cannot possibly be bad.' Thus *οὐ μή* and *μὴ οὐ* in this construction are traced back, as they should be, to the same source: and Goodwin also brings into line with these constructions *οὐ μή* with the 2nd person of aor. subj. or fut. indic. to express 'prohibition.' This is a brief indication of the lines followed by Goodwin's exhaustive treatment of the construction, which deserves study.

10. **ἀσχολίας**: the opposite of *σχολή*: 'distractions': *ἀσχολία* is literally 'want of leisure,' e.g. 66 D *ἀσχολίαν . . φιλοσοφίας* is 'want of leisure for philosophy.'

C 14. **εἰδώλων**: the passions are fleeting and transient, they

have no permanency, no reality to the soul seeking after truth: cf. *Theaet.* 150 E *ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.*

καὶ φλυαρίας: 'nonsense,' 'trifles': cf. *Gorg.* 490 C *περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας.*

15. **τὸ λεγόμενον**: in construction this is in a loose apposition to the clause *οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται.* Observe the force of *ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι* in conjunction with *τὸ λεγόμενον*: it expresses that some common saying or proverb is seen in the light of the foregoing arguments to have a deeper truth and significance than is attached to it in common speech: 77 D *δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς*: *Phaedr.* 256 B *τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν*: so in 80 D *εἰς Ἁιδοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς*, 'to a place we are right in calling Hades.'

17. **καὶ γὰρ πολέμους**: cf. Cic. *de finibus* I. xiii. 44 'Ex cupiditatibus odia discidia discordiae seditiones bella nascuntur.'

22. **θεραπείᾳ**: cf. above 64 D. D

27. **παραπῖπτον**: cf. note on *παραλυπῇ*: 65 C.

43. **ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη**: *ἐστί* is originally to be supplied 67 A
in this phrase—'except in so far as is absolutely necessary': cf. for variants of the same phrase 64 D *καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν*: 83 A *ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι.* The negative is always *μή*, as the relative is generalising.

μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως: 'nor are infected with its nature': for the word applied to a 'disease,' cf. Thuc. ii. 51 *καὶ ὅτι ἕτερος ἀφ' ἑτέρου θεραπείᾳ ἀναπιμπλάμενοι ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθνησκον.*

47. **μετὰ τοιούτων**: sc. *καθαρῶν*; it is best taken as masc. 'in the company of the pure,' cf. 63 B.

51. **μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ**: for the explanation of this idiom cf. B
note on *οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα* 66 C.

CHAPTER XII

67 B–68 B, *c.* xii. So then he will meet death with a good heart who has purified his soul by withdrawing her from contact with the body and accustoming her to dwell apart by herself; for death is the consummation of her release from body. Were it not strange if the wise man shrank from that which all his life long he sought: freedom from his foe the body, and fruition of wisdom his love? Shall a man meet

death gladly in hope of reunion with some earthly love, and for the sake of his divine love shall he fear to die?

C 8. **καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρί**: the point of *καί* is 'equally with myself.'

17. **ἐκλυομένην**: observe the present: 'freeing herself,' 'working out her own deliverance.'

ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος: Cobet reads *ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ* . . For the repetition of the preposition both in the direct and the metaphorical phrase (where the metaphor comes first) cf. 82 E *ὥσπερ διὰ εἰργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα*, 115 B *ὥσπερ κατ' ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν*: *Phaedr.* 255 D *ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθε*: *Rep.* 553 B *πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἕρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει*.

D 21. **μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι**: observe this use of *καί* 'corrigentis' —Lat. 'immo': 'philosophers chiefly, nay philosophers alone.'

E 32. **εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται**: this sentence has two distinct protases, (*a*) *εἰ διαβέβληνται*, (*b*) *εἰ φοβοῖντο*, standing in different relations to the apodosis *οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη*; (*a*) is the supposition on which the whole clause *εἰ φοβοῖντο* . . *πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη* depends, whereas (*b*) *εἰ φοβοῖντο* is the immediate protasis to *πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη*: 'For if they are at variance with the body . . in that case (*τούτου δὴ γιγνομένου*) would it not be very unreasonable if they were to fear and . .?' There is still a third *εἰ* clause, *εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι* . . *ἴοιεν*, but this is merely an explanatory repetition of *εἰ φοβοῖντο*, 'if, that is to say, they were not pleased to go . . ' For a parallel to this last cf. *Apol.* 20 C *οὐ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί*, where the *εἰ* clause explains *οὐδὲν πράττοντος* . . *περιττότερον*, a gen. absol. which does duty as the protasis to *γέγονεν*. For the structure of the whole sentence, with two independent protases, cf. 91 B *ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε*.

68 A 39. **ἀπηλλάχθαι**: depends on *ἐλπίς ἐστιν, ἧρων δὲ φρονήσεως* being parenthetical. The perfect infinitive (as compared with *τυχεῖν*) expresses the final state of being completely emancipated —they trust to be able to say *ἀπηλλάγμεθα*.

40. **ἀνθρωπίνων**, 'mere mortal or human favourites' as contrasted with *φρόνησις*, which is *θεῖα παιδικά*, 'a divine love': so in *Gorg.* 482 A Socrates calls philosophy his *παιδικά*, his

'only love.' The reference in *ἀνθρωπίνων παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν* is to such legends as that of Achilles and Patroclus (Hom. *Il.* xviii. 98 *αὐτίκα τεθναίην, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλον ἑταίρῳ κτεινομένῳ ἐπαμῦναι*), Orpheus and Eurydice, and the like.

44. **φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα**: *ἄρα* gives an ironical touch to the questions: 'we are asked to believe that, whereas . . *ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν* . . *συνέσεσθαι*, a man who is really in love with *φρόνησις* . . will not be glad to die.'

51. **μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι**: the negative *μή* is to be observed; B
as the infin. has been anticipated by *ταῦτα*, of which it is a definition, it is as though Plato had said **τὸ** *μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι* . . *ἐντεύξεσθαι*: the infin. does not depend directly on *δόξει*, but is the infinitive used to express the 'conception' of the verb ('the idea that he will not meet with it elsewhere'), of which the negative is *μή* and not *οὐ*.

CHAPTER XIII

68 B–69 E, *c.* xiii. Therefore the philosopher alone is truly brave and temperate. The courage and temperance of the multitude are spurious: for they endure evils only to avoid greater evils, they forego pleasures only that they may enjoy greater pleasures; thus fear is the source of their courage, indulgence the source of their temperance. But the fount of all real virtue is wisdom: this is the only true currency; virtues that arise from balancing pleasure againt pleasure and pain against pain, apart from wisdom, are worthless and slavish. Virtue is the purification of the soul; the true philosopher is he whose soul is purified and initiated into the holy mysteries of wisdom, and he it is who shall dwell with the gods in the other world. Such is the defence of Socrates.

2. **ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς**: by a not uncommon Greek idiom this relative clause, grammatically defining *ἀνδρός*, takes the place of a noun clause, e.g. *τό* with the infinitive: *ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα* . ., a definition of *ἀνδρός*, takes the place of *τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν*, which is grammatically required as a definition of *τοῦτο*. This idiom is specially common in Thuc., as might be expected in a writer whose style is based on the 'constructio ad sensum': e.g. iv. 18 *σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵτινες τἀγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο*, 'it is characteristic of prudent men to regard any advantage they gain as insecure, as caution suggests,' where *οἵτινες* . . *ἔθεντο* is substituted for *τὸ* . . *θέσθαι*: vi. 14 *τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι ὃς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ*; vii. 69 *νομιμώτατον εἶναι οἳ ἂν* . . *δικαιώσωσιν*. Hdt. i. 146 *ἄνδρα-*

γαθίη δ' αὕτη ἀποδέδεκται . . ὃς ἂν πολλοὺς ἀποδέξῃ παῖδας. It illustrates a common tendency of Greek to follow the logic rather than the form of the sentence; cf. Cic. *pro Clu.* § 109 'proinde quasi non satis signi esse debuerit ab omnibus eum fuisse desertum, qui se ad patronum illum contulisset.'

3. **οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν**: 'is after all no true philosopher': observe this pretty idiom, *ἦν ἄρα*, which is used to indicate that something has just been discovered to be true which has been so all along. Conversely *οὐκ ἄρ ἦν* indicates that something which has been believed to be true is discovered to be untrue: cf. Hom. *Od.* xvi. 418–20—

Ἀντίνο', ὕβριν ἔχων, κακομήχανε, καὶ δέ σέ φασιν
ἐν δήμῳ Ἰθάκης μεθ' ὁμήλικας ἔμμεν ἄριστον
βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισι· σὺ δ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῖος ἔησθα.

The imperfect indicates that what has just been discovered to be the case has been so all along, 'was without our knowing it': *ἄρα*, as usual, expresses an 'inference.'

C 4. **που**: 'presumably.'

8. **τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις**: sc. *τοῖς τῷ σώματι διαβεβλημένοις*, the attitude of mind described in the preceding chapter.

10. **ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι**: 'even using the word in its popular sense.'

12. **ἐπτοῆσθαι**: a poetical word, 'to be fluttered,' 'excited'; Apoll. Rhod. i. 1232 *τῆς δὲ φρένας ἐπτοίησεν Κύπρις.*

D 15. **ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν**: cf. above 59 A (note); 84 A *ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ* (sc. *τῷ λογισμῷ*) *οὖσα.*

23. **τῷ δεδιέναι καὶ δέει**: cf. 78 B *τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ.*

E 30. **τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην**: a sort of transferred epithet—'this foolishly so-called temperance,' i.e. the people who call it *σωφροσύνη* are *εὐήθεις.*

69 A 39. **μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ**: Wagner explains *γάρ* by an ellipse, 'do not approve of this at once, for' . .; but surely this is a very obscure ellipse, and does not even give the right connection of thought. *γάρ* here simply introduces a reason or explanation, and there is no ellipse: 'perhaps the reason of this is that this is not' . . For *μὴ οὐκ ᾖ* cf. note on *οὐ μήποτε κτησώμεθα* 66 B.

πρὸς ἀρετήν: *πρός* here means 'in regard to,' 'in respect of,' and is not the same as in *πρὸς ἡδονάς, πρὸς λύπας*, where it rather signifies, 'in exchange for,' 'in comparison with.'

40. **ἀλλαγή**, 'standard of exchange.'

45. **καὶ τούτου μὲν . . ὠνούμενα**: the participles *ὠνούμενα* B and *πιπρασκόμενα* are equivalent to conditional clauses, just as *χωριζόμενα*, the participle of the *δέ* clause: the predicate is *τῷ ὄντι ᾖ*, 'are in reality what they claim to be'; *καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη . . φρονήσεως* is best taken as explanatory of *πάντα* (or possibly, with very little difference to the meaning, as an expansion of the predicate *τῷ ὄντι ᾖ*). Translate—'and all things, if they are bought and sold for this wisdom and along with it, are in reality what they claim to be, both courage and temperance and justice . ., whether pleasures and fears and the like be added or not.'

For the general metaphor of 'wisdom' as the only true 'standard of value' or currency cf. Eur. *Fr.* 546—

> *οὔ τοι νόμισμα λευκὸς ἄργυρος μόνον*
> *καὶ χρυσός ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ κἀρετὴ βροτοῖς*
> *νόμισμα κεῖται πᾶσιν ᾗ χρῆσθαι χρεών.*

Of course the metaphor is not to be pressed too closely: Plato's own terms will not bear exact analysis. Had he been content with the vague *πρός* (all virtues to be estimated *πρὸς φρόνησιν*, viz. with that as their standard of value), there would have been no difficulty; but he has chosen to use the definite terms of 'buying and selling,' and this involves him in a contradiction in the phrase *τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου*: the purchaser is made to retain the *φρόνησις*, although he pays it as the price for e.g. *ἀνδρεία*. Again we can appreciate the idea of 'selling everything for *φρόνησις*,' in the sense of 'sacrificing everything for it,' but that is not in the least what Plato means by it: we cannot bring that meaning into relation with the other phrase 'buying the virtues for *φρόνησις*.' This is not to accuse Plato of looseness of thought or expression, but to show the mistake of attempting to analyse literally what is only to be taken in its general spirit.

ὠνούμενα: this passive use of the present tense of the deponent *ὠνέομαι* is rare (the perfect passive *ἐώνημαι* is not uncommon). Stallbaum proposes *ἐωνημένα* here, but the present is required to balance *πιπρασκόμενα*, and is supported by Xen. *Equestr.* viii. 2 *ἐωνεῖτο*. Similar passive uses of deponent presents are not infrequent in Plato: *προσχρωμένη*, *ἐπιφθεγγόμενα*, *μιμούμενος*, *βιαζόμενος*.

48. **μετὰ φρονήσεως**: this phrase contains the germ of the Platonic system of ethics, as developed in the Sixth Book of the *Republic* and elsewhere. Plato's theory of morality has

a superficial resemblance to the philosophic doctrine of utilitarianism, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' but it is elevated far above it as an ethical system by being made dependent on his metaphysical system, the theory of the Ideas, culminating in the supreme 'Idea of the Good'—*αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν*, the origin alike of all reality (i.e. truth) and of all good (i.e. virtue). This aspect of the question is embodied in the Socratic aphorism that 'virtue is knowledge': only to the man who has knowledge of the 'supreme good' is the highest kind of virtue possible. This is admirably illustrated by Plato's definition of *ἀνδρεία* in *Rep.* 442 B *καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δή, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζῃ διά τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου* (reason) *παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή.* It is this application of the knowledge attained by the human reason (λόγος) to the practical questions of morality which is more particularly signified by *φρόνησις*.

52. **σκιαγραφία**: no better account of the meaning of this word can be given than the scholiast's note on the word *σκαριφισμός* in Ar. *Frogs* 1493 *σκαριφεύειν γὰρ τὸ τοὺς ζωγράφους ὑποτυπῶσαι* (adumbrare—'to sketch in outline') *πρῶτον τοὺς γραφομένους, καὶ σκαριφίσασθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπισεσυρμένως* (in a careless, slovenly way) *τι ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀκρίβειαν, σκιαγραφεῖν.* The word *σκιαγραφεῖν* seems to have been applied particularly to a kind of scene-painting which was intended to produce its effect at a distance, and not to be closely inspected: a modern 'impressionist' picture conveys something very like what is meant by *σκιαγραφία*. This use is amply illustrated by other passages, e.g. *Theaet.* 208 E *ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι,* *Rep.* 523 B *τὰ πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημένα,* *Crit.* 107 C *σκιαγραφίᾳ δὲ ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπατηλῷ χρώμεθα.* Or again Ar. *Metaph.* iv. 29 (a good parallel to our passage) *τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶ μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μή ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ μέν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὧν ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν.* On a superficial view the popular virtue appears to be identical with the real philosophic virtue, but on closer examination it is seen to be something very far short of it (*οὐ κατὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀκρίβειαν*).

53. **ἀνδραποδώδης**: Professor Geddes has an illuminating note: 'an apt illustration of the force of the word may be drawn from Bion's allegory (Plut. *Mor.* 7 C), whereby pretenders to philosophy were likened to the suitors in the

Odyssey, who, while they professed to aspire to the hand of the queen, became content with the menial company of the slaves, who were but the handmaids of Penelope.'

55. **κάθαρσις . . καθαρμός**: 'the process of purification . . C
the state of being purified.' What this purification is is explained in 67 C.

58. **τὰς τελετάς**: almost certainly refers to the Orphic, not the Eleusinian mysteries; cf. note on *ἐν ἀπορρήτοις* 62 B. The worshippers of Dionysus carried the mystic wand (*θύρσος*) of 'fennel' (*νάρθηξ*): *βάκχοι* are the 'true worshippers' of the god, and the hexameter line *πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι* became proverbial of outward profession as contrasted with the rarer genuine enthusiasm of worship. Clement of Alexandria quotes it as a Gentile parallel to the *πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσι κλητοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί* of the Gospel.

60. **αἰνίττεσθαι**: 'to express a hidden truth in language not to be taken literally,' 'to speak in riddles'; cf. Plat. *Apol.* 21 B *τί ποτε αἰνίττεται ὁ θεός;*

ἀμύητος: for the happiness of the initiated in the after-life cf. the song of the 'Mystae' in Ar. *Frogs* 455—

μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος
καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρόν ἐστιν,
ὅσοι μεμυήμεθ' εὐ-
σεβῆ τε διήγομεν
τρόπον.

67. **ὧν**: must be taken as masc., partitive gen. with *γενέσθαι*, D
'of whose number': in construction *οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον* is to be taken as outside the sentence, strengthening *προὐθυμήθην* = *προὐθυμήθην οὐδὲν ἀπολείπων ἐν τῷ βίῳ.*

70. **ὀρθῶς**: 'recte'—'in a right direction,' whereas above with *οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες* it means rather 're vera'—'in the true sense.'

καί τι ἠνύσαμεν: sc. *ἡμεῖς οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες.*

73. **ὡς εἰκότως**: this is not a definition of *ταῦτα*, but depends rather on an idea contained in *ἀπολογοῦμαι*, 'this is the defence I offer of my contention that it is not without reason': the word *ἀπολογοῦμαι* refers back of course to 63 D and E—*καὶ ἅμα σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται.*

CHAPTER XIV

69 E–70 C, *c.* xiv. All this were very well, replies Kebes, if we were sure that death did no more than release the soul

from her bodily prison. But how do we know that on quitting the body she does not vanish away like a breath? we need some strong assurance that the soul has a conscious and intelligent existence after death. True, says Socrates, and no more fitting subject of discourse could be found for one so near to death as I am.

Thus we distinctly see that the question of the immortality of the soul turns up, not as the main subject of the dialogue, but as arising out of the principal thesis.

70 A 6. [**διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται**]: with these words retained in the sentence, there is a very harsh asyndeton of these verbs and the following subjunctive *οἴχηται*. Schanz brackets *οἴχηται . . ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ*, but there is a strong objection to this on the point of style. Plato would never have followed up his verb *διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται* with two participles *ἀπαλλαττομένη* and *διασκεδασθεῖσα*, standing in quite different relations to the main verb *διαφθείρηται*, and ending the sentence; whereas preceding the main verb they are quite natural. This same argument refutes the suggestion that Plato was led into repeating his main verb *διαφθείρηται* (contrary to grammar) by the long intervening participial clause, because these participles themselves imply that the main verb is still to come. We are driven then to regard *οἴχηται . . καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ* as the main verb, and *διαφθ. καὶ ἀπολλύηται* as a gloss on the phrase *οἴχηται διαπτομένη*. Failing this, I should prefer, with Heindorf, to retain *διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται*, and put a comma after *σώματος*: in that case *καί* would connect, not the participles *ἀπαλλαττομένη* and *ἐκβαίνουσα*, but the two subjunctives *διαφθείρηται* and *οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ*.

8. **εὐθύς**: goes closely with the participle—'in the very moment of leaving': cf. 75 B *γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμεν*: 75 C *ἠπιστάμεθα . . εὐθὺς γενόμενοι*.

10. **οἴχηται διαπτομένη**: for the phrase cf. Hom. *Il.* ii. 71 *ᾤχετ' ἀποπτάμενος*: xxiii. 100 *ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα*.

B 16. **παραμυθίας**: 'reassurance': cf. 83 A *ἡ φιλοσοφία τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται*, 115 D *ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἅμα δ' ἐμαυτόν*.

πίστεως: 'proof': cf. Isocr. 28 B *ταῖς γὰρ πίστεσιν αἷς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγοντες πείθομεν ταῖς αὐταῖς ταύταις βουλευόμενοι χρώμεθα*. Cf. use of Latin 'fides.'

ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ . . καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν: these are two distinct theses: (i.) that the soul

exists, (ii.) that it has faculties and intelligence: the latter is proved (*a*) directly by the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*, (*b*) less directly though more securely by the argument which bases the immortality of the soul on its kinship with the Ideas, chaps. 48–56, which is anticipated in chaps. 25–29.

20. **διαμυθολογῶμεν**: equivalent to *διαλεγώμεθα*: cf. *Apol.* 39 E *οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι*, following *ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην*.

25. **κωμῳδιοποιός**: the comic poet Eupolis is quoted as saying *μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην*, though the reference here is no doubt specially to Aristophanes, who had introduced in the *Clouds* a travesty of Socrates, who is represented as hung in mid-air in a basket, and made to say—ll. 226–231— C

ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον·
. . . . οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε
ἐξεῦρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα,
εἰ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα
λεπτὴν καταμίξας εἰς τὸν ὅμοιον ἀέρα.

Plato deeply resented this attack, as is clear from the *Apology* 19 c (of Aristophanes) *φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα.*

ἀδολεσχῶ: 'to prate,' 'talk garrulously,' from *ἄδην*, *λέσχη*: this word also occurs in Ar. *Clouds* 1463 *ἐμοῦ παρανοήσαντος ἀδολεσχίᾳ.* Geddes remarks 'Aristophanes continued in the same attitude towards Socrates to the end, in the *Birds* (414 B.C.) and *Frogs* (405 B.C.): it would be interesting to know what were the real feelings of Aristophanes during this month of Thargelion, B.C. 399.'

CHAPTER XV

70 c–72 D, *cc.* xv.–xvii. Tradition says that the souls of the dead come back from Hades and live again on earth. That this belief is reasonable we may argue in the following way. All nature shows the generation of opposite from opposite; thus greater arises from less, worse from better, swifter from slower. And between each of such pairs of opposites there are two processes, one in either direction; as between greater and less are increase and decrease, and similar processes between every other pair. Therefore since life and death are such a pair of opposites, we shall expect to find two similar processes between the living and the dead. We see one such process take place before our eyes; the living pass over to the dead: if then

nature's work is not here left incomplete, there must be the other process that we do not see, and the dead pass over to the living. A yet stronger confirmation is this: did all things travel in one direction and were there no return, in the end all living things would die and remain dead, and life would be swallowed up in death. But if it be true that souls return again from the dead, they must be somewhere after their departure from the body; for certainly if they perished utterly, they could return again no more.

We have here one half of the first stage of the argument, which is complemented by the inference from reminiscence that follows. It is true, this argument of *ἀνταπόδοσις* implies the ante-natal existence of the soul, but it is used mainly as evidence of her existence after death. Note also that it proves *ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Ἅιδου*, not *ὡς δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει*. (Archer-Hind.)

1. **εἴτ' ἄρα**: a noteworthy idiom, where what some one else says is put to the test.

3. **παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος**: cf. Hdt. ii. 123 *πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῷον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται, ἐπεὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύνει· τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἳ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω.* He appears in the last sentence to refer to the Orphic and Pythagorean sects, who believed in the immortality and transmigration of souls.

D 10. **μὴ οὖσαι**: i.e. *εἰ μὴ ἦσαν*, 'if they had no existence.'

11. **τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι**: 'of the truth of this proposition,' viz. *ὡς εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ.*

17. **καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν**: from other Platonic discussions of metempsychosis (e.g. *Phaedrus* 249 B) it is clear that Plato attributed immortality to the souls of beasts, and from *Timaeus* 77 A that his principle extended even to vegetable life.

E 20. **ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι**: 'all things that have an opposite': *τοιοῦτόν τι* = *ἐναντίον τι*: cf. above 58 D note.

71 A 32. **τί δέ;** 'or again,' as we should say: cf. below *τί δ' αὖ;*

B 42. **καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω**: 'and these (*αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις*) are the names we give to the processes of growing on the one hand and decaying on the other.'

46. **κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα**: Wagner takes *χρώμεθα* as subj.,

and explains *κἂν εἰ* as = *καὶ εἰ ἄν*, i.e. *καὶ ἐάν*: but this surely neglects the common Platonic use of *κἂν εἰ* for the simple *καὶ εἰ*. The usage of *κἄν* shows three stages: (i.) *κἄν* with optative of the apodosis: here we often have *καί*, properly belonging to *εἰ*, attached to *ἄν*, in the form *κἂν . . εἰ* = *καὶ εἰ . . ἄν*: e.g. *νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ, κἂν ἀσέβειαν εἰ καταγιγνώσκοι, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν* Dem. (= *καὶ εἰ καταγιγνώσκοι . . ποιεῖν ἄν*): (ii.) *κἂν . . εἰ*, used where the verb of the apodosis is no longer one which requires *ἄν*: it has now become a 'formula' = 'even if': this is the common Platonic usage, as in our passage: cf. *κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ*, *Rep.* 473 A: (iii.) in later Greek it is used even without *εἰ* as an emphatic *καί*: cf. Theocr. xxiii. 41 *κἂν νεκρῷ χαρίσαι τὰ σὰ χείλεα*: in its two later stages it is a colloquialism, such as are not infrequent in both Greek and Latin: cf. use of *οἶσθ' ὅ* with an imperative, and in Latin 'ut' with an indicative: e.g. audin ut intonuit laevum?

CHAPTER XVI

2. **ἐγρηγορέναι**: a good instance of the use of the Greek perfect to express a 'state' as contrasted with a 'process,' *ἀνεγείρεσθαι*: similarly *τεθνάναι* is the 'state of death.' C

21. **ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων**: this will be misunderstood unless we bear in mind the precise definition of *τεθνεώς* given in 64 C, as the condition of the soul's existence 'apart from the body.' D

29. **ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις**: observe then that this proof of the 'previous existence of the soul' rests on the principle of the 'uniformity of nature': had Plato rested satisfied with this proof, it would be important to point out a fundamental fallacy which vitiates it—viz. that we have no proof that the 'soul' is subject to a rule which applies to the 'material' world, the rule of 'alternating processes': Plato himself indicates that only one of the processes is clear, the other is an 'assumption' on the principle of the 'uniformity of nature'—*ἥ γ' ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει, τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν . . οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν;* Again in ch. xxiv. when this argument is concluded, the suspicion is again suggested that these 'physical laws of nature' do not apply to the soul, in the form of the 'childish fear' (77 E) lest perchance at the moment of separation from the body the soul is 'caught up and scattered' by the wind. E

32. **ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις**: observe that Plato has not yet proved, as this seems to suggest, that the living are born from 'the dead,' i.e. from souls which have already 'lived 72 A

and died,' but only from souls which were previously in the state called τεθνηκός, 'existence apart from the body': in substituting οἱ τεθνεῶτες for τὸ τεθνηκός Plato is perhaps unconsciously stealing a step in the argument which is not proved till the next chapter: it is not till chapter xvii. that he proves that this soul, τὸ τεθνηκός, can only be soul which has once 'lived.'

36. **καὶ ταύτῃ**: with ὁμολογεῖται, 'by this line of reasoning too.'

CHAPTER XVII

The argument of this chapter is closely connected with the preceding: its conclusion is the complement of what he has already proved. It rests, however, on a quite different scientific principle, that of the 'conservation of energy': the argument is briefly this—if 'living' arises from 'dead,' then if 'living' is not to come to an end, the stock of 'dead' must constantly be replenished, and this can only be if the 'living' constantly pass into the state of 'dead,' viz. 'existence of the soul apart from the body.' It is the principle 'ex nihilo nihil fit,' a principle which had been laid down as regards 'matter' by the early Greek philosophers: cf. Anaxagoras γιγνώσκειν χρὴ ὅτι πάντα (i.e. the sum total of things) οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλέω· οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλέω εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα αἰεί: Arist. *Metaph.* τὸ γὰρ μηθὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι πᾶν δ' ἐξ ὄντος, σχεδὸν πάντων ἐστὶ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως. But can the soul be brought under περὶ φύσεως? Is the argument from 'material' to 'spiritual' more than an analogy? Various alternatives to Plato's conclusion might obviously be suggested: e.g. that the supply of ψυχή is infinite and inexhaustible, or that each soul is created by a creator; or again that, because it is not inexhaustible, life will some day cease to be. Plato's whole argument implies that 'soul' is in some measure 'material,' and not a mere vital principle.



3. **τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα**: if the alternating processes did not correspond: 'if each alternating process had not its corresponding reverse process.'

6. **καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν**: the metaphor is from the δίαυλος δρόμος in the race-course: cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 344 κάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν. The idea can be best illustrated by a

simple mathematical figure: A = τὸ τεθνηκός, B = τὸ ζῶν: soul proceeds from A to B, then back along the corresponding semicircle to A, to replenish the stock of τεθνηκός: were the process εὐθεῖα, a straight line from A to B with no turning back, the stock of A, not being infinite and not being replenished from B, would in the end be exhausted.

14. **πάντ᾽ ἂν λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδ. ἀποδείξειεν**: lit. 'everything C
would show Endymion to be mere child's play,' i.e. the universal state of sleep would make the story of Endymion seem nothing in comparison. Endymion was a beautiful youth, who, as he slept on Mount Latmos, in Caria, melted the heart of the goddess of the moon to love: she cast over him the spell of perpetual sleep (cf. Keats' *Endymion*).

15. **οὐδαμοῦ**: Wohlrab strangely explains this as 'genitive of price'! comparing *καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ* 70 A: but there as here it is the adverb of place—'nowhere': cf. the English colloquialism 'he was nowhere,' i.e. 'he was not prominent': this is admirably illustrated by Dem. *de Cor.* § 310 *ἐν οἷς οὐδαμοῦ σὺ φανήσει γεγονώς, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἕκτος, οὐχ ὁποστοσοῦν.*

19. **ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα**: the state of 'Chaos,' which Anaxagoras attributed to the universe before *νοῦς* came and set all things in order: cf. the words of Diogenes Laert. about Anaxagoras—*πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα ὁ νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε.*

25. **ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων**: i.e. *ἐκ τῶν μὴ τεθνεώτων.* D

26. **μὴ οὐ**: the double negative is used because *τίς μηχανή*, being a rhetorical question, is logically equivalent to *οὐδεμία μηχανή.*

27. **καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι**: lit. 'being exhausted into death,' i.e. 'the store of existence would be exhausted and end in universal death': observe the use of *εἰς* to express 'the issue or end,' *τελευτᾶν ἐς*: *καταξαίνειν ἐς φοινικίδα*, 'to cut into red rags,' Ar. *Ach.* 320: so in Latin 'in' with accusative: 'denique in familiae luctum atque in privignarum funus nupsit,' Cic. *pro Clu.* § 188.

35. **ψυχὰς εἶναι**: these words are followed in the MSS. by *καὶ ταῖς μέν γ᾽ ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον*, a stupid interpolation, foreign to the argument, due to a memory echo of 63 C.

CHAPTER XVIII

72 E–76 D, *cc.* xviii.–xxi. Kebes observes that another line of argument tends to show that our souls are immortal, the

theory that learning is reminiscence. If questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing that the knowledge sought exists in the mind of the respondent; as we see in the case of geometrical truths. For the satisfaction of Simmias Socrates adds the following demonstration. Reminiscence we define as recalling to mind something we formerly knew but had forgotten. For instance, a lover on seeing a lyre thinks of his beloved who used the lyre; similarly a picture of a lyre or a horse may remind us of a man, a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes, or finally a picture of Simmias may remind us of Simmias himself: so that we see reminiscence may be effected either directly or indirectly. Now if it is effected directly, that is, if the object we perceive is similar to that which it calls to our minds, we cannot fail to notice how far the resemblance is exact. For example, we affirm that there is an Idea of equality, which is called to our minds by our perception of sensibles which are equal. That this Idea is something distinct from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the Idea of equality no difference of opinion can exist. Now we are to observe that all sensible equals appear to us as failing short of the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, (2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the Idea must have been acquired before our birth (75 C). Now this of course applies to all Ideas as well as to that of equality. Since then we have obtained this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on this ground: if a man knows a thing he can give an account of it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the Ideas: it follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose it, and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our souls certainly did not acquire this knowledge during their human life they must have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it.

The argument from *ἀνάμνησις* proves the existence of the soul before birth, thus supplementing *ἀνταπόδοσις* which is chiefly used to show her existence after death. Moreover *ἀνάμνησις* shows, what *ἀνταπόδοσις* did not, that the soul *δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει* apart from the body.

The Platonic doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*, the next argument

in favour of immortality, is one of the most interesting of all his theories: it is closely bound up with his theory of Ideas (for which cf. Introd. B). The germ of the doctrine is contained in the words in 73 A *ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα ᾗ ἔχει*: learning and teaching are, according to this doctrine, merely a process of drawing out of the mind, and making conscious, knowledge which was gained in a previous existence of intercourse with the Ideas. The most concise statements of the theory are contained in the *Meno*, which deals mainly with it: cf. *Meno* 81 C *ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν, ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τἆλλα πάντα ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν*: and again *Phaedrus* 249 C *τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως.*

3. **ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν**: Plato attributes all his E
doctrines to Socrates: this, like many others, was not fully developed by the historic Socrates; cf. Introd. B.

18. **ἐπεί τοι**: the MSS. have *ἔπειτα*, which is retained by 73 A
some editors, and made to introduce a specially striking instance of the general truth expressed in the earlier clause: cf. Latin 'cum . . tum' (or rather 'cum . . tum maxime'): but it is very doubtful whether *ἔπειτα* will bear this meaning, and Heindorf's emendation *ἐπεί τοι* is probably right.

19. **τὰ διαγράμματα**: 'mathematical diagrams': transl. by B
Cic. *Tusc.* i. 17. 38 'descriptiones.'

20. **κατηγορεῖ**: sc. *ὁ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα*: for this use of *κατηγορεῖν* in the sense of 'proclaim,' 'assert,' 'prove' cf. Hdt. iv. 189 *καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ οὔνομα κατηγορέει ὅτι ἐκ Λιβύης ἥκει ἡ στολὴ τῶν Παλλαδίων.*

26. **παθεῖν**: incomparably better than the MSS. *μαθεῖν*, which would mean 'to learn the meaning of': *παθεῖν* is to 'go through the experience of which we speak.' For the asyndeton of *ἀναμνησθῆναι* after *τοῦτο* cf. 74 A *τάδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν.*

38. **ἐννοήσῃ**: we have no precise English equivalent: C
'think of,' 'have suggested to one,' 'get an idea of': Lat. 'venit mihi in mentem.' This is the earliest suggestion of what

is so familiar in Locke's system of philosophy, the 'association of ideas.'

39. **οὐ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη**: *μή* because the clause is 'general.'

D 46. **ἔγνωσαν**: the so-called 'gnomic' aorist, where a universal truth is stated as a matter of past experience: the origin of this aorist can be best seen from such examples as Thuc. ii. 89 *πολλὰ στρατόπεδα ἤδη ἔπεσεν ὑπ' ἐλασσόνων*: Plato *Critias* 108 *ἀθυμοῦντες ἄνδρες οὔπω τρόπαιον ἔστησαν*. This is supported by the use of the plup. in the subordinate clause below 73 E *ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο*, which indicates a reference to cases in the past.

E 59. **οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα**: 'the order in which these illustrations are arranged seems at first sight strange. For instead of working up from the simpler and more direct cases of association to the more complex, we have, as it were, a descending scale: it is surely more remarkable that the picture of a lyre should remind us of some particular human being than that a picture of Simmias should remind us of the living Simmias. But the explanation is simple, if we remember how Plato intends to apply his analogy. The particulars, by which we are reminded of the Ideas, stand in much the same relation to the Ideas as the painted Simmias to the real Simmias: hence by this arrangement of his examples Plato emphasises exactly the right form of the analogy. This is one of ten thousand proofs of the astonishing carefulness of Plato's writing' (R. D. Archer-Hind).

CHAPTER XIX

74 A 2. **εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων**: as for instance the recollection of Simmias from the picture of Simmias, and in this chapter the recollection of the Idea from the particular.

6. **τι ἐλλείπει**: *τι* is accus. of extent, *ἐλλείπει* being intransitive.

11. **παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα**: 'above and beyond all these.'

B 15. **λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην**: *ἐπιστήμη* is not used in its full Platonic sense of 'scientific knowledge,' 'knowledge based on the Ideas,' for to say that we get this *ἐπιστήμη* from the particular objects of sense would contradict the whole of Platonic teaching on the subject: he uses it here somewhat loosely for *ἔννοια*, our idea or 'conception' of *αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν*: cf. 74 C *τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας*.

20. **τῷ μὲν ἴσα . . τῷ δ' οὔ**: most editors read *τότε μὲν . . τότε δέ*, making it refer to the judgment of the same individual on different occasions, and supporting this view by *ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη* below, where the judgment of one person only is clearly in question: this reading *τότε μὲν . . τότε δέ*, though linguistically awkward after *ἐνίοτε*, is of course not logically inconsistent with it, as *ἐνίοτε* means 'in some cases,' and answers to *ἔστιν ὅτε* in *ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη;* But *τῷ μὲν . . τῷ δέ* has slightly superior MSS. authority, and, while avoiding the awkwardness referred to, is logically quite adequate: the variety of men's opinions as to the equality of 'equal objects' is sufficient to point the contrast between *τὰ ἴσα* and *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*.

22. **αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα**: this remarkable plural of *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον* has an exact parallel in *Parmen.* 129 B *εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἄν, οἶμαι, ἦν*, a passage which indicates the point of using the plural *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα*. The idea of comparison involves two terms: A must be compared with B: to ask whether A is equal, without any B to compare it with, is nonsense: hence the plural. This is better than the explanation of Olympiodorus, who makes *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* mean 'the Idea of equality in the minds of various individuals': is not this inconsistent with *σοί ἐφάνη*?

25. **ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα**: 'these equal particulars.' C

28. **ὅμως αὐτοῦ**: sc. *ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου*.

30. **οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος . . Πάνυ μὲν οὖν**: it seems quite necessary to bracket this passage as an interpolation. 'In the present context the repeated definition of *ἀνάμνησις* is surely pointless: and worse than pointless is the reintroduction of the *ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον*: for the reminiscence of the Idea by means of the particulars is necessarily *ἀφ' ὁμοίων*. . . The whole force of the argument comes from the fact that this kind of reminiscence is *ἀφ' ὁμοίων*, for in this case alone are we conscious of a defect in the resemblance (74 A): and our consciousness of this defect is our sole warrant for inferring that we must have known the Ideas before we perceived the particulars (74 E)' (R. D. Archer-Hind).

38. **αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν**: 'that which the thing itself really is,' one D of the most frequent Platonic phrases: it signifies the thing in question in its essential nature, separated from all those extraneous conditions involved in its material existence. It is the watchword of the Platonic theory of Ideas—the *λόγος*, definition, concept, essence, idea of a thing. Cf. Introd. B.

ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι: this is the reading

which has by far the strongest MSS. authority, and may be translated 'or does it fall short of absolute equality in respect of being similar to it?' The editors have rung the changes on *ἐκείνου τοῦ*, *ἐκείνῳ τῷ* (Madvig 'does there lack anything to that quality of being like'?—very questionable Greek!), *ἐκείνου τῷ μή*: the last gives the best sense of all, if we are prepared to insert *μή*: 'or does it fall short of that absolute equality, by not being similar to it?' I feel convinced that the subject of *ἐνδεῖ* must be the same as of *φαίνεται* (viz. equal particulars), and that *ἐκείνου* most certainly is *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον*.

E 49. **προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον**: this would suggest that on the first occasion of making such a comparison, the Idea of equality springs forth from the brain like the fully-armed Athena from the head of Zeus, a conclusion which is hardly borne out by psychology. Does the child, when it *first* begins to compare two things which are like, consciously or unconsciously refer them to an ideal standard of equality? Is it not truer that the 'conception' of equality, or any other conception, is derived from the observation of particulars helped by memory and reasoning, and is a constant growth from the most rudimentary stage to the most developed? An interesting comparison might be drawn from this point of view between the Platonic Ideas and Kant's 'Categories,' the latter being, according to the Kantian philosophy, logically prior to experience.

75 A 57. **ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω**: not 'I say the same of all these' (Wagner), but 'I count all these as the same thing,' as is shown by the following words *ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν*.

59. **ἀλλὰ μὲν δή**: *μέν* is here the same as *μήν*: 'verum enimvero': 'but of course.'

B 63. **πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι**: *ἄρα* indicates that this is an inference from what has just preceded. But is the inference a logical one? All that *ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι* can mean is 'the reflection *ὅτι πάντα . . ὀρέγεται κτλ.* is *suggested by* our perceptions.' To translate it 'our ability to refer it to an ideal standard arises from our perceptions' of course contradicts the very point Plato is making, that the Ideas are prior to perception. Plato's conclusion does not follow logically. It is clear from Plato's argument that before we passed the judgment *ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα κτλ.* we must have had the idea of equality; but surely the child that sees two like things does not pass this judgment the first time it sees them, and that is the only argument that could prove Plato's inference.

65. **ἔδει . . εἰ ἐμέλλομεν**: here of course not an unfulfilled condition in the present, but an ordinary condition in the past.

67. **ὅτι προθυμεῖται**: a 'constructio ad sensum,' giving the deduction drawn from a reference to the ideal: so that *ἀνοίσειν* is virtually equal to *ἀνοίσειν ἐνθυμούμενοι*. Or possibly *ὅτι προθυμεῖται* defines *ἐκεῖσε*. The clause *ὅτι προθυμεῖται . . . φαυλότερα* is bracketed by Hirschig and Archer-Hind, on the grounds (i) that it is irrelevant, (ii) that the use of *προθυμεῖται* is very strange: but (i) is not a very cogent argument here: at the worst it is superfluous: and is *προθυμεῖται* more strange than *ὀρέγεται* just above?

CHAPTER XX

1. **εἰ μὲν λαβόντες**: observe that this is a purely imaginary **C**
condition: 'if we were born in possession of them,' implying neither that we were nor were not: Plato says later on that 'we were not born in possession of them.'

9. **οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι**: 'on which we set the **D**
seal of real existence': 'which we label, *ὃ ἔστιν*': cf. *Politicus* 258 C *τῇ πολιτικῇ μίαν ἰδέαν ἐπισφραγίσασθαι*, where it is repeated as *ἐπισημαίνομαι*.

καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν κτλ.: 'in our dialectic discussions,' a precise definition of the Socratic dialectic method of question and answer.

14. **ἑκάστοτε**: sc. 'in each instance,' i.e. 'when each of us is born': or possibly (with the same meaning) closely with *λαβόντες*, 'in each instance of our receiving it.' Observe the perfect *ἐπιλελήσμεθα*: Plato as yet expresses no opinion either in favour of or against the supposition.

εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι: this of course depends on *ἀναγκαῖον*.

19. **εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι**: both *γε* and *οἶμαι* indicate that Plato is **E**
approaching the supposition which he favours, by throwing emphasis on it.

24. **οἰκείαν**: 'one which is already ours,' not *ἀλλοτρίαν*, 'derived from outside.'

27. **ἐφάνη**: sc. 73 C above. **76 A**

αἰσθόμενον ἢ ἰδόντα: these are not alternatives: 'perceived whether by sight or hearing or by any other sense.'

29. **ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν**: 'with which this was associated, whether unlike or like': *ᾧ* refers to *ἕτερόν τι . . ὃ ἐπελέληστο*, *τοῦτο* to *τούτου* in *ἀπὸ τούτου*.

33. **οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἤ**: there is a nice point here between *οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ* (MSS.) and *οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἤ*. The use of *ἀλλ' ἤ*, i.e. *ἀλλὰ ἤ*, is really quite distinct: e.g. *οὐδεὶς ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνη* Hdt. ix. 109 'no one but she': *ἀλλ' ἤ* would seem then to be an instance of the illogical doubling of words, either of which would serve by itself, a confusion of *οὐδεὶς ἄλλος, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη* (no one else, but she), and *οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ ἐκείνη* (no other than she); cf. *μηδὲν ἄλλο . . . ἀλλ' ἢ . . .* 81 B. *οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἤ* is *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ*, 'nothing else than,' another form of the common Platonic *τί ἄλλο ἤ;* meaning 'simply,' 'merely.'

CHAPTER XXI

B 7. **δοῦναι λόγον**: 'give an account of,' i.e. an accurate definition and explanation: cf. *Rep.* 534 B *ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας* (*ἑκάστου* depends on *τῆς οὐσίας*—'the essential nature of each thing'); *καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;*

9. **περὶ τούτων**: sc. about the Ideas.

12. **αὔριον τηνικάδε**: 'to-morrow at this hour,' i.e. when Socrates is dead.

C 21. **χωρὶς σωμάτων**: this is not quite germane to the argument; Plato as yet is only authorised to say 'apart from these particular bodies in which we have our souls.'

καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον: Plato has made a fresh point by his theory of *ἀνάμνησις*, which proves the soul's previous 'intelligent existence': *ἀνταπόδοσις* only proved its previous 'existence.'

23. **οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος**: there are only three possible times at which the soul can have acquired the knowledge of Ideas: (*a*) since birth; (*b*) before birth; (*c*) at the moment of birth. (*a*) has been disproved; (*c*) is now suggested by Simmias, only to be shown to be absurd, as that is the moment at which we lose it: there remains only (*b*), and that proves the soul's previous intelligent existence.

D 24. **ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ;** this Platonic theory, that we lose our knowledge of the Ideas at the moment of birth and gradually recover it during life by being reminded of them by the objects of sense, naturally suggests a comparison with Wordsworth's famous 'Ode on the Intimations of Immortality'—

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
    Hath had elsewhere its setting,
      And cometh from afar:
    Not in entire forgetfulness,
    And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
    From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
    Upon the growing Boy,
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,
    He sees it in his joy:
The Youth, who daily farther from the east
    Must travel, still is Nature's Priest,
    And by the vision splendid
    Is on his way attended;
At length the Man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.

The contrast between the two conceptions is even more pronounced than their similarity, Wordsworth's idea being that we are born as it were with some faint memories of a previous blissful existence still clinging about us, which gradually grow fainter as they are obliterated by the experience of life. It would be beside the point to attempt to say which of the two contains the greater element of truth, as Wordsworth's conception is not an attempt to solve a psychological problem, but only the beautiful dream of a poet.

CHAPTER XXII

76 D–77 B, *c.* xxii. The outcome of the preceding argument is this: the pre-existence of our souls is inseparably bound up with the existence of Ideas and the former stands or falls with the latter. Simmias heartily assents to this and affirms his unshaken conviction that the Ideas do exist and consequently that our souls existed before our birth.

5. **ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον . . . ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως**: Archer- E
Hind brackets these words as a clumsy gloss on *ἀναφέρομεν*, adducing a number of cogent arguments: the most decisive point against their genuineness is the use of *ταῦτα* = 'the objects of sense,' whereas *ταῦτα* in the remainder of the sentence is used three times to mean 'the Ideas.'

7. **ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν**: 'so surely as these Ideas exist, so surely do our souls exist even before we are born.'

9. **εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα** obviously means 'and if these Ideas do not exist.'

10. **ἄλλως**: 'in vain': 'then our argument will have been to no purpose.'

15. **εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει**: Wagner entirely misunderstands this, paraphrasing 'our argument has an admirable tendency to prove that our soul exists, in like manner, before we are born, as also the substance of which you are speaking now': he makes *ἐς καλόν* = *ἐς καλὸν καιρόν*, and *ὁμοίως* apparently to mean *ὁμοίως ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ*, 'just as much before birth as in life.' But it is obvious that *ἐς καλόν* is defined by the clause *ἐς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι . . .*, *καλόν* being neuter: *ὁμοίως* means 'with equal (and no more than equal) certainty,' as is shown by *τε . . καί*. Archer-Hind's translation gives the sense admirably: 'our argument has found an excellent refuge in the position that the pre-existence of our soul rests on the same assurance as the existence of the Ideas,' i.e. the two stand or fall together (*ὁμοίως*).

77 A 22. **ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται**: the subject of *ἀποδέδεικται* is not *τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα*, but *τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς*: 'your argument is satisfactorily proved.'

CHAPTER XXIII

77 B–D, *c.* xxiii. But, continues Simmias, reminiscence only proves that our soul existed before entering into a human body: it does not prove that the soul on leaving the body may not be dissipated and perish. Kebes agrees that immortality is only half proved. Socrates replies that the other half is proved by the argument from alternation of opposites, which proved that the soul must exist after death.

B 5. **διασκεδαννῦται**: the MSS. have *διασκεδάννυται*, with the exception that the Bodleian MS. has *διασκεδάννύται* (η written above), with alternative accent and *η* written above the line. The MSS. reading must be indicative, and Riddell defends this by *Meno* 77 A *ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι*: but the present indicative is not defended by an example of the fut. indic. after *ὅπως μή*, and in our sentence we have *ᾖ* parallel to our verb. Perhaps the contracted form of the subj. is the best of the three possible readings: cf. the contracted optative *πηγνῦτο* 118 A.

8. **ἄλλοθέν ποθεν**: the MSS. reading: sc. *ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ζώντων*. Archer-Hind adopts Bekker's conj. *ἁμόθεν ποθέν*, but

there seems to be no evidence for the omission of γε in this combination of words: it is always in classical authors *ἀμῇ γέ πῃ, ἀμοῦ γέ που, ἀμῶς γέ πως, ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν.*

16. **εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν**: 'if our proof is to be C
complete'; *μέλλει* regularly takes the present, rather than the future infinitive, in this use, where there is no reference to 'intention in the future' or 'probability,' but rather indicating 'logical necessity.'

20. **ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν**: the conclusion arrived at from *ἀνταπόδοσις*—cf. 72 A, end of chapter xvi.

CHAPTER XXIV

77 D—78 B, *c.* xxiv. Yet, says Socrates, you and Simmias seem still to have a lurking fear lest the soul on leaving the body be scattered to the winds. Perhaps, replies Kebes, there is a child within us that still needs to be soothed; and soon there will be no man living who can soothe it. Do not despair, says Socrates; wide is Hellas and wider is the world; you must spare neither pains nor riches to find such a man, not omitting to search among yourselves.

2. **διαπραγματεύσασθαι**: we have already met *πραγματεία* D
63 A, where see note: *διαπρ.* is intensive—'to discuss or investigate thoroughly,' 'to thrash out': cf. 95 E *ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.*

4. **τὸ τῶν παίδων**: it is impossible to say with certainty whether this is cognate accus. with *δεδιέναι*, 'to fear what children fear,' or is outside the construction, in a loose apposition to the following *μή* clause, as we frequently find such phrases as *τὸ λεγόμενον, δυοῖν θάτερον*, and the like: 'lest it be as children think it is, that the soul is scattered' (Wagner): possibly in the latter case we should rather expect *μή, τὸ τῶν παίδων, ὡς ἀληθῶς* . . .

ὡς ἀληθῶς: cf. the precisely similar use in 66 C *ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν*, with note.

6. **διασκεδάννυσιν**: this use of the indic. after *μή* with verbs of fearing marks a nice difference from the subj.; it expresses not merely a fear, but a suggestion that the thing feared is true: *φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν*, 'I am afraid we have missed both alike.' The difference between 'fear' as to a fact which cannot be prevented (indic.), and 'fear' of a result which may be prevented (subj.), comes out admirably in Eur. *Phoen.* 92–95—

ἐπίσχες ὡς ἂν προὐξερευνήσω στίβον,
μή τις πολιτῶν ἐν τρίβῳ φαντάζεται,
κἀμοὶ μὲν ἔλθῃ φαῦλος ὡς δούλῳ ψόγος,
σοὶ δ' ὡς ἀνάσσῃ.

E 8. **ὡς δεδιότων**: the gen. absolute is not infrequently used in reference to a person or persons who *afterwards* come into the sentence in a different construction: cf. *διαβεβηκότος ἤδη Περικλέους ἠγγέλθη αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφέστηκε* (Thuc.): Wagner wrongly explains it as agreeing with *τινῶν* (sc.); the following clause *μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων* clearly indicates that the first *δεδιότων* means *ἡμῶν δεδιότων*.

11. **ἐν ἡμῖν**: not 'among us,' but 'within us.'

13. **μορμολύκεια**: explained by the lexicographer Timaeus as *τὰ φοβερὰ τοῖς παισὶ προσωπεῖα*: 'bogie' is our nearest English word. It is derived from *Μορμώ*, a she-monster, with whom nurses and mothers would frighten their children: cf. Theocr. xv. 40 *μορμώ, δάκνει ἵππος*, 'boh': Xen. *Hell.* iv. 4. 17 *φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς πελταστάς, ὥσπερ μορμόνας παιδάρια*: so we have the verb *μορμολύττομαι*, 'to scare.'

15. **ἐξεπᾴσητε**: Heindorf's admirable correction of *ἐξιάσηται*—'until you have charmed it out of him,' i.e. charmed the fear of death out of the *παῖς*: this seems better than Archer-Hind's 'charmed him out of you,' sc. the *παῖς* out of Kebes and Simmias: *ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ* surely implies that the *παῖς ἐν ἡμῖν* (to whom the dative refers) is the 'patient,' not the 'disease.' The reference is to the belief, common among the Greeks, that 'incantations' were effective in healing disease. For *ἐξεπᾴδειν* cf. Soph. *O.C.* 1192—

εἰσὶ χἀτέροις γοναὶ κακαὶ
καὶ θυμὸς ὀξύς, ἀλλὰ νουθετούμενοι
φίλων ἐπῳδαῖς ἐξεπᾴδονται φύσιν,

which confirms the version above, as the subject of *ἐξεπᾴδονται* (and consequently the object of *ἐξεπᾴδειν*) is the 'patient.' The view of philosophy as an incantation which exercises a healing influence over the soul finds frequent expression in Plato: cf. *Charmides* 157 A *θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη ἐπῳδαῖς τισι· τὰς δ' ἐπῳδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς.*

78 A 23. **εἰς ὅ τι ἀναγκαιότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα**: most recent editors insert *ἂν* before *ἀναγκαιότερον*, and its omission in the MSS. may be due to the *αν* of *ἀναγκαιότερον* (haplography). Mr. Arthur Sidgwick has, however (vide his excellent note on Aesch. *Ag.* 620 *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλά*), established

the use of the simple optative in clauses of this kind, not as a variant of the 'potential optative with ἄν,' but as a 'remote deliberative optative,' and so a variant of the deliberative subjunctive. He has collected an array of undoubted examples both in direct and indirect sentences: Ar. *Plut.* 438 *ποῖ τις φύγοι;* Plat. *Gorg.* 492 B *τί κάκιον εἴη;* Aesch. *P. V.* 292 *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ μείζονα μοῖραν νείμαιμ' ἢ σοι*: Eur. *Alc.* 55 *ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἄλκηστις ἐς γῆρας μόλοι;* They are all interrogative sentences, and this suggests that the old explanation, that they are potential optatives without the ἄν (a bad explanation in itself), is to be suspected. '*ποῖ φύγῃ* would be in ordinary circumstances the expression; but *ποῖ φύγοι* is the exclamation of supreme terror, treating escape as in the last degree unlikely.' The idiom is certainly rare in prose; but cf. Plat. *Gorg.* (above) and *Euthyd.* 296 D *οὐκ ἔχω πῶς ἀμφισβητοίην*: also *Phaedo* 107 A *ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν πάροντα.*

24. **μετ' ἀλλήλων**: none of the editors notice this somewhat unusual use of *μετά* with the gen. in the sense of 'among': in 81 A we have *μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα*, but there it may be translated 'along with,' 'in the company of': *μετά* with the dat. is used in Homer in the sense of 'among,' e.g. *Il.* 1. 252 *μετὰ τριτάτοισιν ἀνάσσειν.*

27. **ὑπάρξει**: *ὑπάρξει* has its usual meaning—'that at any rate you can *rely on* our doing.' *ὑπάρχει*, lit. 'is there to begin with,' used of something that can be 'taken for granted,' 'counted on.'

30. **μέλλει**: sc. *ἡδομένῳ μοι εἶναι*: 'how can it but be?' B

CHAPTER XXV

78 B–80 E, *cc.* XXV.–XXIX. The question is then, what kind of things are liable to dissolution and what are not? and to which class does soul belong? That which is composite and consists of parts may doubtless be resolved again into parts; but if we can discover something which is incomposite and without parts we may safely affirm that this, if anything, is indissoluble. To the class of incomposites we should assign whatever is constant and changeless; to that of composites all that is ever-changing. Now this is precisely what constitutes the difference between the contents of the ideal and of the phenomenal world respectively: the Ideas are changeless, simple, apprehensible by pure intelligence; phenomena are ever-changing, manifold, apprehensible by mere sensation.

Let us term the former the invisible, the latter the visible world: to which sphere shall we assign soul and body respectively? (1) the body is visible, the soul is invisible: (2) when the soul apprehends by means of the bodily senses, she deals with the ever-changing and is herself filled with confusion and uncertainty; when she apprehends by herself, she deals with the changeless, and her own reflections are constant and sure: (3) when soul and body are together, the soul is mistress, the body is servant; and to command is the function of the divine, to obey is that of the mortal. For these three reasons we decide that the affinity of soul is to the divine and changeless and indissoluble, the world of Ideas; that of body to the mortal and changeful and dissoluble, the world of phenomena. Hence we should infer that while the body quickly decays, the soul is nearly if not quite indissoluble. And as even a body that is embalmed lasts for an indefinite time, how much more enduring then should we expect the soul to be?

7. **πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν;** *πότερον* is of course the neuter adj.: 'which of the two is the soul.'

C 9. **συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ**: *συντεθέντι* expresses the process, *συνθέτῳ* the resultant condition: cf. a similar pair of words 68 D *τῷ δεδιέναι καὶ δέει*. *φύσει* should be taken with *προσήκει*, not with *συνθέτῳ*.

17. **ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα**: for this use of *δέ* with *ταῦτα*, where the demonstrative has already been defined, to emphasise the contrast with a previously mentioned class of things, cf. 81 B *τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες . . τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν*, 80 D and 113 E: it is the same as the so-called '*δέ* in apodosi.'

D 20. **ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι**: this is merely another way of saying *οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι* (75 D): 'that essence which we define as *being*.' The relation of the two genitives, *ἧς* and *τοῦ εἶναι*, to *λόγον* should be carefully distinguished: *ἧς* is an objective genitive, the thing 'of which' the definition is given; *τοῦ εἶναι* is the 'genitive of definition,' describing what the *λόγος* consists of. Wagner gives a version which is impossible in the context—'of the existence of which we give the proofs.'

21. **καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι**: a repetition from the words in 75 D following *οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι*: it marks the close association in the Platonic system between the Ideas and the dialectic method.

30. **τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν**; an interesting use of the partitive genitive instead of *περὶ τῶν πολλῶν*, the full form of which is *τί οἴει τῶν πολλῶν;* cf. *Rep.* 459 B *τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*

ζῴων; *Gorg.* 509 D τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν;

32. **τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων**: ἐκείνοις are obviously the E
'Ideas,' αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι (D): 'named after the Ideas,' i.e. defined by attributes derived from the Ideas. The series ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ . . ὁμωνύμων is not a continuation of the previous series ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, but a fresh series of 'attributes' to the former—'whether equal or beautiful or sharing any attribute of the Ideas': the substantival phrase πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων is somewhat irregularly substituted for ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων. For ὁμώνυμος cf. *Sophist* 234 B μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ: καλὸς ἵππος is ὁμώνυμος to αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν.

33. **πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις**: an adverbial phrase in loose apposition to the following clause: cf. the frequent τὸ λεγόμενον, and possibly τὸ τῶν παίδων 77 D.

34. **αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς . . κατὰ ταὐτά**: 'uniform in their relation either to themselves or to each other': the changeable and shifting character of the phenomena of sense was a strong point in the speculations of the early Greek physical philosophers: cf. the dictum of Heracleitus πάντα ῥεῖ.

35. **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**: 'in a manner of speaking,' in the sense of 'almost': 'never, or hardly ever.'

40. **τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ**: διάνοια is the 'faculty,' **79 A**
λογισμός the 'process' of reasoning: cf. note on 65 C.

41. **ἀειδῆ**: a synonym of οὐχ ὁρατά: 'invisible.'

CHAPTER XXVI

1. **θῶμεν οὖν βούλει . .; Θῶμεν, ἔφη**: a good illustration of the fact that the 'deliberative' and 'jussive' subjunctives are merely interrogative and positive forms of the same 'jussive' or 'hortative' subjunctive.

4. **μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά**: μηδέποτε because it is a definition of a 'class of things' not an individual thing: μή is the negative of the 'mental conception,' οὐ of the 'concrete fact.'

5. **ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν**: ἄλλο τι is here used for the more usual ἄλλο τι ἤ (cf. 70 C) meaning 'is anything else the case than that . . ?' 'is it not the case that . . ?' = ἆρα οὐκ; The reply **οὐδὲν ἄλλο** then means 'that is so.'

CHAPTER XXVII

1. **πάλαι ἐλέγομεν**: sc. chs. ix.–xi.

C 2. **προσχρῆται**: *προσ-* signifies 'uses in addition' or 'as an ally': 'uses the assistance of.'

9. **τοιούτων**: the familiar Platonic usage—sc. *τῶν πλανωμένων καὶ ταραττομένων,*' 'the confused and unstable objects of sense': trans. 'since such is the nature of the things she grasps': so below (D) *ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη=τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων.* Wagner wrongly explains it as *τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεων.*

D 15. **καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ**; 'when, that is to say (*καί*), she is able to do so,' viz. *αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι*: there seems to be a reference to 66 B *μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς.*

πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου: cf. *Rep.* 500 C *εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι*: and *Parmenides* 135 E *οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν.*

16. **περὶ ἐκεῖνα**: this seems to mean 'in iis versata,' or possibly 'living in their company' (cf. *οἱ περὶ τὸν Κῦρον*), but the omission of *οὖσα* is very difficult: the words would go more naturally with the verb *ἔχει*—'and remains constant and unvarying in her relations to the Ideas'—but this is not the sense we require: *ὡσαύτως ἔχει* is wanted absolutely—'remains constant.' Ast conjectures *ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα.*

19. **καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις**: a not infrequent combination of the two alternative phrases *καλῶς λέγεις* and *ἀληθῆ λέγεις*: cf. in Latin Ter. *Ad.* iv. 3. 18 'et recte et verum dicis.'

E 24. **ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου**: *μέθοδος* is a 'scientific method,' 'process of investigation,' 'line of argument.'

25. **ὅλῳ καὶ παντί**: an emphatic repetition—'altogether and entirely': cf. *Rep.* 527 C *τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διοίσει*: 469 C *ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει τὸ φείδεσθαι.*

CHAPTER XXVIII

3. **ἡ φύσις προστάττει**: cf. above 78 C *φύσει προσήκει*, *φύσις* being the 'natural course of things.' 80 A

4. **καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ**: 'in this respect,' 'from this point of view too.'

7. **οἷον ἄρχειν**: 'of a nature to rule': cf. 83 D *οἵα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἅιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι*: 94 E *οἵας ἄγεσθαι*: 98 C.

13. **τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει**: 'this is the conclusion we arrive at.'

16. **ψυχή**: the MSS. reading, involving a slight anacoluthon. B
Instead of a definition of *τάδε* in the acc. and infin. (*εἶναι ψυχήν*), we have *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* in a sort of loose apposition to *τάδε*, or perhaps rather put in the nom. as subjects to *ξυμβαίνει*, as though *τάδε* had not gone before. We do not need, then, either to understand *ξυμβαίνει* over again, or to emend to *ψυχήν* (Wohlrab, Archer-Hind).

17. **ἀνοήτῳ**: here in the philosophic meaning as the opposite of *νοήτῳ*—'not the object of *νοῦς*, intelligence.'

20. **ᾗ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει**: 'qua re hoc non ita sit': cf. Theaet. 184 C *ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ῃ οὐκ ὀρθή*: *ᾗ* is the indirect interrogative.

CHAPTER XXIX

80 E–81 E, *cc.* xxix., xxx. We cannot then believe that the soul when she leaves the body is scattered and dispersed; nay, if she departs pure and untainted of the body, because she has never willingly held communion with it during life, she is freed from its follies and passions and reaches the abode of the invisible, where she dwells with the gods for ever. But if she has been the companion of the body, sharing its pleasures and desires, and thinking that alone to be real which she can apprehend by it, then she departs tainted and clogged with the material; and in fear of the viewless region, weighed down by her earthly load, she flits about the visible world. Hence it is that ghosts are seen about places of burial; they are such gross spirits as cannot rise from earth, but wander about it, until for their love of the material they once more enter a bodily form.

3. **ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου**: indicates that the conclusion of the

foregoing arguments is only one of probability, that immortality is an attribute of the soul rather than of the body.

C 8. **τούτων οὐδέν** : sc. *διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν.*

9. **ἐπιεικῶς συχνόν** : 'satis diu,' 'a fairly long time.'

10. **ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων** : this is the protasis to *καὶ πάνυ μάλα*, i.e. *πάνυ μάλα συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον* : the *μέν*, by implying contrast with another clause unexpressed, adds emphasis: 'if a man dies with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of life' : *τοιαύτῃ* refers to the words just preceding—sc. *τοιαύτῃ ὥστε χαριέντως ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα.*

12. **συμπεσὸν γάρ** : *γάρ* might almost be translated 'why!' It confirms the previous statement by adding a still stronger case.

D 15. **καὶ ἂν σαπῇ** : sc. *τὸ σῶμα.*

17. **ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα** : *ἄρα* is ironical—scilicet: 'as some people would tell us,' is the sort of suggestion of the word. What Wagner means by translating it 'as might have been expected,' I fail to see.

18. **εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον** : sc. *ἀειδῆ* ; cf. note on 58 D.

20. **εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς** : 'to that which may in very truth be called Hades' : cf. note on 66 C.

22. **αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν** : for *δέ* cf. 78 C *ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα* (note).

E 29. **κοινωνοῦσα** : we might, perhaps, have expected *κοινωνήσασα*, but *κοινωνοῦσα* is the ptcp. of *ἐκοινώνει*, expressing a continued course of action in the past.

33. **ῥᾳδίως** : there can be little doubt that this is an ignorant gloss: not only does it alter the meaning of *τεθνάναι μελετῶσα* from the philosophic meaning Plato has given it, but *τεθνάναι ῥᾳδίως* is not Greek for 'to die with equanimity' ; it should be *ἀποθανεῖν ῥᾳδίως.*

81 A 43. **διάγουσα** : the MSS. reading *διάγουσα* involves a violent anacoluthon from the dative ptcp. *ἀπηλλαγμένῃ*, with which it should be grammatically parallel. In trying to defend the reading, we are concerned not so much to justify the nom., as to explain how it may have arisen : so that we need not resort to the suggestion that the nom. is logical (as distinct from grammatical) on the ground that *ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εἶναι = δύναται εἶναι.* Rather, perhaps, we may say that, under the influence of the intervening *ὥσπερ* clause, Plato harks back unconsciously to the form of the principal clause *οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα . . ἀπέρχεται*, in which *ψυχή* is the subject. Much more violent

anacolutha are to be found in Thucyd. (but then Thucydides' style is entirely one of 'logic before grammar'), and even in Plato *Phaedr.* 241 D we read '*ᾤμην αὐτὸν ἐρεῖν . . λέγων*' (for *λέγοντα*). Many editors boldly alter the word here to *διαγούσῃ*.

CHAPTER XXX

5. **ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν**: *τε* does not connect B
this with *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*, but anticipates the following *καί*: 'by the body, that is to say, by the lusts and pleasures.'

7. **ἀλλ' ἤ**: 'except,' for the simple *ἤ*: v. note on 76 A; cf. 68 B, 97 D.

οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο: the relative can be supplied in a new case (*ὅ* with *ἴδοι*, *ᾧ* with *χρήσαιτο*) without being repeated: cf. 65 A *ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.*

10. **φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν**: 'comprehensible by philosophy': cf. *Tim.* 29 A *λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν.*

14. **διειλημμένην**: 'interpenetrated': the particles of cor- C
poreal matter are regarded as 'separating,' 'holding apart' the particles of soul. For the sentiment cf. Milton *Comus* 460–480.

18. **ξύμφυτον**: 'ingrained,' 'concretus': cf. Virg. *Aen.* vi. 738 'penitusque necesse est | multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris': 745 'donec longa dies . . | concretam exemit labem purumque reliquit | aetherium sensum.'

26. **οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα**: a very in- D
teresting example of the way in which Plato uses a popular belief (or a popular expression) to illustrate a philosophic truth: there is of course more poetry than philosophy in the idea that ghosts are souls which cannot rid themselves altogether of the corporeal. Observe the characteristic middle *παρέχομαι*, of something which is 'identified' in some way with the subject of the verb: so *παρέχεσθαι πόλιν*, of 'representing' a city at a conference, etc.; lit. 'to contribute for one's own part.'

29. **εἰκὸς μέντοι**: *μέντοι* of emphatic confirmation: cf. above 65 D.

32. **τροφῆς**: from meaning 'education,' 'way of bringing up,' *τροφή* has the meaning 'way of life'; cf. 84 B: Soph. *El.* 1183 *φεῦ τῆς ἀνύμφου δυσμόρου τε σῆς τροφῆς.*

CHAPTER XXXI

81 E–82 B, *c.* xxxi. These souls pass into the bodies of animals whose habits are likest to their former way of life; the sensual into asses, the cruel into wolves and hawks; while they that have lacked philosophy but led humane and harmless lives pass into bees and wasps and ants, or even into the human form again.

E 1. **εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ**: *τοιαῦτα ἤθη = ζῷα τοιούτοις ἤθεσι χρώμενα*, 'types of animals.' Plato now reinforces his argument, that the soul's highest duty in life is to separate itself from the bodily element, by the Pythagorean doctrine of 'transmigration.' According to the degree and character of the corporeal element clinging to the soul at death will be its condition in the next stage of existence—the souls contaminated with the lowest passions will pass into the bodies of the lowest orders of the animal world. We need not understand Plato as giving his deliberate approval to this precise form of the doctrine of metempsychosis. Rather he would seem to be availing himself of a familiar philosophic doctrine to reinforce his argument: the precise destiny of the souls of the wicked is not a main point of interest in the dialogue. For the belief of Pythagoras cf. Xenophanes—

> *καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα*
> *φασὶν ἐποικτεῖραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος·*
> *παῦσαι μηδὲ ῥάπιζ᾽, ἐπείη φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶ*
> *ψυχή, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀΐων.*

For other passages in Plato on metempsychosis cf. *Timaeus* 91 D sqq., 41 E–42 D: *Rep.* 618 A–620 C: *Phaedrus* 249 B.

5. **ὕβρεις**: used here in the special sense of 'lust,' 'outrage,' 'stupra.'

82 A 12. **ἀμέλει**: originally an imper. of *ἀμελῶ*, 'never mind': cf. Ar. *Clouds* 867 *ἀμέλει δίδασκε*: then it comes to mean 'certainly,' 'of course.'

14. **ἕκαστα**: a somewhat unexpected neut. pl. for *ἑκάστη*, 'each group of souls'; the neuter is perhaps used because Plato is thinking of the 'souls' and the 'animals' side by side.

κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας: 'according to the peculiar affinities of their pursuits.' [R. D. A.-H.]

16. **εὐδαιμονέστατοι καὶ τούτων**: *καί* is difficult: the natural trans. would be 'even of these': i.e. 'even among those

who do not attain the supreme happiness which falls to the lot of *οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ἐν τῷ βίῳ* there are degrees of happiness, the happiest being those who . .'

17. **τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν**: 'popular and social virtue': *δημοτική* means 'popularly so called,' or 'in vogue among the *δῆμος*' (cf. 68 C *ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην*): cf. Hdt. ii. 36 *διφασίοισι δὲ γράμμασι χρέωνται, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἱρὰ τὰ δὲ δημοτικὰ καλέεται.* It is defined by the following words *ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην κτλ.*: cf. *Rep.* x. 619 C *ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα.* B

22. **τοιοῦτον**: 'a race like themselves, social and civilised.'

24. **μελιττῶν**: the 'locus classicus' on the social organisation of bees is Virgil *Georg.* iv. ll. 153 sqq.—

> solae communes natos, consortia tecta
> urbis habent, magnisque agitant sub legibus aevum,
> et patriam solae et certos novere penates ; . .
> namque aliae victu invigilant et foedere pacto
> exercentur agris . .
> sunt quibus ad portas cecidit custodia sorti,
> inque vicem speculantur aquas et nubila caeli,
> aut onera accipiunt venientum, aut agmine facto
> ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent . .
> praeterea regem non sic Aegyptus et ingens
> Lydia nec populi Parthorum aut Medus Hydaspes
> observant : rege incolumi mens omnibus una est :
> amisso rupere fidem.

Side by side with this may be set the companion picture in Shaks. *Henry V.* i. 2, where the life of the hive is compared to the life of a busy community.

26. **ἄνδρας μετρίους**: a word common in Dem. for the 'average,' 'respectable citizen.' Prof. Geddes quotes from Wordsworth's 'Ode to Duty,' to illustrate how 'the principles of a Divine Morality, giving more value to the unconscious and self-denying affections, teach greater reverence than is accorded by Plato, for the

> Glad hearts, without reproach or blot,
> Who do Thy work, and know it not.'

CHAPTER XXXII

82 C, D, *c.* xxxii. But to the company of the gods only the true philosopher can come. For this cause he keeps himself

pure from vice, not from the worldly motives that govern the vulgar, but because he will not resist philosophy when she offers freedom and purification to his soul.

C 3. **φιλομαθεῖ**: *Rep.* 376 B *τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν.*

7. **οὔ τι οἰκοφθορίαν καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι**: cf. what Hor. says of the 'sapiens,' *Sat.* II. vii. 83—

> quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent,
> responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores
> fortis, et in se ipso totus teres atque rotundus,
> externi ne quid valeat.

10. **ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας**: 'the ill-repute arising from wickedness.' For the sentiment cf. *Theaet.* 176 B *οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον τὸ δ' οὔ, ἵνα μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι.*

11. **ἔπειτα**: = *τούτων ἕνεκα*, an emphatic summing up of the previous participles: Lat. 'idcirco': cf. for *ἔπειτα* used to emphasise a preceding participle *Apol.* 20 C *οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν.*

D 16. **σῶμά τι πλάττοντες**: there can be little doubt that this is the proper correction of MSS. *σώματι πλάττοντες*: not only is it nearer the MSS. than *σώματα*, but the *τι* gives a contemptuous touch (or possibly it suggests 'are concerned with what sort of body they can fashion—*σῶμά τι* meaning 'some particular fashion of body'). Two passages of Plato admirably illustrate this use of *πλάττω* — *Tim.* 88 C *τόν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνταποδοτέον κινήσεις*: *Rep.* 377 C *καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν* (of the duty of nurses with children). Ast reads *σώματι πράττοντες*, 'working for the body,' quoting Thuc. v. 76 *οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πράττοντες*; but that is not adequate justification, as *πράττειν τινί* is a recognised 'political' term, signifying 'to scheme in the interests of a party.'

20. **ἐκείνης λύσει**: *ἐκείνης* is subjective — 'her work of rescue.'

CHAPTER XXXIII

82 D–84 B, *cc.* xxxiii, xxxiv. Philosophy, finding the soul a prisoner in her bodily abode, strives by persuasive admonition to set her free; telling her that she is deluded by the body

and its sensations: from such she should withdraw herself and trust to herself alone; for she alone can behold the invisible and apprehend the true. And the soul that is discreet listens to the voice of philosophy, for she sees that indulgence of bodily passions has this fatal result. Whatsoever awakes in us the strongest pleasure or pain, fear or desire, this we think to be most surely true. So if she share the body's pleasures and pains, she will also share its beliefs concerning truth; and being the body's close companion through life will leave it at death contaminated by its nature: therefore she will never reach her home in the invisible but must enter again into another body. For this reason the philosopher is virtuous; not from any common motive; but because, when philosophy is delivering his soul, he will not undo her work by indulging the body's appetites. So his soul has peace from its troubling and lives apart from it; and at death she returns to her divine abode, fearing not at all lest as she departs she be scattered by the winds and exist no more.

3. **παραλαβοῦσα**: either (i) 'finding' (Lat. excipere), or (ii) in the special sense of a master 'receiving' a pupil: cf. *Apol.* 18 B *οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθον* . .

4. **ἀτεχνῶς**: 'literally,' 'absolutely,' very often used with a metaphorical word, to show that it is no mere metaphor—Lat. 're vera': cf. 90 C *πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται.* E

5. **ὥσπερ διὰ εἱργμοῦ**: cf. Virg. *Aen.* vi. 733–34

neque auras
dispiciunt clausae tenebris et carcere caeco.

8. **κυλινδουμένην**: for the metaphor cf. the proverb in 2 Peter ii. 22 *ὗς λουσαμένη εἰς κύλισμα βορβόρου.*

τοῦ εἱργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστί: most editors take this as an example of prolepsis for *ὅτι ἡ δεινότης δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστί*: but it makes nonsense of the sentence to make *δεινότης* the subject of *ἐστί*: the subject is *ὁ εἱργμός*, 'realising the terrible nature of this imprisonment, viz. that it (the imprisonment) arises from lust': the *ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστί* defines 'what the *δεινότης* consists in.'

9. **ὡς ἂν μάλιστα**: this has been interpreted in the most various ways, *ὡς ἄν* being taken by some as final, by others as = *ὥστε ἄν*. Mr. Archer-Hind is clearly right in taking it as 'relative,' lit. 'in the way in which': 'under circumstances in which the captive is most apt to aid in his own imprisonment': cf. 83 D *ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα*

προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, 'the prison of lust is just that very one of which the soul shuts the doors upon herself: for each act of indulgence is the shooting of a fresh bolt.' (R. D. A.-H.)

10. **τῷ δεδέσθαι**: we might perhaps have expected the partitive genitive with ξυλλήπτωρ, and most editors read τοῦ against all the MSS.: the dative is not without parallel: cf. *Laws* 645 A τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ ξυλλαμβάνειν.

83 A 12. **οὕτω**: goes with ἔχουσαν, 'in this sorry plight.'

B 22. **δι' ἄλλων**: contrasts with αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν, and means τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων: ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο contrasts with αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, 'varying under varying conditions.'

27. **οὕτως ἀπέχεται**: οὕτως means 'consequently,' 'in that spirit': cf. 61 D.

31. **οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν . . ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη**: τοσοῦτον means practically 'so slight' (cf. Lat. 'tantum,' 'so small'): cf. *Rep.* 608 B μέγας ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ. Possibly here we ought to take it as getting this meaning by 'irony'—'none of the terrible evils one might imagine.' ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη is put somewhat irregularly for ὅσον ἄν . . as though there had been no τοσοῦτον, but only οὐδὲν κακὸν ὧν ἄν τις . . (partitive genitive).

32. **οἷον ἢ νοσήσας**: it is on such considerations as these that δημοτικὴ ἀρετή is based.

C 37. **ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι . . καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι**: the real predicate is in ἡγεῖσθαι, 'is compelled, in the act of feeling some violent pleasure . . to believe that what most strongly excites this feeling is most vivid and real': the feeling and the belief inevitably go together (ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι . . καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι).

D 45. **προσηλοῖ**: cf. Hor. *Sat.* ii. 2. 77 quin corpus onustum | hesternis vitiis animum quoque praegravat una | atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae.

49. **ὁμότροπος καὶ ὁμότροφος**: 'kith and kin': for a similar play upon words cf. *Laches* 188 B οὐδὲν ἄηθες οὐδ' αὖ ἀηδές.

CHAPTER XXXIV

E 3. **οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν**: it would be natural Greek to supply with φασιν "αὑτοὺς κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείους," but that would make Plato say that the bulk of mankind misrepresent the motives of philosophers; which is not the sense required. Riddell says 'φασι is followed by κοσμίους εἶναι

understood, and this εἶναι contains the dictative force' (i.e. φασιν εἶναι = κελεύουσιν εἶναι); but this will not bear analysis. Most editors follow Stallbaum in understanding (φασι) κόσμιοι εἶναι, 'the reasons for which most men profess to be temperate.' But it surely meets the requirements of the sense better to understand δεῖν with φασι: that is, to translate it as Riddell does, but instead of giving to φασι the sense of κελεύουσι, as he does, to supply δεῖν, as may easily be done in so obvious a case—'not for the reasons for which most men say we ought to be temperate.'

6. **τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι**: this μέν clause is entirely subordinate: taken by itself it contradicts the sense: cf. note on 60 B τὸ ἅμα μὲν . . ἐὰν δέ τις . . 84 A

7. **λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι . . ἑαυτήν**: none of the editors notice αὐτήν, which is to be taken from αὐτός 'self,' as the subject of παραδιδόναι, not as the object of λυούσης.

8. **ἐγκαταδεῖν**: the Greek equivalent of the Latin gerundive —'se dedere vinciendam.'

9. **ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν**: be careful not to translate 'and make her work void' (taking ἀνήνυτον as predicate): this would require ἀνήνυτον τὸ ἔργον ποιεῖν. It means 'engage in an endless (and unprofitable) task.'

10. **μεταχειριζομένην**: this reading is undoubtedly right in spite of the superior MSS. evidence for μεταχειριζομένης. With the latter reading we should have to take Πηνελόπης . . μεταχειριζομένης as genitive absolute—'as though Penelope were weaving her web in the opposite way': but this would require ὥσπερ, if not ὥσπερ Πηνελόπης τινός. The genitive of the MSS. is no doubt due to the proximity of Πηνελόπης: μεταχειριζομένην agrees of course with αὐτὴν (τὴν ψυχήν). Πηνελόπης is possessive genitive with ἱστόν: Prof. Geddes prefers to take it with ἐναντίως, quoting in support of the construction 112 E τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέρων, where, however, τούτου is better taken only with καταντικρύ, Plato always using the dative with ἐναντίως. The position of τινά again is decisive in favour of taking Πηνελόπης closely with ἱστόν: 'weaving a sort of Penelope's web in the opposite way.' 'Penelope, to preserve her virtue, undid at night the work she wove by day: the soul weaves again the web of lusts which philosophy has been unravelling to set her free' (R. D. A.-H.)

γαλήνην τούτων: sc. ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν: the genitive τούτων would be hard to define: is it genitive of separation, 'the tranquillity of being free from them,' or the same genitive as it would be in the opposite phrase ταραχὴ τούτων, a sort of

subjective genitive? At any rate γαλήνη is γαλήνη ψυχῆς, a state of the soul, not of the passions.

12. **ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα**: cf. note on 59 A: *ἑπομένη* and *οὖσα* are subordinate to *παρασκευάζουσα*.

13. **τὸ ἀδόξαστον**: that which is not the subject of *δόξα* (opinion), but of *ἐπιστήμη* (knowledge): the distinction is fully worked out in *Republic*, Bk. vi.

B 16. **εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον**: sc. *εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.*

ἀφικομένη: the nom. is curious, as *ἀπηλλάχθαι* depends grammatically on *δεῖν*: even the earlier ptcps. *παρασκευάζουσα*, etc., are not strictly grammatical, as they define *οὕτω*, and *οὕτω* modifies not *οἴεται*, but *ζῆν*, which depends on *δεῖν*, and so should have an accus. ptcp. agreeing with its subject: the whole construction of this sentence illustrates the wonderful flexibility of Greek.

18. **οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ**: 'there is no danger of her being afraid lest,' an emphatic form of *οὐ μὴ φοβηθῇ*: cf. *Apol.* 28 B *οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ*: *Rep.* 465 B *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις διχοστατήσῃ*: Ar. *Eccles.* 650 *οὐχὶ δέος μή σε φιλήσῃ.* These phrases do not justify the explanation of the ordinary *οὐ μή* construction by the 'omission of *δέος*': rather the idea of 'fear, warning, threat, danger' (which that construction contains) is inherent in *μή* with the subjunctive, and can by the natural genius of the Greek language be made more explicit and emphatic by the insertion of *δεινόν* or *δέος*: it analyses, as it were, the meaning, not the origin, of *οὐ μή* (cf. note on 66 B).

19. **ὅπως μὴ . . οἴχηται**: cf. 77 B *ὅπως μὴ . . διασκεδαννῦται ἡ ψυχή*: in *Symp.* 193 A we have the fut. indic. *φόβος οὖν ἐστιν, ἐὰν μὴ κόσμιοι ὦμεν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ὅπως μὴ καὶ αὖθις διασχισθήσεται.*

'At first sight the concluding words of the chapter seem to imply that a soul that is pure is less likely to perish than the impure. But since this is not the case, we must understand Plato to mean that the pure soul alone is exempt from *fear*. The impure soul, having cast in her lot with the body, and having no conception of existence apart from it, may well suppose that corporeal life is a condition of her being; but the pure soul, who has lived apart from the body so far as she may and feels her own independent power, has no misgivings lest the company of her slave be necessary to her existence: the body may dread dissolution, but she is secure (Archer-Hind).

CHAPTER XXXV

84 c–85 d, *c.* xxxv. Silence ensues as Socrates ceases: but presently Simmias and Kebes are heard conversing apart. Are you discussing any doubtful matters in the argument? asks Socrates, for there must be many remaining. *Simmias:* There are points on which we should like further satisfaction; but we shrink from troubling you at so sad a time. *Socrates:* If I cannot convince you that I do not consider my present situation sad, I should find it hard indeed to persuade the rest of mankind. You think I am more foolish than the swans: for they sing sweetest just before they die; not, as men say, that they are lamenting their approaching death, but because they are Apollo's birds and know the good things that are in Hades; wherefore they sing in gladness of heart. I too am the servant of Apollo, and I depart this life no less cheerfully than they; speak then, if you have anything to ask. *Simmias:* I will speak: the truth of the matters we have been discussing is hard to discover, nevertheless it were faint-hearted to abandon the search. So in default of some divine word we must strive by all means to find the surest theory that human reason can furnish, as it were a raft to bear us over the sea of life. Therefore, I tell you, Socrates, that the foregoing proof does not seem to me complete.

3. **πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν**: 'was bent upon, or occupied with, the foregoing argument': a stronger form is *ὅλος εἶναι πρός τινι*: cf. Dem. *de Falsa Leg.* § 127 *ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔκφρων ἦν καὶ ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λήμματι*: cf. the Latin 'totus esse in aliqua re.' C

ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο: 'as he seemed from his appearance': cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* v. iv. 11 *καὶ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς σὲ ἐπαναθεασόμενος ᾖα ὁποῖός τίς ποτε φαίνῃ ἰδεῖν ὁ τοιαύτην ψυχὴν ἔχων.* *ἰδεῖν* is the epexegetic infinitive, much commoner in poetry than in prose, e.g. Eur. *Herc. Fur.* 1002 *εἰκὼν ὡς ὁρᾶν ἐφαίνετο* Παλλάς: it corresponds to Latin ablative of the supine, 'ut visu apparebat.' Wagner calls *ἰδεῖν* pleonastic, and translates 'as on seeing him it seemed' (does he take *ἐφαίνετο* as an impersonal?): *ἰδεῖν* is not pleonastic, as there are more ways of judging than by appearance.

7. **μῶν μή**: the origin of *μῶν* (*μὴ οὖν*) is lost sight of: cf. *μῶν οὐ, μῶν δῆτα, μῶν οὖν*, all of which imply the same thing.

9. **ἀντιλαβάς**: a metaphor from wrestling, 'grip,' 'point of attack,' or, as we should say, 'handle': cf. Thuc. vii. 65 *ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἔχοι ἀντιλαβὴν ἡ χείρ* (the grappling-iron).

E 24. **ὅτε γε**: 'quandoquidem.'

26. **διάκειμαι**: not only is there no need to take this as subjunctive, or to alter it to *διακέωμαι*, but the indicative is right and the subjunctive wrong. When a verb of fearing expresses a fear or uncertainty as to a thing which is a matter of fact in the present or past, the corresponding tenses of the indicative are used in the subordinate clause: cf. note on 77 D. In *μή σοι ἀηδὲς ᾖ* (five lines above) the subjunctive is used because the thing feared is in the future, and the unpleasantness may still be avoided by not putting the question.

29. **ᾄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ**: the earliest trace in Greek literature of the idea that the swan sings just before death is found in Aesch. *Ag.* 1444 *ἡ δέ τοι κύκνου δίκην τὸν ὕστατον μέλψασα θανάσιμον γόον κεῖται*, of the dying Cassandra. There are earlier references to its being a bird of song: Hom. *Il.* ii. 463 *κλαγγηδὸν προκαθιζόντων*: Hesiod *Shield of Her.* 316 *κύκνοι ἀερσιπόται μεγάλ' ἤπυον*. Other similar passages are Ar. *Birds* 769 *τοιάνδε κύκνοι, τιὸ τιὸ τιὸ τιὸ, συμμιγῆ βοὴν ὁμοῦ πτεροῖς κρέκοντες ἴακχον Ἀπόλλω, τιὸ τιὸ τιτίγξ*: Call. *Hymn to Apollo* 5 *ὁ δὲ κύκνος ἐν ἠέρι καλὸν ἀείδει*: so in the *Hymn to Delos* the swans sing at the birth of Apollo. Aristotle supports the poets in both ideas: *ᾠδικοὶ δὲ (οἱ κύκνοι), καὶ περὶ τὰς τελευτὰς μάλιστα ᾄδουσιν· ἀναπέτονται γὰρ καὶ εἰς τὸ πέλαγος καί τινες ἤδη πλέοντες παρὰ τὴν Λιβύην περιέτυχον ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ πολλοῖς ᾄδουσι φωνῇ γοώδει, καὶ τούτων ἑώρων ἀποθνῄσκοντας ἐνίους.* The tradition seems to be derived from the undoubted fact that the wild swan (*Cycnus Musicus*) does sing; the wild swan is in modern times an inhabitant of northerly climes, and stories of the swan's song may have been conveyed to Greece by men who had travelled in more northerly regions. Macgillivray (*British Birds*, vol. iv. 652) says 'their cries are loud, trumpet-like, and when proceeding from a distance, clear, mellow, and resembling the sounds from a distant band of music. They are described as having a peculiarly exciting effect on the human mind, especially in desert regions, and to give rise to the most agreeable feelings. This I can well understand, having experienced the like on seeing and hearing a flock of wild swans in the Hebrides.' The melancholy sound may have suggested the tradition of the death-song, though Socrates interprets it as a song of joy at the prospect of passing into the presence of their lord and master, Apollo.

30. **πλεῖστα καὶ μάλιστα**: to avoid an apparent tautology, Blomfield would read *κάλλιστα*: but *μάλιστα* is 'most loudly,' *πλεῖστα* 'most frequently.'

85 A 32. **οὗπερ εἰσὶ θεράποντες**: 'the majestic form, the dazzling

whiteness, the grace of motion on the element of water, and the lofty freedom of flight in the element of air, combined with its incapacity to move with ease on the common element of earth, were features marking out this bird for high poetic associations: and a mystic symbolism would easily find in it an image of the Sun moving in resplendent majesty on the face of the heaven, and at evening and morning bathing his brightness in the baths of Ocean. It was but a step to complete its investiture as the bird of Apollo by ascribing to it the almost necessary accomplishment of the gift of song. Very similar is the fancy of Nonnus, that in the rebellion of Typhaon, Apollo disguised himself by transformation into a swan' (Geddes).

36. **ἐξᾴδειν**: the preposition suggests 'sing with their dying breath': cf. Polyb. xxxi. 20. 1 *ἐξᾴσας τὸ κύκνειον.*

38. **ἥ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ**: chosen doubtless as the three birds connected in Attic legend with the tragic legend of the Thracian king Tereus, and the two daughters of the Attic king Pandion, Procne and Philomela: Tereus was changed into a hoopoe, Procne into a swallow, and Philomela into a nightingale. This protest of Plato against the current view of the nightingale's song as one of melancholy is renewed by Coleridge in his 'Nightingale.'

46. **ὁμόδουλος . . καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ**: cf. note on B
60 D.

58. **μὴ οὐχὶ . . ἐλέγχειν**: *μὴ οὐχί* is due to the negative C
idea in *πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός*, which is another way of saying that the conduct suggested is 'not the right conduct': cf. 72 D *τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι*; and Dem. *Fals. Leg.* § 123 *αἵ τε πόλεις πολλαὶ καὶ χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ.*

62. **ἢ μαθεῖν . . ἢ εὑρεῖν**: 'to learn . . or to find out for one's self': cf. 99 C *οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην*; cf. too Hesiod *W. and D.* 291—

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

64. **δυσεξελεγκτότατον**: 'most irrefragable,' 'irrefutable.'

65. **ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας**: cf. Cic. *Tusc.* i. 30. 73 'itaque D
dubitans circumspectans haesitans multa adversa reverens tanquam in rate in mari immenso nostra vehitur oratio.'

68. **λόγου θείου τινός**: 'some divine revelation.' This has very naturally been interpreted as an anticipation of, or at least an aspiration after, a divine revelation such as that granted to humanity in Christ, the Word of God. Olympio-

dorus implies that Christians quoted the passage in that sense—*τίς ὁ ἀσφαλέστερος καὶ ἀκινδυνότερος καὶ βεβαιότερος καὶ θεῖος λόγος; οὐ δήπου, ὥς φασιν, ὁ θεόθεν ἐκδοθείς· δοξαστικὸς γὰρ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ εἰρημένος αὐτοπτικὸς νοῦς ὁ θεῷ τῷ ὄντι συνών, ὡς ἐν Φαίδρῳ.* His own interpretation, then, is 'the perfectly developed reason of the philosopher': but this is not in keeping with the spirit of the passage. The reference is more probably to some such revelation as was supposed to be given in the Mysteries, e.g. the Orphic: it is appropriately put in the mouth of the Pythagorean Simmias (v. Introduction, C).

CHAPTER XXXVI

85 E–86 D, *c.* xxxvi. Simmias states his objection. All the terms that have been applied to soul and body may be transferred to harmony and the lyre. The harmony is invisible, immaterial, beautiful, divine; the lyre is material, composite, earthly, perishable. Might we not then on the same principle maintain that the harmony must survive the destruction of the lyre? yet we know it does not. Now suppose the doctrine to be true, that the soul is a harmony of the body, arising from the due proportion and temperament of its parts; will she not, let her be ever so divine, vanish away if these bodily conditions cease? will she not, like other harmonies, cease to be, long before the body itself suffers dissolution?

E 3. **ταύτῃ . . ᾗ δή**: 'why, in this respect, that a man might advance this very same argument with regard to harmony and (its relation to) the lyre and its strings.'

86 A 10. **ἐπειδὰν . . κατάξῃ**: this clause is subordinate to *ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν*, the whole depending on *διισχυρίζοιτο ὅτι . .* The apodosis to *εἰ διισχυρίζοιτο* never comes, the sentence being interrupted by parentheses and explanations: at the end of the chapter *ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ* is in fact substituted for this original protasis.

14. **οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη**: this is not Simmias' own argument, but still the argument of *τις*.

15. **τὴν μὲν λύραν**: cf. note on 84 A, and v. supra 60 E.

B 19. **φαίη**: depends on *εἰ* of *εἰ διισχυρίζοιτο*.

24. **ὑπολαμβάνομεν**: we need not take the first person to refer to the Pythagoreans, with whose doctrine of transmigration this description of the soul as a 'harmony' is, as Archer-Hind points out, inconsistent: it is better to take it as implying that the theory was one commonly accepted. It is found in Parmenides, and further developed by Zeno: cf. Diog. Laert.

γεγενῆσθαι γὰρ τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ . . καὶ ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν. In particular it was held in the form mentioned by Plato by the later Aristoxenus, a pupil of Aristotle, and a famous writer on music, to whom Cic. refers (Tusc. i. 19) 'Aristoxenus musicus idemque philosophus ipsius corporis intentionem quandam (cf. *ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος*), velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur.' So Lucr. iii. 98—

sensum animi certa non esse in parte locatum,
verum habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse,
harmoniam Grai quam dicunt.

25. **ἐντεταμένου**: cf. note on 60 D: the metaphor would seem here to be derived from 'stringing a lyre': cf. below C *ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἢ ἐπιταθῇ.*

40. **ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ**: a slight obscurity in the argument is caused by the fact that the difficulty arising from the *ἁρμονία* theory is put from opposite points of view in the two clauses *εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο* and *ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ*: the contradiction between 'immortality' and the 'harmony' theory can be shown in two ways: (i) if the soul is immortal, then we have a harmony outlasting the materials that produce it, which is absurd: (ii) if the soul is a harmony, then it must like other harmonies perish before the materials (bodily elements) of which it consists, which contradicts the theory of immortality. It is a dilemma represented from either side in turn. D

CHAPTER XXXVII

86 D–88 B, *c.* xxxvii. Socrates defers his reply to Simmias until he has heard the objection of Kebes, which the latter states as follows. I think our argument is no further on than it was: I admit that the antenatal existence of the soul has been fairly proved, but the evidence of her existence after death seems still insufficient. Not that I agree with the objection of Simmias; but all that has yet been proved is that the soul is more lasting than the body. Suppose a weaver were in the habit of making his own coats; in the course of his life he would wear out many coats; but when his time came to die, the last coat would exist after him; yet we do not deny that the weaver is more durable than the coat. Similarly the soul in the course of a man's life may wear out many bodies: that is, so fast as the body wastes, she may renew it like a garment that needs mending; but when the time of her dissolution

comes, she perishes and the body as last renewed by her exists after her. Or to grant you even more: let us suppose that she wears out many bodies, not only in the span of one life, but in many lives; and that at the separation she continues to exist in Hades; yet we have no assurance that this goes on for ever; after repeated incarnations she may gradually be wearied out, and some one of them will be her last. Therefore it is not enough to show that the soul is ever so much stronger and more lasting than the body: you must show that in her own nature she is altogether indissoluble and eternal; else our hope of immortality is but foolishness.

1. **διαβλέψας**: 'with a piercing glance.' Socr. had prominent eyes: cf. *Theaet.* 132 E *προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων*: cf. too Socr.'s words in Xen. *Symp.* v. 5 *οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ἤδη οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλίονες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν. Πῶς δή; Ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ' εὐθὺ μόνον ὁρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιοι εἶναι*: cf. too 117 B *ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας*. *δια-* seems to have the same meaning as in *διαβαίνω* (cf. Theogn. *εὖ διαβάς*, 'with the feet planted well apart'), and suggests wide open, staring eyes: the word *διαβλέπω* is so used in Ar. *de insomniis* 462 A, B *ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάμπαν διαβλέπουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ σκότος, φαίνονται εἴδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὥστ' ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι πολλάκις φοβουμένους.*

2. **δίκαια μέντοι**: cf. note on 68 B.

4. **τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο;** 'quin' or 'quidni respondet?'

E 8. **ἐγγενομένου**: a favourite word with *χρόνος* in Thuc.: *ἐν-* is the Latin 'inter': e.g. 'intervallum,' 'intervenio.'

10. **συγχωρεῖν**: parallel to *ἀκοῦσαι* (above) and dep. on *χρῆναι*.

προσᾴδειν: a musical metaphor appropriate to the subject of discussion, viz. soul as *ἁρμονία*: cf. 92 C *οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνᾴσεται; καὶ μὴν . . πρέπει γε, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνῳδῷ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας*: cf. too *Laws* 670 B *γελοῖος γὰρ ὅ γε πολὺς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκειν τό τ' εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὔρυθμον καὶ μή, ὅσοι προσᾴδειν αὐτῶν καὶ βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ γεγόνασι διηναγκασμένοι*: 'to be in accord' (accinere), sc. *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*: it practically = *τι λέγειν*.

11. **οὕτως ἤδη**: for this use of *οὕτως* = 'accordingly,' resuming the meaning of a previous clause cf. 61 D, 83 B.

12. **τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον**: with this reading we must regard *ἀπιστίαν παρέχει* as a gloss on *θρᾶττον*: to save the words some editors read *ὅ*, with inferior authority of MSS. For *θράττω* (= *ταράττω*) in this special sense of philosophical doubt cf.

Theaet. 187 C *θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ . . γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος.*

13. **λέγω δή**: 'well then, I will tell you': the same *δή* that we have in the familiar *καὶ δή* of Tragedy, meaning 'suppose': e.g. *καὶ δὴ τεθνᾶσι· τίς με δέξεται πόλις;* Eur. *Med.* 386.

14. **ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι**: 'in the same position' as it was at the end of the *ἀνάμνησις* discussion. The later argument derived from the soul's attributes (as *θεῖον, ἀόρατον* etc.) is only one of probability, proving the soul to be *πολυχρονιώτερον τοῦ σώματος*, not 'immortal.'

17. **εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος**: sc. 'the human form': cf. 76 C *εἶναι* **87 A**
ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει.

18. **ἀνατίθεμαι**: 'retract'; the metaphor would seem to be derived from moving a piece on the draught-board: cf. *Gorgias* 461 D *καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ.* Cf. Plut. ii. 1068 C *πεττῶν δίκην μετατιθέναι*: for a simile from the same source cf. Eur. *Erechth.* (fragment) *πόλεις πεσσῶν ὁμοίως διαφοραῖς ἐκτισμέναι*, and the mysterious phrase in Arist. *Pol.* I. ii. 10 *ἄζυξ ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς.*

19. **εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν**: cf. Dem. 223 *ἵνα μηδὲν ἐπαχθὲς λέγω*: 'invidiosum,' 'offensive,' 'arrogant': it refers to the possible appearance of arrogance in *πάνυ ἱκανῶς.*

21. **οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε**: sc. *ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι*: for *τῇδε* cf. 72 A *ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ.*

23. **ἀντιλήψει**: 'objection': cf. 84 C *ἀντιλαβάς*: *ἀντιλαβή* is 'an opening for attack,' 'ground of objection,' *ἀντίληψις* the 'objection' itself.

24. **πᾶσι τούτοις**: 'in all these respects,' sc. in being *ἰσχυρότερον, πολυχρονιώτερον* etc.

32. **ὁμοίως . . ὥσπερ ἄν**: 'with the same amount of reason **B**
as a man might argue concerning . .': there is no need, then, to emend to *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ*, as some editors do.

λέγεσθαι ταῦτα: sc. the argument that the soul is immortal because *ἰσχυρόν, πολυχρόνιον* etc.

34. **ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος**: not 'that his *soul* has not ceased to exist,' but 'that *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, living man, body and soul together, has not perished': *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* is used in its quite ordinary sense, 'the human being, body and soul.' *ἄνθρωπος* stands in the same relation to *θοἰμάτιον* as *ψυχή* stands

to *σῶμα* : this is required by the comparison, and is proved, if proof were needed, by the words *τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου πρότερος* (D), which states as an obvious fact that the weaver perishes (i.e. ceases to be what we call *ἄνθρωπος*) before the last garment.

35. **ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς** : MSS. have *ἴσως*, but Forster's correction is almost certainly right, as the next line shows.

C 44. **τὸ δ' . . οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει** : this use of *τὸ δέ* as a demonstrative is characteristic of Plato : it expresses a contradiction of what has gone before, and is almost the same as *τὸ δ' ἀληθές* : cf. *Apol.* 37 A *ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν τοιοῦτον* : infra 109 D, note.

D 57. **ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη** : *γάρ* gives an explanation, here of something to be supplied with *ἀλλά* : fully expressed it would be *ἀλλὰ φαίη ἂν* (*ἀπόλλυσθαι ἴσως τὴν ψυχὴν πρότερον τοῦ ὑστάτου σώματος*), *ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν* : or, as we might express it in English, 'but the natural conclusion (viz. that the soul outlasts the body) does not follow, because . .'

60. **εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι** : this *γάρ* introduces a clause explaining more fully the bearing of the previous *πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν*. For *ῥεῖν* used of the body cf. *Tim.* 43 A *τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον.*

ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου : observe that Kebes proposes two hypotheses consistent with the superior durability of the soul and yet at the same time with the supposition that it perishes at death : (i) it may be that the soul, in the course of a single human life, wears out many bodies, the body being constantly wasted and repaired by the soul : (ii) we may go farther, and admit that the soul may survive one life or many lives, entering into one body after another : yet in any particular life (our own, perhaps), it may be approaching exhaustion, and so perish even before this particular body (*τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα*) perishes.

E 66. **τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας** : it is difficult to believe that this means nothing more than 'its weakness' (Wagner) or even 'its inherent weakness' : may we not give it its full meaning 'that wherein its weakness consists' (viz. 'that it cannot go on being repaired when the soul has left it') ?

ἐπιδεικνύοι : the optatives in this sentence are interesting and instructive : some editors insert *ἄν* here, others (including Archer-Hind) supply it from the preceding *ἀναγκαῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη* : but Prof. Geddes is almost certainly right in taking it as the opt. of reported speech. He quotes Soph. *Phil.* 615—

εὐθέως ὑπέσχετο
τὸν ἄνδρ' Ἀχαιοῖς τόνδε δηλώσειν ἄγων·
οἴοιτο μὲν μάλισθ' ἑκούσιον λαβών,

where the opt. is more natural in O.O. for *οἴεται* (i.e. *οἴομαι*) as the main verb is in a past tense: cf. Lys. xiii. § 9 *λέγει* (historic present) *ὅτι, ἐὰν αὐτὸν ἕλησθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης πρεσβευτὴν αὐτοκράτορα, ποιήσειν ὥστε . .· οἴοιτο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων τῇ πόλει εὑρήσεσθαι.* The peculiarity of *ἐπιδεικνύοι* is that it is optative after *φαίη ἄν*, by the common Greek principle of attracting into the optative any verb (subj. or indicative) depending on an optative. This attraction occurs usually in relative clauses, but here it is extended to O.O. Notice that the same explanation accounts for *εἰ ῥέοι καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο*, which is not an imaginary condition in the future, but is clearly the O.O. form of *εἰ ῥεῖ καὶ ἀπόλλυται*, 'if it is the case that the body wastes away': it is not opt. because the protasis of *ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη*.

67. **τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ**: with *πιστεύσαντα*, 'we are not yet justified in feeling confident, on the strength of this argument, that . .'

76. **αὐτό**: sc. *τὴν ψυχήν*: cf. 61 A *ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης* **88 A**
μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος: 109 A *πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό* (sc. *τὴν γῆν*). Archer-Hind ingeniously suggests that *αὐτό* is attracted into the gender of its predicate *ἰσχυρόν*.

78. **μὴ οὐ πονεῖν**: this *μὴ οὐ* with inf. after a negative verb is usually confined to the so-called redundant *μή* (with such verbs as *κωλύω, ἀπαρνοῦμαι*): here it is extended to an infinitive with *μή* where *μή* has its full negative force, i.e. *μηκέτι συγχωροῖ μὴ οὐ πονεῖν = μηκέτι συγχωροῖ ὡς οὐ πονεῖ.* A similar extension is seen below, 88 B *οὐδενὶ προσήκει . . μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν.*

81. **τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον**: he cannot recognise the parti- **B**
cular death that brings the destruction of the soul, because he cannot tell how often his soul has previously been incarnate: his own body may be the last of the series. *διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος* is a definition of *θάνατον, σώματος* being gen. of separation, 'severance from the body': so below *ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει.*

85. **οὐδενὶ προσήκει**: 'no one can claim in facing death without a qualm that his confidence is not ill-grounded.'

88. **εἰ δὲ μή**: not, of course, *εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει*, but either *εἰ δὲ μὴ προσήκει . . θαρρεῖν*, or *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχει ἀποδεῖξαι . .*

ἀνάγκην εἶναι: Prof. Geddes (and after him Wagner) says this depends on *εἰκός ἐστι* contained in *προσήκει*: surely it is

simpler to take it as parallel to *εἰδέναι μηδένα* and *ἀδύνατον εἶναι*, depending on *φαίη*, though the series of infinitives is broken by *οὐδενὶ προσήκει*. The whole sentence to the end (*παντάπασιν ἀπόληται*) is to be regarded as the argument of *τις* (*εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον*, beginning of 88 A). This protasis, *εἰ γάρ τις . . συγχωρήσειεν*, never finds its apodosis, which can easily be supplied—'how are we to answer him?' or something of the kind: the actual form of the sentence has been lost sight of before the end comes, because of the involved series of clauses.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

88 C–89 C, *c.* xxxviii. Phaedo pauses to describe the effect of these objections upon the audience: how their confidence is shattered in the argument and in their own judgment. Echecrates sympathises, adding that the conception of soul as a harmony has always had a strong attraction for him. He desires to know how Socrates behaved. Never, replies Phaedo, did Socrates appear to greater advantage: he showed neither irritation nor dismay; he cheered and encouraged us, as a general rallies his broken forces. In illustration thereof Phaedo narrates a little by-play which passed between Socrates and himself.

Observe how this interruption in the dialogue marks a critical point in the discussion: Echecrates, Phaedo's hearer, shares the consternation of those present (at the death-scene) at this subversion of what had seemed to be a well-grounded proof. The digression at the same time, especially in the by-play between Socrates and Phaedo, serves to keep before us the human and dramatic interest of the scene. Plato clearly regards Socrates' cheerful behaviour as a strong re-inforcement of his dialectic in favour of immortality: Socrates throughout the dialogue is the living embodiment of his belief.

C 6. **τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις**: a somewhat rare dative after a verbal noun, whose verb governs the dative.

8. **εἶμεν . . ᾖ**: this variation of mood after verbs of fearing, or again in final clauses, in past time, is not in-frequent, and may be put down principally to that love of variety so characteristic of the best Greek writers (cf. just above *τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις . . εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι*). So far as a distinction can be laid down, the opt. expresses the more remote, the subj. the more vivid fear or the more direct purpose. A series of examples will help to show how unsafe it is to lay down hard and fast rules for

so flexible a language as Greek: Thuc. iii. 22 *παρανῖσχον δὲ . . φρυκτοὺς πολλοὺς . . ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα τῆς φρυκτωρίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ᾖ καὶ μὴ βοηθοῖεν*: Thuc. vi. 96 *ἑξακοσίους ἐξέκριναν πρότερον ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἴησαν φύλακες, καὶ ἢν εἰς ἄλλο τι δέῃ ταχὺ ξυνεστῶτες παραγίγνωνται* (on the analogy of this we should expect in the earlier example . . *εἴη καὶ μὴ βοηθῶσιν*, the subj. to express the more definite, concrete purpose): Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 2 *δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο εἶναι μή τινα καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας διαβολὴν σχοῖεν καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται δύσνοι εἰς τὰ πράγματα ὦσιν* (this again agrees with Thuc. vi. 96, not with Thuc. iii. 22). In our own passage we might make two possible distinctions between *εἶμεν* and *ᾖ*: (i) that mentioned above between a more remote and a more vivid fear: (ii) *εἴημεν* fear of something temporary (and so naturally following the tense of the main verb): *ᾖ* a fear concerning a general truth referring to all time. Observe that *μὴ . . εἶμεν* is the past form of *μὴ . . ὦμεν*, as is proved by *ᾖ*: were it not for *ᾖ* it would be tempting to take it as the past of *μὴ . . ἔσμεν*, 'a suspicion that we *were* incapable judges' (for which cf. note on *διασκεδάννυσιν* 77 D, and *διάκειμαι* 84 E).

12. **ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα**: *ὡς* is exclamatory, 'how convincing D
was the argument of Socrates which has now fallen into discredit.'

15. **ἀντιλαμβάνεται**: 'has a wonderful hold on me': cf. above *ἀντιλαβή, ἀντίληψις*.

22. **μετῆλθε**: 'went after,' 'pursued': for the metaphor cf. 89 E *καί με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος*.

23. **ἀχθόμενος**: 'disconcerted.' E

24. **ἐβοήθει**: of the process, 'came to the rescue of': *ἐβοήθησε* of the result, 'was his reinforcement of the argument adequate?'

29. **ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος**: *ἐκεῖνος* is thrown into the 89 A
relative clause (instead of being subject of *ἔχειν*) to give it emphasis by virtue of its position: it underlines the pronoun, as it were.

32. **ὡς ἡδέως**: cf. note on 58 E *ὡς ἀδεῶς ἐτελεύτα*.

52. **ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι**: the story is told in Hdt. i. 82 how C
the Argives, foiled in their attempts to recover Thyreatis from the Lacedaemonians, took an oath *μὴ πρότερον θρέψειν κόμην Ἀργείων μηδένα μήδε τὰς γυναῖκάς σφι χρυσοφορήσειν πρὶν ἂν Θυρέας ἀνασώσωνται. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἔθεντο νόμον, οὐ γὰρ κομέοντες πρὸ τούτου ἀπὸ τούτου κομᾶν.* For the

Greek feeling on this point cf. the use of *κομάω*, 'to give one's self airs,' and *κουρά*, e.g. *κουραῖσι καὶ θρήνοισι* (Eur. *Hel.* 1060).

53. **ἀναμαχόμενος**: 'renew the contest and conquer.'

54. **πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ 'Ηρακλῆς οἷός τε εἶναι**: a proverbial expression, more fully explained in *Euthyd.* 297 B *ἥττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμῶν, ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν. πολὺ γάρ πού εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ 'Ηρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν τῇ τε ὕδρᾳ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρίᾳ οὔσῃ καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνιείσῃ, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν ἀποτμηθείη τοῦ λόγου, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μιᾶς, καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ σοφιστῇ ἐκ θαλάττης ἀφιγμένῳ . . ὃς ἐπείδη αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀρίστερα λέγων καὶ δάκνων, τὸν 'Ιόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν.* Compare the neat application of the proverb in the epigram of Rufinus (*Anthol.* v. 93)—

ὥπλισμαι πρὸς Ἔρωτα περὶ στέρνοισι λογισμόν,
οὐδέ με νικήσει, μοῦνος ἐὼν πρὸς ἕνα.
θνατὸς δ' ἀθανάτῳ συστήσομαι· ἢν δὲ βοηθὸν
Βάκχον ἔχῃ, τί μόνος πρὸς δύ' ἐγὼ δύναμαι;

58. **οὐχ ὡς 'Ηρακλῆς**: Phaedo modestly declines the part of the champion, Heracles: he will play Iolaus to Socrates' Heracles.

CHAPTER XXXIX

89 D–90 D, *c.* xxxix. Socrates continues: we must beware lest we become haters of arguments as some become haters of mankind. For when one has been repeatedly deceived in others, whom he believed to be good and true men, he falls sometimes into distrust and dislike of the whole human race. But this is owing to his ignorance of human nature: he does not reflect that extremes are rare, and that the very good and very bad are equally few in number. It is the same with arguments: if we have come rightly or wrongly to distrust one argument after another, we must not hastily conclude that no valid argument is to be found; it is our own want of skill that we should rather blame. We ought to take warning by those contentious disputants, who assert that there is no stable truth in anything, and fancy themselves prodigiously clever to have found this out. Yet it were sad indeed, supposing there is such a thing as truth, and that we might discover it, if, instead of laying the fault where it is really due, we quarrelled with philosophy and thus deprived ourselves of all chance of attaining truth.

D 5. **ἢ λόγους μισήσας**: a strict grammatical analysis might seem to require *τοῦ λόγους μισεῖν* after *μεῖζον κακὸν τούτου*:

cf. above 83 B οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἤ τι ἀναλώσας.

8. **ἐνδύεται**: 'se insinuat in': the word is middle: cf. *Rep.* 620 C τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου (ψυχὴν) πίθηκον ἐνδυομένην.

9. **ἄνευ τέχνης**: a good instance of the use of τέχνη—scientific or specialist knowledge of a particular subject, here of human nature: cf. below τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια. Geddes well compares Lucian's account of Timon's misanthropy (*Timon* ch. viii.) χρηστότης ἐπέτριψεν αὐτὸν . . ὡς δὲ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ ἄνοια καὶ εὐήθεια καὶ ἀκρισία περὶ τῶν φίλων, ὃς οὐ συνίει κόραξι καὶ λύκοις χαριζόμενος.

10. **ὑγιῆ**: the more usual Attic is ὑγιᾶ: cf. however 86 A ὁμοφυῆ.

14. **ὑπὸ τούτων**: 'experiences this at the hands of those . .': παθεῖν is constructed as the passive of ποιεῖν: cf. ἀποθανεῖν ὑπό, φεύγειν ὑπό, ἐκπίπτειν ὑπό, and many other verbs.

15. **ἑταιροτάτους**: cf. *Gorg.* 487 D τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις: L. and S. also quote for the adjectival use of ἑταῖρος *Rep.* 439 D τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν . . πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον, but as there it is acc. it is probably the noun: the use of the positive as adj. is far less likely than the superlative.

17. **οὐδενὸς οὐδέν**: 'in anyone,' we should say: cf. 90 C E
ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον.

22. **ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο**: 'he would have formed an opinion answering to the truth.'

23. **χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα**: σφόδρα goes with χρηστούς and πονηρούς: its position throws extra emphasis on it—'the extremes of virtue and vice are rare': taken with ὀλίγους it would emphasise the wrong word: cf. below τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων.

31. **τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων**: 'the extremes at both ends.' 90 A
Archer-Hind puts the case lucidly: 'The ἔσχατα are the two opposite qualities, ἄκρα the extremes of these. Thus if we conceive λευκόν and μέλαν to be represented by a straight line, the central portion is occupied by shades of grey: the ἔσχατα, or parts remote from the centre, by white and black: and the ἄκρα, or ends of the line, by the highest degree of each.'

35. **καὶ ἐνταῦθα**: 'in the case of human wickedness too' (as well as in other ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων).

37. **ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι**: Plato does not mean to say that B
arguments are 'different' from men in this respect, but only

that this is not the analogy he wishes to draw between them: he has been led into a digression by Phaedo's πῶς λέγεις; 90 A.

39. **ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ ᾗ ἐπειδάν τις**: the apodosis to *ἐπειδάν τις*, which would point the analogy, never comes in a grammatical form—'lost like a stream in the sand' (Geddes): it is resumed in another form (§ C) *οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ . . . μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο.*

42. **ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὤν**: we are not to supply *ψευδής*, nor yet *ἀληθής*: the participle in its own right means 'being true': it is the participle of *ἔστι*, not *ἐστί*.

C 44. **οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες**: 'Eristic philosophers': he would seem to be alluding specially to the 'sophists,' of whom he says in 91 A *ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται*: and to whom he refers again in 101 E as disputing not to find out the truth, but to satisfy their vanity—*αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*: we are reminded of the definition of the sophist in Ar. *Clouds* as one 'who makes the worse appear the better argument.'

49. **ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται**: the perplexing nature of the currents in the Euripus channel (cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 183 *Αὐλίδος παλίρροθοι τόποι*) made it a proverb of instability: cf. Aeschin. lxvi. 27 *πλείους τραπόμενος τροπὰς τοῦ Εὐρίπου*: Hipparch. *ἄστατα καὶ ἀβέβαια Εὐρίπου τρόπον.* For *ἀτεχνῶς* cf. 82 E.

54. **ἔπειτα**: cf. *Apol.* 20 C quoted above, note on 82 C.

CHAPTER XL

90 D–91 C, *c.* xl. Let us beware then, says Socrates, lest we rashly charge our argument with being faulty, when the fault is our own. The question is of deep interest to us all, and to me especially: indeed I feel less like a philosopher than those who argue not for truth's sake but merely that their opinion may prevail; only I am more anxious to persuade myself than you. However, if my belief is true, it is well; if not, it will at least make me better company for you while I am with you. For your part, you must think more of the truth than of Socrates; and you must not accept my reasoning until you have fully tested it; lest I depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.

91 A 9. **οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλὰ φιλονείκως**: 'to be inspired not by a love of wisdom, but by a love of contention.'

13. **ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο**: 'the position they have themselves laid down': their own *ὑπόθεσις* cf. *θεμένων* 93 c, *ὑποθέμενος* and *τίθημι* 100 A.

17. **εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον**: 'except incidentally': this sentence is to be taken as an instance of Socrates' playful *εἰρωνεία*.

23. **ἧττον . . ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος**: Wagner proposes to B insert *μή* or *ἤ* before *ὀδυρόμενος*, failing to see that the quasi-negative *ἧττον* qualifies the whole phrase *ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος*, 'I shall be less likely to offend by lamenting.'

26. **ὀλίγον ὕστερον**: 'presently': the dilemma is a quaint one: if his soul survives death, he will know that the soul is immortal: if not, he will at any rate not be any longer the victim of *ἄγνοια*.

29. **σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες**: cf. *Rep.* 595 c *ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρὸ* C *τῆς ἀληθείας προτιμητέος ἀνήρ*.

34. **ὥσπερ μέλιττα**: probably a proverbial phrase: cf. Eupolis' famous saying concerning Pericles—

οὕτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων
τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις,

which would seem to be a somewhat grim parody of the Greek fashion of speaking of a poet or orator as *μέλιττα*, and of his words as *μέλι*: e.g. *Σοφοκλέους τοῦ μέλιτι κεχρισμένου* Ar. *Fr.* 231: *μέλιτταν Ἤριννα Μουσῶν ἄνθεα δρεπτομέναν* *Anth.* vii. 13.

τὸ κέντρον: Wohlrab explains this by saying 'Socrates stirs thoughts in the hearts of his hearers, which leave them no peace, until they attain to certainty with regard to them.' But surely this is not the *κέντρον*, or what becomes of *ἐξαπατήσας*? the sting is the poison of 'false belief,' the 'lie in the soul.'

CHAPTER XLI

91 c–92 d, *c.* xli. Socrates briefly re-states the objections of Simmias and Kebes: he then points out to the former that he must make his choice between the doctrine that soul is a harmony and the doctrine that learning is reminiscence. The theory of reminiscence presupposes that the soul existed before the body; but a harmony comes into existence after that which produces it; either therefore soul is not a harmony or she has had no precognition of the Ideas. Simmias admits this and declares without hesitation in favour of reminiscence, which he affirms to be a rational hypothesis, while the other is merely a plausible analogy.

The first refutation is addressed to believers in ἀνάμνησις and pre-existence of the soul; it appeals therefore only to Platonists or possibly Pythagoreans.

1. **ἀλλ' ἰτέον**: 'well, let us proceed': cf. 78 c ἴωμεν δή.

4. **ὅμως καὶ θειότερον**: ὅμως, grammatically belonging to the principle verb, is often attached to the participle for emphasis: it is then *virtually* a stronger form of καίπερ 'for all that it is more divine.'

D 5. **ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα**: 'since (or "on the supposition that") its existence is on the principle of a harmony': the effect of εἶδος is much as if he had said ὥσπερ ἁρμονία τις: he does not bind the word ἁρμονία down to a literal interpretation.

8. **ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί**: from συγχωρεῖν we must supply for this, φάναι.

9. **πολλὰ δὴ . . καὶ πολλάκις**: at first sight these two words would seem to refer to the two cases put by Kebes: (i.) the wearing out of many bodies during the course of a single human life: (ii.) the soul's surviving repeated incarnations (87 D, 88 A). But the next clause καὶ ᾖ . . παύεται shows that Socrates is only thinking of the first case, for the second case involves repeated θάνατοι, all of which except the last are not ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος.

22. **ἐνδεθῆναι**: of course with an allusion to the body as the δεσμωτήριον ψυχῆς: cf. διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι 88 E.

92 A 24. **ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ**: 'I abide by that as I do by no other argument,' i.e. more than by any other argument.

32. **συγκεῖσθαι**: the true Attic of συντεθεῖσθαι, and so repeating σύνθετον—'composite . . is composed': cf. *Legg.* 793 B νόμων τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων.

33. **αὑτοῦ λέγοντος**: for αὑτοῦ (Bodl. MS.) in place of σαυτοῦ cf. 78 B δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς: 101 D σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιάν (where it is no doubt influenced by τὸ λεγόμενον): 91 c where some MSS. give ἅμα ἑαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας. For the case with ἀποδέχομαι cf. 92 E μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος, and still more clearly 96 E ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς . .'

B 36. **ταῦτα συμβαίνει λέγειν**: 'this is what your statement amounts to . .,' viz. ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκειμένη πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει . .

41. **ὃ ἀπεικάζεις**: 'harmony is not such as you represent it to be,' viz. like the soul: the other reading ᾧ ἀπ. would mean

'such as that to which you liken it,' viz. the soul, a condensed expression for *οἷον (ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν) ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις*, which has a parallel in *Rep.* 349 D *τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν* (Wagner).

48. **πρέπει γάρ**: the affirmative use of *γάρ*, frequent in Plato: cf. *Rep.* 502 B *ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος . . πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα. Ἱκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη*: cf. Lat. 'enim.' In the same sense we have *μέντοι* 65 D. C

53. **ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινός**: 'only by a specious sort of analogy, without scientific proof.'

54. **τοῖς πολλοῖς**: confirms the interpretation of *ὑπολαμβάνομεν* (86 B), as a commonly accepted belief. D

57. **ἀλαζόσιν**: '*ἀλαζών* is one who professes more than he ought, the opposite of *εἴρων*, one who professes less than he might: hence *ἀλαζονεία* is the special characteristic of the Sophists, *εἰρωνεία* of Socrates as their exposer' (Geddes).

61. **ἐρρήθη γάρ που**: 76 E, where the *ὑπόθεσις ἀξία* is given—*ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν ἔλεγες.* In that passage, the *οὐσία* spoken of is not the 'existence of the soul,' but the 'Idea' or 'Ideas.' Accordingly the MSS. reading *ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία* (which some editors retain) cannot be regarded as giving the meaning of that passage, whilst at the same time it makes nonsense of the whole sentence. Heindorf reads *αὐτῆς*, and gives it a very forced interpretation as possessive genitive—'so surely as that essence . . belongs to her' (in the sense of 'being known by her'), referring to *ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν* (76 E). But those words are themselves probably spurious (v. note on 76 E), and the meaning given to *αὐτῆς ἔστιν* is very strained Greek as well as un-Platonic philosophy.

64. **ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν**: 'having the name of essence': cf. 75 D *οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι*: 78 D *ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι*, where we have the same genitive of definition (*τοῦ*). E

65. **ἱκανῶς**: 'on adequate grounds': *ὀρθῶς*—'correctly': the conclusion is correct and well grounded.

CHAPTER XLII

92 E–94 B, *c.* xlii. Again a harmony must conform to the conditions of the materials which produce it; consequently the completeness of the harmony is in exact proportion to the completeness with which these are brought into tune. It

follows then that there are degrees in harmony, corresponding with the conditions of the materials. But in soul there are no degrees; each soul is just as completely soul as every other. Furthermore we say some souls are virtuous, others vicious; and we define virtue to be a harmony, vice a discord of the soul. Now supposing that souls are harmonies, they are harmonies which admit of no difference in degree, since we have admitted that there are no degrees of soul. But a virtuous soul, being a harmony, has in her another harmony, while a vicious soul has a discord; therefore the virtuous soul is more of a harmony, that is, more of a soul, than the vicious. But this being contrary to our premisses, we are forced to conclude that no soul is more virtuous or vicious than another; or rather that all souls, being complete harmonies, are completely virtuous: a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The second argument will reach those who accept neither *ἀνάμνησις* nor the Ideal theory, but who do accept the view that virtue is a harmonious state of the soul. It is to be observed (1) that the premiss in 93 A *πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ κτλ.*, of which a different use is made in the next chapter, here is simply brought in to show that the perfection of the harmony depends upon the tuning of the strings, etc., and consequently that as these may be more or less in tune, the harmony admits corresponding degrees of completeness: (2) the argument might seem to be complete in 93 B, where it is allowed that, while harmony admits degrees, soul does not. But we should regard all the earlier part of the chapter as collecting the materials for the refutation which proceeds consecutively from 93 D: moreover Plato had to guard against the rejoinder that, although harmony, as such, admits of degrees, there may yet be particular kinds of harmony, whereof soul is one, which do not admit of degrees.

1. **τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῇδε**: lit. 'what do you think of the matter from the following point of view?'

93 A 5. **τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ**: 'anything else besides what': any adjective in Greek which signifies comparison or difference may take *παρά* in place of *ἤ* or the comparative.

9. **πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ . . κινηθῆναι**: a very common idiom in Plato—'it is far from' . . 'it is very unlikely to,' followed by the infinitive: so we have *παντὸς δέω—παντὸς δεῖ τοιοῦτος εἶναι*, *Soph.* 221 D: sometimes *δέω* is personal, sometimes impersonal (*δεῖ*): the infinitive is not dependent on *δέω*, but is a consecutive infinitive. The corresponding phrase with *ὀλίγου* is only used absolutely—*ὀλίγου δεῖν* = 'almost': cf. *ὀλίγου* alone in 94 D.

ἐναντία κινηθῆναι: *ἐναντία* is neut. plur.: adverbial accusative—'to undergo different movements.'

12. **οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι**; 'is it not the nature of every harmony to depend on the manner in which it is harmonised?'

14. **ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον**: Plato obviously B
has in his mind two different points of view from which a harmony may be regarded as perfect: e.g. (1) a certain combination of notes make a 'natural' harmony, as contrasted with a 'discord'; (2) the notes themselves may be more or less 'perfectly in tune,' and so the harmony be 'less perfect' (e.g. a piano or violin 'out of tune'): from these two points of view we may speak of (1) a better, (2) a more perfect harmony. It is difficult to decide which of the two is expressed by *μᾶλλον*, which by *ἐπὶ πλέον*: personally I incline to take *μᾶλλον* of (1), 'a better natural harmony,' *ἐπὶ πλέον* of (2), 'a more exact harmony.'

15. **εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται**: *εἴπερ* is rather 'since' than 'if': perhaps 'admitting that this is possible' would give the nearest shade of meaning; cf. 93 E *εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία εἴη*.

16. **μᾶλλον . . καὶ πλείων**: for the combination of adv. and adj. cf. *Phileb.* 41 E *τίς μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδροτέρα ἡδονή;*

19. **μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας**: many editors omit *μᾶλλον* in spite of MSS. authority, but without it the phrase *ἑτέραν ἑτέρας* would be unnatural, referring to a comparative which is to follow. The comparison is first suggested in its most general form by *μᾶλλον*, and then expressed more explicitly in the terms Plato has already used *ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἧττον*. It is not quite to the point to compare examples of *μᾶλλον* used with a comparative adjective, which are plentiful enough.

21. **αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχήν**: *ψυχήν* is in apposition to *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*: 'that which it is, viz. soul.'

26. **θεμένων**: cf. 91 A *ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο*. C

27. **τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς**; Prof. Geddes, Wohlrab, and Prof. Linde take *ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς* with *ὄντα*, in defiance of the order of the words and of the Greek idiom by which the real predicate is so often contained in the participle: *ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς* undoubtedly goes with *εἶναι*, *τί* with *ὄντα*: *τί ὄντα φήσει τις ταῦτα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς*. The idiom cannot be reproduced in English, which must say 'what are these qualities (*τί ὄντα*) which exist in the soul?' If *τί* belonged to *εἶναι*, *ὄντα* would be superfluous.

D 37. **τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα**: *τοῦτο* is not to be taken as predicate, but as subject—'this admission amounts to' . ., *ἔστι* is the whole predicate.

39. **ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν [ἁρμονίας] εἶναι**: in spite of MSS. authority and of the high authority of Mr. Archer-Hind, I feel convinced that *ἁρμονίας* is an interpolation due to a misunderstanding of the phrase: *ἁρμονίαν* is not the subject of *εἶναι*, but the predicate: 'when we admit that one soul is not more perfectly "soul" than another, we admit that one soul is not more perfectly "harmony" than another soul.' This interpretation, besides being necessitated by the argument, is surely demanded by the very next sentence—*τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον . . ἁρμονίαν οὖσαν μήτε μᾶλλον . . ἡρμόσθαι*,—where *ἁρμονίαν* is clearly predicative. The argument then proceeds quite logically from step to step: (1) one soul is not more perfectly 'soul' than another; (2) that means that one soul is not more perfectly 'harmony' than another (since *ψυχή=ἁρμονία*); (3) that means that one soul is not more perfectly 'harmonised' than another; (4) that means that one soul has not a 'greater share of harmony' than another; (5) that means that one soul has not a greater share of 'virtue' than another (since 'virtue' is 'harmony'—*εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη* 93 E)—which is absurd.

E 52. **εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία . . εἴη**: according to the definition given in 93 C *πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν;* the optative is by attraction to the mood of the main verb, *ἂν μετέχοι*.

94 B 65. **καὶ πάσχειν ἄν**: the infinitive of *ἔπασχεν ἄν*, 'would be in this predicament.'

I have thought it desirable to append a close translation of this difficult chapter.

'Look at it again, Simmias,' said he, 'from another point of view. Do you think it proper to a harmony, or to any other composition, to be in any other state than are the elements of which it is composed?' 'Certainly not.' 'Nor yet, I take it, to do or experience anything other than those elements do and experience?' Simmias concurred. 'Well then, it is proper to a harmony not to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to be led by them.' Again Simmias agreed. 'It is extremely improbable, then, that a harmony can undergo any contrary motion or utter a contrary sound, or in any way oppose its component parts?' 'Very unlikely indeed,' he replied. 'To proceed,' said Socrates, 'is it not the nature of every harmony to depend for its quality on the way it is

harmonised?' 'I don't quite follow you,' said Simmias. 'Why,' he replied, 'if it is better harmonised and more perfectly, admitting that to be possible, will it not be a better and more perfect harmony, and if worse and less perfectly, a worse and less perfect harmony?' 'Most decidedly.' 'Now is it true of the soul, that one more than another is, in even the smallest degree, more perfectly and completely or less perfectly and completely that which it calls itself, soul?' 'Not in the smallest degree,' answered Simmias. 'Tell me then, in the name of heaven: do we say that one soul has intelligence and virtue, and is good, and another has folly and wickedness, and is bad? And is the statement true?' 'It is indeed true.' 'What then will the man who defines soul as harmony say these qualities are which exist in the soul, virtue and vice? Another kind of harmony and discord? Will he say that the one is harmonised, the good soul, and being itself a harmony, contains in itself another kind of harmony; and that the other is itself unharmonious and does not contain in itself this other harmony?' 'I cannot say,' Simmias replied; 'but it is clear that the man who gives the definition you mention would say something of the kind.' 'Well,' said Socrates, 'we have already admitted that one soul is not more or less soul than another; and this admission means that one soul is not more or more perfectly, or less or less perfectly, harmony than another: is it not so?' 'Certainly.' 'And that that which is not more or less harmony is not more or less harmonised: is that the case?' 'It is.' 'And does that which is neither more nor less harmonised partake more or less of harmony, or to the same degree?' 'To the same degree.' 'Well then, soul, since it is not, one more or less than another, that which it calls itself, soul, is not consequently (δή) more or less harmonised?' 'That is so.' 'And if that is true of it, it could not partake more of discord or of harmony?' 'Of course not.' 'And if that again is true of it, it could not partake, more or less one than another, of vice or virtue, since (by our definition) vice is discord and virtue harmony?' 'It could not.' 'Or rather, Simmias, to speak correctly, no soul will partake of vice, since it is a harmony: for, of course, a harmony, if it answers completely to its definition as harmony, could not partake of discord.' 'Certainly not.' 'Nor, consequently, a soul of vice, if it answers to its definition as soul?' 'What we have said proves it impossible.' 'According to this line of argument, then, we find (ἡμῖν) that all souls of all living creatures will be equally good, since they are by nature equally what they call themselves, viz. souls.' 'I agree with you, Socrates,' said he. 'Do you think our conclusion is sound,'

said he, 'or that our argument would have found itself in this predicament, if our premiss, that soul is harmony, had been correct?' 'By no means,' he replied.

CHAPTER XLIII

94 B–95 A, *c.* xliii. Lastly we see that the soul rules the body, often thwarting its desires and controlling its affections; whereas we saw that a harmony could not act in opposition to its constituent elements. Soul therefore cannot be a harmony.

'The last argument rests neither upon the Ideal theory nor upon the doctrine that virtue is harmony: it is simply an appeal to common sense. Aristotle's views on the subject will be found in *de anima* I. iv. §§ 2–9. In the lost dialogue *Eudemos* he argued against harmony, (1) that harmony has an opposite, viz. *ἀναρμοστία*, but soul has no opposite—an obvious *petitio principii*; (2) that the opposite of *ἁρμονία σώματος* is *ἀναρμοστία σώματος*: the *ἀναρμοστία* is disease, weakness, and deformity, therefore the *ἁρμονία* is health, strength, and beauty; none of which is soul. See Bernays, *Dialoge des Aristoteles* p. 26.' (Archer-Hind.)

3. **ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον**: *φρόνιμον*, the reading of all the MSS., must of course agree with *ψυχήν*: one is sorely tempted to read *φρονίμου* (sc. *ἀνθρώπου*), either as governed by *ἄρχειν* or possessive genitive with *ψυχήν*: we seem to require an epithet of *ἄνθρωπος*. *τῶν ἐν ἀνθρ. πάντων* is partitive genitive with *ἔσθ' ὅ τι ἄλλο.*

4. **τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα**: 'the bodily affections' or 'inclinations': *τὰ κατά* (with accus.) is 'things connected with, concerning . .'

C 12. **ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν**: *γε* throws emphasis on to the participle—'that is to say, if it is harmony,' 'in as much as it is . .'

οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο: 'contrary to the tension, or relaxation, or vibration of the elements of which it is composed.' One of the prettiest idioms of Greek construction = *ἐκείνοις ἃ ἐπιτείνοιτο*, *ἃ* being the cognate accusative, used with intransitive verbs and passives. Thus the idiomatic Greek for 'the party-strife of the city' is *ἃ στασιάζει ἡ πόλις*, which in the genitive (e.g.)—'as a result of the party-strife'—becomes *ἀφ' ὧν στασιάζει ἡ πόλις*: every page of Dem. furnishes examples. The opt. *ἐπιτείνοιτο* is by attraction to the mood of *μήποτ' ἂν ᾄδειν*, the infin. of *οὔποτ' ἂν ᾄδοι*: cf. note on *ἐπιδεικνύοι* 72 D.

13. **καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι**: *ἄλλο* has fallen out of its proper construction after *ἐναντιουμένην*, attracted into the cognate accusative with *πάσχοι* (for *ἄλλῳ ᾡτινιοῦν πάθει ὃ πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα*).

14. **τυγχάνει οὖσα**: cf. note on 65 E.

15. **οὔποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν**: earlier in the sentence we had *μήποτ' ἂν ᾄδειν*, *μή* being the negative of strong asseveration, 'could never possibly': here we return to the ordinary negative after a verb of saying.

25. **ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις**: dative after *διαλεγομένη*. D

28. **πεποίηκεν**: in the technical sense of 'writing poetry,' 'has written, represented': cf. 60 D *πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας*. The half-serious, half-playful appeal to Homer is characteristic: so in *Theaet.* 152 E he traces back to Homer the doctrine *πάντα ῥεῖ*: *εἰπὼν γὰρ Ὠκέανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθὺν πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως.* The quotation is from *Od.* xx. 17, and is appealed to for a similar purpose in *Rep.* 441 B *τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου μαρτυρήσει τὸ στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κτλ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλῆττον πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ.*

35. **ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν**: observe the use of *κατά*, 'than any- E thing of the nature of harmony': it is contemptuous: cf. an almost exact parallel in Hdt. i. 121 *ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐκεῖ πατέρα τε καὶ μητέρα εὑρήσεις οὐ κατὰ Μιθραδάτην τε τὸν βουκόλον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ*, 'of a very different kind from': Chionides, *οὐ κατά σε*, 'none of your sort': Dem. 569. 16 *πολλὰ κἀγάθ' ὑμᾶς εἰσιν εἰργασμένοι, οὐ κατὰ τὰς Μειδίου λῃτουργίας*: cf. too 108 D *χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην*: Ar. *Frogs* 500 *εἰ δειλὸς ἔσομαι, καὶ κατὰ σὲ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων.* We have the same *κατά* in the use with comparatives followed by *ἤ*—*μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα*: *κάτα* is literally 'in the class of,' 'on a level with.' Wagner misses the point, translating 'than in the manner of harmony.'

CHAPTER XLIV

95 A–E, *c.* xliv. Having thus disposed of the theory of harmony, Socrates proceeds to deal with the objection of Kebes, which he first recapitulates. If the philosopher is to feel any reasonable confidence that his life in Hades will be the happier for his devotion to philosophy on earth, we must prove that the soul is absolutely indestructible. It is not

enough that she is strong and godlike, nor that for ages before our birth she enjoyed an intelligent existence. This does not prove her immortality: the very incarnation in a human body may be the first symptom of her coming dissolution; it matters not whether she undergo one or many such incarnations; if we cannot show that she is actually imperishable, our hope of a future life is vanity.

95 A 1. **τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας**: some of the ancient commentators gave a mystic interpretation to a passage which is merely a pleasantry on the part of Socrates: Simmias, the champion of the *ἁρμονία* theory, and Kebes are both Thebans: '*Ἁρμονία* (the daughter of Aphrodite, and wife of Theban Cadmus) has been disposed of: we must now see what we can make of Cadmus' (clearly nothing but the companion-theory of the second Theban, Kebes).

2. **ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονε**, 'has proved reasonably gracious': *ἵλεως* ('propitius,' 'secundus') is a word used of deities; so below *ἱλασόμεθα*. Mr. Archer-Hind quotes Shilleto as giving to *ἵλεα* the connotation of 'bidding farewell': *ἵλαθι*, he says, is addressed to a deity in the same sense as *χαῖρε* to a mortal: cf. Cic. *de natura deorum* i. § 124 'deinde, si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat: quid enim dicam, "propitius sit"?' Cf. Theocr. xv. 143, where the lady ends her song *ἵλαθι νῦν, φίλ' Ἄδωνι, καὶ ἐς νέωτ' εὐθυμήσαις*: so too Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 1773) thus takes leave of his heroes *ἵλατ' ἀριστήων μακάρων γένος*. So here *ἵλεα γέγονε* may include the idea of 'we have taken leave of.'

6. **θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν**: cf. note on 66 A *ὑπερφυῶς ὡς*.

B 12. **καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον**: *λόγον* put with *θαυμάζοιμι*, instead of being made subject of *πάθοι*: this position gives it emphasis to contrast with *ὁ τῆς Ἁρμονίας λόγος*.

14. **βασκανία**: cf. Lat. 'fascinum.' The malice of the gods was supposed to be excited by over-proud speech: Soph. *Ant.* 128 *Ζεὺς γὰρ μεγάλης γλώσσης κόμπους ὑπερεχθαίρει*: cf. the common formula *σὺν θεοῖς, σὺν θεῷ δ' εἰρήσεται*, used to avert this malice: in *Rep.* v. 451 A Socrates says *προσκυνῶ δ' Ἀδράστειαν* (Nemesis), *ὦ Γλαύκων, χάριν οὗ μέλλω λέγειν*: so in Latin, Cat. lxvi. 71 'pace tua fari hic liceat, Rhamnusia virgo,' viz. Nemesis, the personification of this spirit of malice. The Latin 'mala lingua' represents the same idea: Virg. *Ecl.* vii. 27—

> aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare frontem
> cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro.

The reproof in Socrates' mouth is of course only playful: the Platonic Socrates maintains that no evil can come from God, and specially that he is incapable of *φθόνος*: *Phaedr.* 247 A *φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χόρου ἵσταται.*

16. **ἐγγὺς ἰόντες**: a common phrase in Homer, so that *Ὁμηρικῶς* would seem to include both ideas, (i) in Homeric phrase: (ii) like Homer's heroes, undauntedly: 'let us come to close combat . .'

17. **εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις**, 'if there is anything after all in what you say.'

18. **τὸ κεφάλαιον**: the main point, summary, outline: cf. the verb *κεφαλαιοῦν*, 'to sum up,' 'touch the main points of.'

20. **εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνήρ**: 'note that Plato once more carefully marks the proof of immortality as merely subordinate to this main thesis' (Archer-Hind). C

22. **ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ**: sc. *ἐν βίῳ μὴ φιλοσόφῳ.*

24. **τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν . . οὐδὲν κωλύειν . . πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν**: *τὸ ἀποφαίνειν* is taken up with *ταῦτα*, subject of *μηνύειν*: *μηνύειν* depends on *κωλύειν*, 'as to the proof that . . there is nothing, you say, to prevent this from indicating not immortality, but . .'

30. **καὶ ᾔδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα**: 'and had knowledge and activity of various kinds.' D

31. **οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον**: we might possibly have expected *ἐστί*, but *ἦν* is probably due to the influence of the preceding and succeeding *ἦν*, neither of which could be anything but *ἦν*: all three refer to past time, the time preceding birth and the time of birth.

34. **ζῴη**: for this optative of reported speech without *ὅτι* cf. note on *ἐπιδεικνύοι* 87 E: here the only expressed word of speaking is *φῄς* (present), but it is in reality a historic present, going back to the moment when Kebes spoke—hence *ζῴη* is possible (*ἔφησθα ὅτι ζῴη*): so *γίγνοιτο* in 96 B *ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα.* The same explanation may perhaps be given of *εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη*, four lines below: but two other accounts of *εἴη* are possible: (*α*) due to *προσήκει φοβεῖσθαι*, which virtually equals a potential, *φοβοῖτο ἂν εἰκότως*: (*β*) it may be an example of the optative occasionally found in the subordinate clause of a perfectly general statement not referring to any particular time, past, present, or future: cf. *ἆρα δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἰατρὸς ὠφέλιμος εἶναι ᾧ ἰῷτο;* (Plato): *καὶ γὰρ ὕστερον τό γ' εὖ πράσσειν, ἐπεὶ πύθοιτο, κέρδος ἐμπολᾷ* (Soph. *Tr.* 93).

42. **πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω**: Plato, without committing the artistic error of saying directly that his next proof is the most important of all, draws attention to it by this careful statement of the argument which is to be refuted: the effect is enhanced by the opening words of the next chapter—*συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος.*

43. **εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς**: this perfectly transparent phrase would require no note, were it not for the perverse ingenuity of Wagner in creating a difficulty: he takes *προσθῇς* and *ἀφέλῃς* as subj. after *βούλει*, but in that constr. *βούλει* is interrogative, and the subj. in the first person: here the subj. depend on *ἵνα*.

CHAPTER XLV

95 E–97 B, *c.* xlv. This demands an investigation into the causes of generation and decay, on which subject Socrates proposes to relate his own experiences. In his youth he was strongly fascinated by the old physical philosophy; he inquired whether heat and cold were the universal generative forces; whether the blood were the source of intelligence, or fire, or air, or the brain. But finally he came to the conclusion that he had no aptitude for such speculations, and even lost his faith in the knowledge he before supposed himself to possess. Formerly he rested comfortably in the belief that eating and drinking were the cause of growth; nor did he shrink from saying that one man was taller than another by the head, and that ten are more than eight because of the addition of two. But now he cannot satisfy himself that the mere juxtaposition of separate units is a sufficient cause for their being two; all the less because the same result is produced by the precisely opposite process of division; nor can he even tell why one is one; but he is forced to reject the physical method as affording no real explanation of anything.

E 5. **διαπραγματεύσασθαι**: 'to go thoroughly into': cf. note on *πραγματεία* 63 A: and 77 D.

96 A 6. **τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη**, 'my own experiences': it is a point impossible to decide with certainty whether this is to be taken as historically true of Socrates (Grote, followed by Prof. Geddes), or as the history of Plato's mental development put dramatically in the mouth of Socrates (Archer-Hind, following Hermann): it is undoubtedly in favour of the former view that in the *Clouds* of Aristoph. (423 B.C.), Socrates is satirised mainly as a speculator in physical science. It may, of course,

as Mr. Archer-Hind suggests, be merely an ideal sketch of the history of the mind in the search for truth—'the development of philosophy to the theory of Ideas.'

8. **περὶ ὧν λέγεις**: in spite of inferior MSS. authority, this seems required by the sense—'your statement,' 'your argument': *περὶ ὧν ἂν λέγῃς* would have to mean, 'whatever you shall say': the *ἂν* may be due to the previous *ὧν ἂν λέγω*, and *ἂν* would bring along with it *λέγῃς* for *λέγεις*.

12. **ὑπερήφανος**: sc. *σοφία*.

17. **ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ**: B 'when hot and cold undergo a sort of fermentation,' or 'decomposition.' This doctrine was attributed by ancient writers to various philosophers of the Ionic school—Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Archelaus. The line taken in the main by the Ionian philosophers was to explain the world as derived from some single element—Thales said the primary element was 'water,' Anaximenes 'air,' and so on: Anaximander called his primary element *τὸ ἄπειρον*, of which pairs of opposites, such as *τὸ ὑγρόν* and *τὸ ξηρόν*, *τὸ θερμόν* and *τὸ ψυχρόν*, were primary determinations. The *σηπεδών* spoken of would take place by the action of *τὸ θερμόν*: cf. Ar. *Meteorologica* IV. i. 379 a 16 *σῆψις δ' ἐστὶ φθορὰ τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὑγρῷ οἰκείας καὶ κατὰ φύσιν θερμότητος ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίας θερμότητος· αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ περιέχοντος· . . καὶ ζῷα ἐγγίγνεται τοῖς σηπομένοις διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀποκεκριμένην θερμότητα φυσικὴν οὖσαν συνιστάναι τὰ ἐκκριθέντα*, a process illustrated by the formation of worms in putrefying matter, maggots in cheese, etc.

19. **καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν**: cf. Empedocles 315—

> *αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀμφιθροῶντος,*
> *τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κυκλίσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν.*
> *αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα,*

referred to without name by Lucr. iii. 43, 'et se scire animae naturam sanguinis esse,' and probably too by Virg. *Georg.* ii. 484 'frigidus obstiterit circum praecordia sanguis.'

20. **ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ**: the doctrines respectively of the Ionian philosophers Anaximenes and Heraclitus.

21. **ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλος**: the origin of this doctrine is attributed by Diog. Laert. to the Pythagoreans, though with doubtful authority: it was held by the physician Hippocrates: *οὗτος* (sc. *ὁ ἐγκέφαλος*) *γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠέρος γενομένων ἑρμηνεύς, ἢν ὑγιαίνων τυγχάνῃ· τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν αὐτῷ ὁ ἀὴρ παρέχεται . . ἐς δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν ὁ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ διαγγέλλων.*

23. **ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο**: for *γίγνοιτο* cf. notes on 87 D, 95 D.

24. **λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταὐτά**: Geddes retains the MSS. *κατὰ ταῦτα*, which he translates 'accordingly,' comparing *οὕτως* in 61 D: *κατὰ ταὐτά* would go with *ἠρεμεῖν*—'when it has acquired stability.' The doctrine here alluded to as to the origin of *ἐπιστήμη* is probably 'popular opinion,' and not that of any special philosopher or sect. It differs *toto caelo* from the Platonic doctrine, which regards *ἐπιστήμη* as fundamentally different from *δόξα*, in that the latter deals with the shifting phenomena of sense (*γιγνόμενα*), and so is itself shifting and unreliable, while the former deals with the immutable Ideas (*τὰ ὄντα*), and so is itself immutable. The difference is well brought out in the *Meno* (97 E): *καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα, καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ . . ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστί, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.*

C 29. **ἀφυὴς εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα**: 'the most stupid creature in the world': lit. 'stupid, as no (other) thing': we have a very close parallel in 92 A *καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ*.

33. **ἀπέμαθον**: 'unlearned': cf. *ἀπογιγνώσκω—ἀπέγνωσαν τὸ πορεύεσθαι*: cf. Latin 'dediscere.'

D 38. **ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται**: an allusion has been seen here to the Anaxagorean doctrine of the *ὁμοιομερῆ*, or 'homogeneous particles,' bone being formed of small particles of bone, flesh of small particles of flesh, and so on: but in view of *παντὶ δῆλον* it is perhaps best to take it as describing the ordinary man's view of the subject: the process described by Socrates is 'obviously' the outward manifestation of the assimilation of food. *μετρίως* again (five lines below) points to the same conclusion: it is an appeal to 'common-sense.'

46. **ἱκανῶς**: 'on adequate grounds': cf. 92 E *ἱκανῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι*.

E 47. **αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ**: 'simply by a head': Prof. Geddes finds a reference to *Il.* iii. 193 *μείζων μὲν κεφαλῇ Ἀγαμέμνονος*.

53. **πόρρω ἐμὲ εἶναι**: depends on *δοκεῖ*.

55. **ὅς γε**: Lat. 'qui' or 'quippe qui' with subjunctive.

57. **ᾧ προσετέθη**: i.e. 'the original "one" to which the second "one" was added.'

62. **αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία**: an instance of the common attraction of the subject into the gender of the predicate, for *τοῦτο ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο.* 97 A

63. **ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ . . τεθῆναι**: 'the combination formed by (or "consisting of") their juxtaposition,' a similar genitive of definition to *ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι* 78 D, and *τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν* 92 D.

64. **οὐδέ γε ὡς, ἐάν τις . .**: this *ὡς* anticipates, by a natural colloquial freedom of speech, the *ὡς* following *πείθεσθαι.*

73. **κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου**: 'by this method B of investigation,' viz. physical speculation.

75. **αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω**: Prof. Geddes takes *φύρω* in the sense of *φυράω*, 'to knead,' quoting Ar. *Av.* 462 *προπεφύραται λόγος εἷς μοι, ὃν διαμάττειν οὐ κωλύει*: but *φύρω* is to 'mix up,' 'confound,' and *εἰκῇ* confirms this, if confirmation was needed; cf. 101 E *ἅμα οὐκ ἂν φύροις.* Socrates is surely here only speaking with his accustomed *εἰρώνεια*: he had been forced to abandon the 'infallible' methods of the physicists, and resort to a 'wild jumble' of his own.

76. **προσίεμαι**: 'accept,' 'embrace': the same meaning can be expressed by *τοῦτό με οὐδαμῇ προσίεται*—'this does not attract me' (literally—'to draw to one's self').

CHAPTER XLVI

97 B–98 B, *c.* xlvi. Afterwards Socrates hears a passage of Anaxagoras, wherein that philosopher declares that mind is the universal cause. His hopes are thereby raised to the highest pitch; a system which takes mind for its principle cannot, he thinks, be otherwise than teleological. Anaxagoras will surely point out that mind must order all things for the best, and he will seek no other cause why each thing is as it is, but that it is best so. He will first inform us of the shape and position of the earth and then explain how that shape and position were the best; and similarly with all other natural phenomena, assigning as the cause the best for each and all. So he read the book with eager anticipation.

1. **ἐκ βιβλίου τινός**: 'but once hearing a man reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, which declared . .': *ἀναγιγνώσκοντος* agrees with *τινός* (masc.), *λέγοντος* probably with *βιβλίου*, though it may agree with *τινός.*

3. **ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν**: cf. Anaxagoras' own C words, quoted by Diog. Laertius—*πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ·*

εἶτα ὁ νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. Cf. Ar. *Met.* I. iii. 984. 8 (after speaking of the physical speculators) *μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῶν οὐσῶν γεννῆσαι τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, πάλιν ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὴν ἐχομένην ἐζήτησαν ἀρχήν. τοῦ γὰρ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν τὰ δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων ἴσως οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε γῆν οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν οὔτ' εἰκὸς αἴτιον εἶναι οὔτ' ἐκείνους οἰηθῆναι· οὐδ' αὖ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς εἶχεν. νοῦν δή τις εἰπὼν εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον.*

8. **καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ**: i.e. he imagined that Anaxagoras' theory of *νοῦς* would be what modern philosophy calls a 'teleological' explanation of the universe, indicating that the universe is designed by a supreme intelligence to attain to a perfect *τέλος*, and that things are as they are because they fit in best with this design.

D 15. **περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου**: 'with regard to his particular object of inquiry,' *ἐκείνου* referring to *περὶ ἑκάστου* above, as *περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν* does in the next line.

21. **κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ**: 'to my mind,' with a playful reference to the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras. This reminds us of the similar play on the phrase 'ex animi mei sententia' (meaning (*a*) 'to the best of my knowledge,' (*b*) 'to my liking') recorded by Cic. *de Or.* ii. 64. 270 'ridicule illud L. Nasica censori Catoni, cum ille, "ex tui animi sententia tu uxorem habes?" "non hercule," inquit, "ex animi mei sententia."'

23. **πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη**: many of the Ionian speculators held that the earth was flat, e.g. Anaximenes and Thales, the latter maintaining that it floated like a piece of wood—*οἱ δὲ ἐφ' ὕδατος κεῖσθαι (φασὶ τὴν γῆν)· τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον παρειλήφαμεν τὸν λόγον, ὅν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον, ὡς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον*: the Pythagoreans, on the other hand, believed it to be spherical.

E 26. **ἄμεινον ἦν**: not to be confused with *ἄμεινον εἴη*: it would be *ἦν*, not *ἐστί*, in the O.R.: it signifies 'has been from the beginning,' 'was in the beginning of things': Wohlrab well compares the Arist. formula *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.*

27. **ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι**: observe the force of *ἐπι*—'go on to show.'

98 A 36. **οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾤμην**: *ἂν* goes with *ἐπενεγκεῖν* (inf. of *ἐπενέγκοι ἄν*).

φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμῆσθαι: for the con-

sistency of the Platonic system of 'Ideas' with the principle here enunciated cf. Introduction B ad finem.

39. **ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα**: 'in assigning to each phenomenon its cause and to the universe in general, I thought he would go on to explain what was best for each and what was the universal good.' B

CHAPTER XLVII

98 B–99 D, *c.* xlvii. Bitter was his disappointment when he found that Anaxagoras did not really use mind as a cause, but accounted for phenomena by the agency of merely physical forces. Exactly similar would be the conduct of one who, after saying that Socrates acted by intelligence, should maintain that he sat there in prison because he had muscles and sinews and joints which enabled him to do so; instead of assigning the real cause, that he thought it right to submit to the judgment of the Athenian people. So far as his bones and muscles are concerned, he might have been at Megara by this time; only he thought it his duty to remain. To call such things causes is folly; although they may be termed instruments without which the cause would not produce its effect. But just this confusion of cause and instrument is made by those who suppose a vortex or some other physical force is what keeps the earth in the centre, instead of the true cause, that it is best for it to be there. About this supreme cause, the good, Socrates would gladly have learnt, could he have found a teacher: as it is he was obliged to content himself with the second best method.

1. **ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος**: Wagner translates this 'starting from great hope I was sailing along, when as I went on' . . : this will not do: (i) *ἀπό* is too familiar with *ἐλπίδος*, in such phrases as *καταβάλλεσθαι ἀπ' ἐλπίδος*, to be used in this new sense of 'starting from': (ii) *ᾠχόμην φερόμενος* can hardly mean 'I was sailing along': it would have to mean 'I was off at top speed,' which is not to the point: (iii) *ἐπειδή* can hardly bear the sense of the Latin 'cum subito.' The meaning is quite different—'from what high hopes was I plunged headlong when, on going on to read, I found' . .

3. **ἄνδρα**: 'a man who': not the same as *τὸν ἄνδρα*.

4. **[οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον]**: this must surely be an interpolation, and an unintelligent one. If retained it must be translated 'nor assigning any *real* causes': but we cannot give to *αἰτίαι*, at this stage of the argument, the meaning 'real

causes,' as later on (D) he gives the name of *αἰτίαι* to the 'so-called causes' of Anaxagoras—*ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος*. It is not till 99 A that he says *ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον*. Again both *τινας*, the most unemphatic of words, and the plural *αἰτίας* are against this translation: *αἰτίας τινὰς ἐπαιτιώμενον* is the very thing Plato might accuse Anaxagoras of doing.

C 7. **πεπονθέναι**: a common euphemism, especially in the orators, for *ἁμαρτάνειν*.

14. **διαφυάς**: 'joints,' the same thing as *ἄρθρα* regarded from a different point of view, *διαφυαί* as breaking the continuity of the limbs, *ἄρθρα* as knitting the parts of the limb together.

χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων: this use of the preposition is notable; it is practically 'adjectival,' taking the place of a participle—*χωρίζοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων*.

D 15. **τὰ δὲ νεῦρα**: in the regular Platonic sense of 'muscles,' 'sinews,' not 'nerves.'

17. **ὃ συνέχει αὐτά**: *αὐτά* is best perhaps taken to embrace *νεῦρα*, *ὀστᾶ* and *σάρκες*.

αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων: this, instead of gen. absolute, might have been *ὀστᾶ* as the object of *χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα*: cf. 77 E *ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν* (note).

99 A 30. **νὴ τὸν κύνα**: cf. *Apol.* 22 A, *Rep.* iii. 399 E, *Gorg.* 482 B, where it takes the fuller form *μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν*. Prof. Geddes in his note on this familiar Socratic oath combats the view, held for example by the Christian Fathers, that it expressed Socrates' contempt for the popular religion of the Greeks (cf. Tertullian, 'taceo de philosophis, Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat'). The form of it found in *Gorgias loc. cit.* suggests that it was derived from an Egyptian source: the Egyptian god Anubis was represented with the head of a dog. In the scholiast on Ar. *Birds* 521 we have recorded the decree of the Cretan Rhadamanthys, evidently from an Egyptian source—*λέγεται* (*Ῥαδάμανθυς*) *πρῶτον οὐδένα ἐᾶν ὅρκους ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλ' ὀμνύναι κελεῦσαι χῆνα καὶ κύνα καὶ κριὸν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια*. We may attribute the Socratic oath, then, rather to true reverence than to any contempt of the gods of Greece.

33. **εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην**: the pros and cons of escape from prison are the subject of the *Crito*.

B 41. **καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων**: MSS. have *πράττω*, which would

mean 'to say that it is because of these things that I do what I do, and at the same time that I do it by intelligence.' But there are several objections to this: (i) 'at the same time' in the translation is not in the Greek, though vital to the meaning: (ii) *ταῦτα* is odd, in a different sense from *διὰ ταῦτα*: (iii) why is *πράττω* substituted for *ποιῶ*, if *ταῦτα* is its direct object? (iv) most fatal of all, *ἀλλά* must introduce a verb contrasting with the *last preceding* principal verb, and this condition is violated by *πράττω* coming between. All these objections are done away with by Heindorf's neat emendation *πράττων*—'and that too though I act by intelligence': (i) the idiomatic *καὶ ταῦτα* supplies the necessary 'at the same time': (ii) *καὶ ταῦτα* is the familiar idiom, so that *ταῦτα* creates no difficulty: (iii) *πράττων* is used because no object is expressed: (iv) *διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ* becomes the principal clause immediately preceding *ἀλλά*.

43. **ῥᾳθυμία τοῦ λόγου**: 'a slip-shod way of speaking.'

τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι: much better taken as an anacoluthon than as the indignant exclamatory infinitive. The *τὸ μή* clause becomes lost in the relative clause *ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται*, and the verbal phrase (e.g. *εὔηθές ἐστι*), so easily supplied, is not expressed.

47. **ψηλαφῶντες**: 'groping blindly': cf. *χερσὶ ψηλαφόων* Hom. *Od.* ix. 416 of the blinded Cyclops, and the familiar *εἰ ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν (τὸν θεὸν) καὶ εὕροιεν* (Acts xvii. 27) of the heathen 'groping after God': *ὃ*, in *ὃ δή μοι*, is perhaps best taken with *προσαγορεύουσι*: *ψηλαφ.* used absolutely.

48. **ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι**: 'a name that does not belong to it.'

49. **ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθείς**: this explanation was given by Empedocles: cf. Arist. *de caelo* II. xiii. 295 a 16 *οἱ δ' ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιθέουσαν καὶ θᾶττον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυάθοις ὕδωρ* (as water stays in a cup which is whirled round rapidly). This 'vortex' theory was so familiar a one that Ar. (*Clouds* 379) represents *Δῖνος* as the new god in place of Zeus: speaking of the clouds, he says:—

> *Στρεψ.* ὁ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτάς, οὐχ ὁ Ζεύς, ὥστε φέρεσθαι;
> *Σωκρ.* ἥκιστ', ἀλλ' αἰθέριος δῖνος. *Στρεψ.* Δῖνος; τουτί μ' ἐλελήθει,
> ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλ' ἀντ' αὐτοῦ Δῖνος νυνὶ βασιλεύων.

There is some doubt about the construction of *ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*: most of the editors take it with *δίνην* (Stallb.,

Wohlrab, Wagner), comparing 110 E ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότων (where v. note): there is no difficulty in ὑπό with the verbal noun, but two points are decidedly in favour of taking ὑπό with μένειν: (i) δίνην . . ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ would mean 'a revolving of the earth *caused by* the heavens,' whereas the δίνη is 'the revolution *of* the heavens' (cf. quotation from Aristotle and use of the word περιτιθείς): (ii) if ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ is taken with δίνη it leaves μένειν very abrupt: we should at least expect the idiomatic οὕτω with it— οὕτω δὴ μένειν ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν. μένειν is virtually a passive—'is kept in its place by,' cf. ὑπό with πίπτειν, ἀποθανεῖν, and the like.

51. **ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ**: lit. 'others again set the air beneath it as a support, as though it were a flat kneading-trough': cf. Arist. *l.c.* Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλάτος αἴτιον εἶναί φασιν τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν· οὐ γὰρ τέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιπωματίζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν ('lies like a lid on the air beneath it'). Aristophanes exercises his wit on κάρδοπος (*Clouds* 670 sqq.) as he had already done on δίνη: being feminine, Socrates says, it should be called καρδόπη.

53. **τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε**: τοῦ of course goes with κεῖσθαι— lit. 'the faculty of being disposed in the best possible manner in which they could be placed.'

C 55. **δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν**: the subject of ἔχειν is presumably not ταύτην, but αὐτά of the previous clause.

56. **Ἄτλαντα**: as Atlas bears the weight of the physical universe on his shoulders, so we want to find an Efficient Cause capable of supporting the burden of the universe: τούτου is probably not neuter for ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως, but masculine with reference to Atlas: 'an Atlas stronger and more divine than the true Atlas.'

58. **τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον**: 'the good and binding,' a play on the double sense of δέον, 'right' and 'binding': cf. *Cratylus* 418 E ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὖσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς. Mr. Archer-Hind points the bearing of this criticism: 'All this critique of Anaxagoras is a propaedeutic to the Ideal theory. The main fault of Anaxagoras is that 'the good' is not the ultimate cause in his system. Plato supplies his defects (in the *Republic* first, and still more in the later dialogues) (i) by making τὸ ἀγαθόν the principle of all existence, so that each thing really exists in proportion as it is perfect; (ii) in that νοῦς, instead of being a merely external motive power, is actually the universe: causation is ultimately identity.'

63. **τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν**: this common proverb is taken from the seafaring life so familiar to the Athenian: cf. Eustathius *δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται ὅτε ἀποτυχών τις οὐρίου κώπαις πλέῃ*: so *Phileb.* 19 C *καλὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτόν*: Arist. *Nic. Eth.* II. ix. 4 *ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν.* D

CHAPTER XLVIII

99 D–100 A, *c.* xlviii. Since then, continues Socrates, I have been forced to abandon the investigation of physical phenomena, and fearing lest, as those who rashly take observations by gazing on the sun himself, instead of his reflection in the water, are bereft of their bodily vision, my soul should be blinded by gazing directly at phenomena, I bethought me of contemplating their images, by which I mean definitions or concepts. And yet to call these definitions images is perhaps somewhat misleading: for he that investigates definitions certainly does not contemplate an 'image' more than he who observes sensible objects. Anyhow this was the course I took: assuming the best definition I could form, I regard whatever agrees with that as true, and whatever does not I reject as false. I will presently explain my method more clearly.

2. **ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν**: few passages in ancient literature have caused so great diversity of interpretation as this: to state and discuss at length all the interpretations would be beyond the scope of this book. The crucial point is *τὰ ὄντα*: is this (i) 'realities,' *τὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα*, or (ii) 'things,' 'the physical world'? I think the latter: if it had been meant in the former sense, would it not have been expressed more distinctly (e.g. *αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα*)? cf. 97 D *τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων*, where *τὰ ὄντα* is clearly 'the physical world.' These *ὄντα* then correspond to the *ἥλιος ἐκλείπων*, and it is here that the difficulty arises. Mr. Archer-Hind contends (and quite correctly) that elsewhere (e.g. *Rep.* 516) 'the Ideas' are represented under the figure of the sun as seen with the naked eye, and as dazzling the intelligence that has not been led up by degrees to contemplate them: from which he argues that Plato could not possibly compare 'the phenomena of sense' to the sun, and the *λόγοι*, or 'conceptions,' to a reflection of the sun in water. This, I think, is to argue too much, and my own impression, from reading and re-reading this very difficult chapter, is that we are to find in it an example of the Socratic *εἰρωνεία*: 'I failed,' says Socrates, in effect, 'to arrive at a satisfactory *αἰτία*

by the method of physical investigation, even the νοῦς theory of Anaxagoras, from which I hoped so much, proving a broken reed: but perhaps the light was too strong for my eyes: I determined to see if I could not study phenomena through some sort of "reflection" or "image."'

This enables us to give a natural rendering to *βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι*, which positively must be taken of 'looking at physical phenomena with the eyes.' In an article in the *Classical Review* (vol. xv. p. 249), Mr. R. K. Gaye, arguing for the interpretation of *τὰ ὄντα* as 'realities,' 'Ideas,' lays great stress on *τὰ πράγματα*, to which he gives the same meaning: 'the Ideas,' he says, 'have already in this dialogue been referred to as *τὰ πράγματα*: *αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα* (66 D), where no stress need be laid on *αὐτά*, which merely correlates with *αὐτῇ* immediately preceding.' Strange language indeed for a Platonist! Surely *αὐτά* is the very last word to be disregarded in such a discussion: an impartial reading of the phrase *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα* in its context suggests that the phrase itself indicates that *τὰ πράγματα* without *αὐτά* would simply mean 'things,' i.e. 'phenomena.' Mr. Gaye further says: 'I do not know of any passage in which *πράγματα* is used definitely of particulars.' Here are two very clear cases: 98 B *τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα*: does Mr. Gaye translate this, 'making no use of *νοῦς* in the arrangement of the Ideas'? Still clearer is 103 B *τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.*

Further, this interpretation seems to me to give a natural point to *ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω . . οὐκ ἔοικεν.* Socrates has called the *λόγοι* an *εἰκών*: an *εἰκών* of what? Those who take *τὰ ὄντα* to mean 'the Ideas' say 'an *εἰκών* of the Ideas': but, if so, why does he immediately tone down his metaphor, and say 'I am far from allowing that the *λόγοι* are more of an *εἰκών* than *τὰ ἔργα*.' According to Mr. Archer-Hind's interpretation, he has said nothing that could possibly suggest such an idea. If, on the other hand, we take *τὰ ὄντα* as 'physical phenomena,' then by calling *λόγοι* an *εἰκὼν τῶν ὄντων*, Socrates does seem distinctly to suggest that the *λόγοι* have less reality than the phenomena, and so naturally he proceeds immediately to correct that impression by saying that we are not to press the word *εἰκών* too closely—*ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν.*

Finally Mr. Archer-Hind lays great stress on *δεύτερος πλοῦς* (v. note on 99 D): he says it implies that the *πρῶτος πλοῦς*, with which it contrasts, must be a 'superior method': that Socrates could not call 'physical investigation,' 'the examination of phenomena,' his *πρῶτος πλοῦς*, and the *λόγοι* a *δεύτερος*

πλοῦς: consequently the πρῶτος πλοῦς must be the 'Ideal theory,' especially the discovery of τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον. But is not δεύτερος πλοῦς just the sort of thing we might expect of Socrates in 'irony'? cf. the closing words of ch. xlv. ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω. Socrates' 'second best' turns out to be not so bad in the end: what is it, after all, as developed in the succeeding chapters, but the 'theory of Ideas,' that a thing is what it is by virtue of its indwelling Idea? It is this on which his final proof of the soul's immortality rests, and his audience are satisfied with it: can we believe that Plato seriously meant to call this method of proof a 'second-best,' something short of the ideal at which Socrates had once aimed?

[While my MS. was in the printers' hands, two articles by Mr. W. J. Goodrich have appeared in the *Classical Review*, vol. xvii. p. 384, and vol. xviii. p. 5, criticizing Mr. Gaye's article in the same spirit as my note, and adopting the same view of τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν. H.W.]

11. **εἰς τοὺς λόγους**: the Socratic λόγοι are very much what we mean by 'definitions,' or more closely still 'concepts': cf. Introd. B. E

13. **ᾧ εἰκάζω**: sc. τούτῳ ᾧ εἰκάζω αὐτό. 100 A

14. **οὐ . . πάνυ**: 'I am far from allowing.'

15. **ἐν εἰκόσι**: Socrates has called the λόγοι an εἰκών of τὰ ὄντα, 'phenomena' (cf. note on ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη): he now guards against a misconception, viz. that of imagining that the λόγοι are less real than 'phenomena': phenomena themselves are, according to the Platonic doctrine, εἰκόνες of the Ideas.

16. **ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις**: the word ἔργον is chosen, not to suggest that phenomena are the 'effects' of the Ideas, but because ἔργον is a natural contrast to λόγος.

ἀλλ' οὖν δή: much the same as the commoner δ' οὖν: 'well, however that may be.'

CHAPTER XLIX

100 B–102 A, *c.* xlix. My method is nothing new, he proceeds: it starts from the Ideal theory which is familiar to us; and by means of this theory I hope to prove the soul's immortality. Starting from the assumption that there are Ideas of beautiful, and just, and great, etc., I simply affirm that all particulars possessing these qualities possess them through the Idea, whether by participation, presence, or communion, or

however you may define the connection. All other causes are beyond my comprehension ; I cling simply to my safe reply, that the Idea of the beautiful is the cause of beauty. If you accept this, you will never consent to say that one man is greater or less than another by a head, but by greatness or smallness ; nor that ten are more than eight by two, but by multitude. Similarly when one is added to one, or divided, the cause why the two are two is not addition or division, but the Idea of duality ; all other causes you would leave to wiser heads than yours. Again if you were forced to give an account of your hypothesis, you would proceed to a higher generalisation, and again to another ; ascending till you reached one that was adequate : and you would beware of falling into the confusions of thought, of which sham philosophers are guilty. Here Echecrates interrupts to express his admiration of Socrates' clear exposition.

The upshot of this chapter is that universals alone can be known. For the present, however, these universals are in the form of *λόγοι* or *ὑποθέσεις*, which are not objects of *νοῦς* proper. When dialectic is made perfect, *λόγοι* will be exchanged for *ἰδέαι*, *ὑποθέσεις* for *ἀρχαί*.

B 2. **καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ** : cf. e.g. opening words of ch. xxii. 76 D.

4. **ἔρχομαι . . ἐπιχειρῶν** : the ptcp. is more usually future, but *ἐπιχειρῶ* has the force of a future itself, so that the present ptcp. is more logical : cf. the common phrase *ὅπερ ᾖα ἐρῶν*, 'as I was going to say' : for the verb of 'going,' to express a future, cf. besides the English idiom, the Latin future infinitive passive 'datum iri.'

11. **τὴν αἰτίαν . . ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή** : observe how the Greek word *αἰτία* covers both 'cause' and 'explanation.'

C 13. **οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων** : lit. 'you cannot be too quick in proceeding,' i.e. 'pray proceed right away' : cf. Eur. *I. T.* 245 *χέρνιβας δὲ καὶ κατάργματα | οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἂν εὐτρεπῆ ποιουμένη.*

16. **οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο** : a more emphatic form of *δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο*.

D 22. **ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον** : the ptcp. explains *δι' ὅ τι*, 'viz. because it has . .' : cf. 102 D *λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί.*

26. **ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως** : 'simply, artlessly, it may be foolishly' : *ἀτέχνως* is to be distinguished from *ἀτεχνῶς* (=omnino).

29. **εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένου** : by a natural

Greek idiom the third alternative of the series, *εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε . .*, is expressed by a different construction from the first two: Plato is saying that what makes a beautiful thing beautiful is the relation in which it stands to the 'Idea of beauty': he does not wish to specify precisely what that relation is: it may be *παρουσία*, or *κοινωνία*, or a relation of some other sort. The MSS. have *προσγενομένη*, a ptcp. which cannot apply to *παρουσία* or *κοινωνία*: it is not *παρουσία* or *κοινωνία* which 'stands in a certain connection' with the object, but *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, and our ptcp. describing the relation must agree with *ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ*: Ueberweg's emendation, *προσγενομένου*, is almost certainly right. Mr. Archer-Hind adopts this, though he quotes in support of the suggestion to omit the ptcp. altogether Plato *Laws* 899 B *θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως*: but it is one thing to use *ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως* absolutely as parallel to a ptcp., quite another thing to use it as parallel to a noun like *παρουσία* or *κοινωνία*. Other editors propose *προσαγορευομένη* (but the 'name' is not the point; it is rather the 'mode of relation'); Wohlrab, to keep *προσγενομένη*, reads *ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μέθεξις εἴτε παρουσίᾳ εἴτε κοινωνίᾳ εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη*, thus losing a very pretty idiom, and making *προσγενομένη* refer to *μέθεξις*, to which it applies no better than to *παρουσία* or *κοινωνία*.

30. **οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι**: *ἔτι* is to be noticed: its use is 'logical,' not 'temporal': 'for I do not go on to insist on that point.'

54. **τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι**: at first sight this looks **101 B**
like a verbal quibble on the two uses of the dative in *τῇ κεφαλῇ*, (i) modal, (ii) causal; in reality Plato is clearing up a logical difficulty: he points out by a 'reductio ad absurdum' the danger of assigning as the cause of a thing some outward appearance rather than the possession of a quality or property.

67. **τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ**: *ἑκάστου* is the **C**
possessive genitive after *οὐσίας*—'the particular essence of each quality of which it participates': *ἑκάστου* corresponds e.g. to *δυάδος* in *ἡ οὐσία τῆς δυάδος*.

73. **κομψείας**: 'refinements,' 'subtleties': *κομψός* in the contemptuous sense is commonly applied to the sophists and their kind: cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 426 *κομψός γ' ὁ κῆρυξ καὶ παρεργάτης λόγων*: *Rhes.* 625 *τρίβων γὰρ εἶ τὰ κομψά*: cf. *Crat.* 429 D *κομψότερος ὁ λόγος ἢ κατ' ἐμέ*: *Laches* 197 D *πρέπει σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα κομψεύεσθαι*: Eur. *Antiope* *ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφεὶς σοφίσματα.*

D 76. **τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιάν**: an obvious figure of speech to express 'excessive caution' or 'timidity,' common to many languages: for *τὸ λεγόμενον* cf. note on 66 C.

77. **ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως**: 'clinging to the safety of your hypothesis': the hypothesis is the same as the *λόγος*, a 'concept' or 'definition' (e.g. 'beauty') arrived at by observation and generalisation from particulars (cf. Intr. B § 2): or perhaps, to speak with more accuracy, the hypothesis is the 'assumption of the truth of the *λόγος*.'

78. **[εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο]**: obviously *ἔχοιτο* is wrong, occurring in the unusual sense of 'attack' immediately after being used in its regular meaning of 'cling to': Madvig proposed *ἔφοιτο*, which would meet this objection. But there are other grave objections to the whole passage: (i) *εἰ δέ τις . . ἔφοιτο* is merely a clumsy repetition of the next clause *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον*, where the wording *ἐκείνης αὐτῆς* appears to me to imply a *contrast* with the clause immediately preceding, i.e. with 'deductions from the hypothesis.' (ii) *εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ* does not correspond to the Platonic method: the hypothesis (v. previous note) is arrived at by generalisation from particulars: once it is formed, particulars are to be judged by reference to it, and not by comparison with each other. (iii) Mr. Archer-Hind suggests that *ὁρμηθέντα* should be *ὡρμημένα*. (iv) *ἕως ἂν . . σκέψαιο* is not Greek: why *ἕως ἄν*? (cf. below *ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις* in an exactly parallel clause): L. and S. quote in support of *ἕως ἄν* with opt. Soph. *Trach.* 687 *ἕως ἂν ἀρτίχριστον ἁρμόσαιμί που*, which I find Jebb alters to *ἕως νιν*; of course this point is not conclusive evidence against the genuineness of the whole sentence, as *ἕως ἄν* might be a 'pictorial repetition' of *ἐφῇς ἄν*.

83. **ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης**: just as we treated particulars, reducing them to a *λόγος* by a process of generalisation, so we now treat our hypothesis: we bring it under some higher genus, some higher generalisation.

84. **ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν**: for the meaning of *ἄνωθεν*, 'more general,' 'more universal,' cf. Ar. *Post. Anal.* I. xx. 82 a 23 *λέγω δὲ ἄνω μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου, κάτω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος.*

85. **ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις**: there is no need to find here an allusion to the final *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* (called in *Rep.* *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος*): it only means 'a generalisation which satisfies the man who impugns your first hypothesis': 'satisfactory.'

ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις: MSS. have *φύροιο*: if passive, it

does not give the sense required, and the middle verb (as some editors explain it) has no authority: we want an equivalent of *ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες* in the next clause. Is *ἅμα* to be taken closely with *φύροις*? i.e. 'You would not confuse, by discussing together': I am inclined to think so, for *ἅμα δέ*, in its usual sense of 'and at the same time,' is out of place: Socrates is not pointing out a 'further advantage' of this process, as that *ἅμα δέ* would imply.

Observe the force of this precaution—in discussion you must keep quite distinct, (i) discussion of deductions from a hypothesis, (ii) discussion of the validity of the hypothesis itself: your opponent must either allow your hypothesis (i.e. allow you to assume its truth), or impugn it: in the latter case you must try to establish your hypothesis by continually higher generalisation, till you reach one that satisfies him (*ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις*).

91. **ὅμως δύνασθαι**: a somewhat illogical repetition of the idea of *ἱκανοί*, due to *ὅμως*: 'they are quite equal to . . and still being able to satisfy themselves.' E

95. **νὴ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε**: the adverb goes with *ἔφη*: 'I am not surprised they assented.' This is the last dramatic interruption of the argument for immortality, and marks that the climax is approaching: our final proof is to rest on the 'hypothesis' just enunciated, that there are such things as *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον* and the like, and that it is by participation in these essences that things possess the qualities which they do possess: from this Socr. goes on to deduce his final and convincing proof that *ψυχή* is immortal (cf. opening words of ch. 1.). 102 A

CHAPTER L

102 A–103 A, *c.* 1. Assuming then that Ideas exist corresponding to the hypotheses, and that by participation in them particulars possess their attributes, Socrates proceeds thus. When we say Simmias is bigger than Socrates and less than Phaedo, we are speaking loosely: in reality Simmias partakes of the Ideas of great and small; and it is greatness in him which is bigger than smallness in Socrates, and smallness in him that is less than greatness in Phaedo. For it has nothing to do with the personality of Simmias, Socrates and Phaedo, as such, that one is greater or less than another. We observe then that (1) two opposite Ideas can coexist in the same subject, although (2) such opposite Ideas cannot combine with each

other, either (3) as they exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they are manifested in concrete particulars. And this incapacity of one opposite Idea to take upon it the nature of the other is true of all pairs of opposite Ideas as well as great and small.

Setting aside the metaphysical objections to the doctrine of Ideas of relation, which we have here in its most pronounced form, it conveniently serves Plato's purpose to show that in particulars contradictory Ideas may coexist. In 103 D we pass on to the next stage. We are here dealing with the participation by particulars in Ideas which are not essential to their nature. Greatness and smallness are not essential to a man as heat is essential to fire and cold to snow. With this chapter it is well to contrast *Parmenides* 150 A foll. (Archer-Hind.)

B 3. **τἆλλα**: i.e. the phenomena of the world.

10. **ἀλλὰ γάρ**: 'however,' introduces a modification or qualification of what has preceded. The point of this exceedingly difficult chapter does not seem to me to have been brought out very clearly by any of the editors: the critical words seem to me to be *οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων*. Greatness or smallness is not part of the essential character, part of the *λόγος* we might say, of Simmias: it is an 'accidental' predicate (*τυγχάνει ἔχων*) applied in relation to some other individual: he can part with it, and yet retain his identity (cf. E *ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι*): the Idea of 'greatness' in him *ὑπεκχωρεῖ* on the approach of the Idea of smallness. Cf. *Parmenides* 129 B *εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἄν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι.*

12. **οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν**: *τὸ ἀληθές* is of course the subject of *ἔχειν*, the constr. of *τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν* being allowed to lapse: trans. 'as to Simmias exceeding Socr., do you admit that the truth is not exactly as expressed in the words?'

D 23. **τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων**: the MSS. for *ὑπέχων* read *ὑπερέχων*, which would have to govern *τὴν σμικρότητα*: 'surpassing the smallness of the one (Socr.) by surpassing it in greatness, and lending to the other (Phaedo) by comparison a greatness exceeding his own shortness': this gives a very awkward and obscure sense, and involves the use of *ὑπερέχειν* with gen. and accus. in the two clauses: Madvig's conj. *ὑπέχων* is almost certainly right (*ὑπερέχων* being due to

frequent recurrence of this word in the sentence): 'submitting his smallness to the greatness of the one (Phaedo) to be surpassed by it (epexegetic infinitive), and to the other (Socr.) presenting his own greatness, surpassing that other's smallness.' Here the phraseology is rather elaborate than obscure: Socrates laughingly apologises for it in the next words.

26. **ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν**: there can be little doubt that the *ξυγγραφή* meant is 'a bond,' 'a legal document': 'it looks as if I were going to speak in the style of an indenture.'

29. **οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος**: not merely the Idea in the abstract, but also the 'Idea' as informing the particular, is incapable of admitting its opposite: this point is of vital importance when we come to the application of it to the case of *ψυχή*.

37. **ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος**: the sentence is best printed with E
only a comma after *ὅπερ ἦν* (Mr. Archer-Hind seems to take it in this way, though he prints a full stop): trans. 'in the way that I accept and submit to smallness and, still remaining the man I am, without losing my identity am small': it illustrates the process just described as impossible for *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος*, viz. *εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν*: '*τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος* cannot be *σμικρόν* (*ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν*) as I can.'

45. **ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι**: sc. *ἐν τῷ προσιέναι αὐτῷ τὸ* 103 A
ἐναντίον.

CHAPTER LI

103 A–C, *c.* li. One of the company suggests that this doctrine is inconsistent with our former theory of generation from opposites (70 C foll.). Socrates replies that then we were speaking of particulars possessing the attributes of such opposites, but now we deal with the absolute opposites themselves. The former can pass from one to the other of two opposite conditions; but the opposite itself can never put on the nature of its opposite.

3. **ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις**: sc. 70 E sqq.

6. **ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη**: 'precisely this': *αὕτη* is of course predicate, and is explained by *ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων*.

9. **παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλήν**: 'bending his head,' to catch the remark, which may have been made in a low tone from diffidence.

13. **ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος**: *πρᾶγμα* is here the 'con- B
crete particular' as contrasted with *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον*, 'the

abstract Idea': this is the point that Socrates has been making in the previous chapter, that Socrates is not bigger or smaller by virtue of being Socrates, i.e. that bigness and smallness are not part of the definition, or *λόγος*, of Socrates, and so there is nothing to prevent Socrates from becoming 'bigger' or 'smaller' without losing his identity: hot water can become cold water, because 'hot' and 'cold' are not essential properties of water.

19. **ὧν ἐνόντων**: not genitive absolute: *ὧν* depends on *ἐπωνυμίαν*.

21. **γένεσιν ἀλλήλων**: the verbal noun of *γίγνεσθαι ἄλληλα*, 'submit to becoming each the other.'

24. **ἐτάραξεν**: v. note on 86 E *τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον*.

C 25. **οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχω**: 'no, said he, not this time': he had seen objections to various points earlier on, e.g. 61 D and 87 A sqq., but with this particular difficulty he is not in sympathy.

CHAPTER LII

103 C–104 C, c. lii. The mutually exclusive opposites, hot and cold, are not identical with fire and snow; yet we see that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. Whence we infer that there may be an Idea which is not one of a pair of opposites, but which may exclude one of such opposites. For instance, the Idea of odd is opposite to that of even, and exclusive of it. Also the Idea of three, though not opposite to even, excludes it, because the Idea of three necessarily carries with it the Idea of odd. Similarly the Idea of even and the Idea of two exclude the Idea of odd. Thus it appears that there are (1) opposite Ideas which are mutually exclusive, (2) other Ideas, not identical with any such opposite but necessarily partaking of it, which, equally with that opposite, exclude the other opposite.

3. **ἆρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ**; 'are they the same things as snow and fire?' We are approaching a fresh stage of the argument: ch. 50 has shown that opposite Ideas cannot admit of each other: now Socrates is to show that things of which one of a pair of opposites is an '*essential*' attribute cannot admit the opposite of that Idea: 'snow' involves the Idea of 'cold,' and so cannot admit 'warm,' but must either withdraw from it or perish.

E 18. **ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί**: here *μορφή* is used as a synonym of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*, as is proved

by 104 D ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ: 'snow is not the same as "cold" (ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο) but always contains the Idea of cold' (ἔχει τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν). With ἄλλο τι we are to understand again ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος, 'snow must always have the predicate cold.'

26. **καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν**: sc. περιττόν. 104 A

διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι: 'because it is its essential nature, never to be without oddness': for πεφυκέναι cf. 102 B οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, and opening remarks on ch. 50 (note on ἀλλὰ γάρ).

34. **ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας**: 'one entire half of the series of numbers,' i.e. all the odd numbers, a common Greek idiom for τὸ ἥμισυ (or τὸ ἥμισυ μέρος) τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ: cf. Thuc. i. 2 τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη, on which Classen observes 'the peculiarity, and, properly speaking, irrationality of this turn of expression may be explained in this way: the noun in the genitive should be understood in a collective sense, i.e. as if it were in the plural, but should be supplied to the adjective in a partial sense. The two expressions "the best land" (partial) and "the best of the land" (generic) are mixed up in Greek in a manner not admissible to our sense of language': cf. Thuc. i. 5 τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου: viii. 8 τὰς ἡμισείας τῶν νεῶν.

37. **ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος**: 'the alternate row of numbers,' B viz. the even numbers.

44. **ἔοικε δεχομένοις**: 'seem to admit': for the constr. cf. Hom. *Il.* xxiii. 379 αἰεὶ γὰρ δίφρου ἐπιβησομένοισι ἐΐκτην, Pl. *Prot.* 361 B ἔοικε σπεύδοντι, 'he seems anxious . .'

46. **ἤτοι ἀπολλύμενα**: here the ptcps., instead of following ἔοικε in the dative, somewhat ungrammatically agree with the subject, as though ἔοικε had been φαίνεται.

CHAPTER LIII

104 C–105 B, *c.* liii. Let us define these Ideas more closely. Such an Idea is not itself one of two opposite Ideas; nevertheless, into whatsoever particulars it informs it carries along with it one of these opposites; so that the particulars are called not only by the name of their own Idea, but by the name of this opposite also; nor can they admit the other opposite without ceasing to be what they are. For instance three particulars are three by participation in the ideal triad; but they are also odd, because the triad always carries with it the Idea of oddness. Consequently they can never admit the

Idea of even without ceasing to be three. Of this a number of other examples are given.

D 3. **ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ**: there is a new point made in this chapter, which might at first sight seem merely a repetition of the foregoing argument, viz. the application of the principle to concretes: Plato is now to show that 'concrete particulars (*τὰ τρία*), being informed (as part of their definition) by an Idea (*ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα*) which necessarily imports another Idea (*περιττότης*), cannot admit the opposite of that imported Idea (*ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα*).' Observe the force of *κατέχω*, 'to occupy,' or in the terminology of philosophy, 'to inform': *ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατέχει τὰ τρία* in the sense of 'giving three things their quality of *threeness*.'

4. **τὴν αὑτοῦ ἰδέαν**: the editors differ as to what *αὑτοῦ* refers to: grammatically, being in the singular, it would seem natural to take it = *ἐκείνου ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ*, and so Archer-Hind takes it: but the grammatical peculiarity of *αὑτοῦ* referring to *ἅ* is not so impossible, if we realise that Plato is taking a single instance as typical: indeed does not the singular *ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ* imply as much? Archer-Hind says *τὴν αὑτοῦ ἰδέαν* is sheer nonsense, if *αὑτοῦ* refers to *ἰδέα* (i.e. to *ἅ*, not *ὅ τι*), but is it altogether unnatural Greek for *ἑαυτήν*, especially as it is to be followed by *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου τινός*? cf. above 103 E *τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν*, where *ἐκείνου* can be nothing but *αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος*: is not *τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν* a close parallel to *τὴν αὑτοῦ ἰδέαν*? On the whole it is perhaps safer to take *αὑτοῦ* in the first way, though I should hesitate to say that the other is impossible Greek.

5. **ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου ἀεί τινος**: all the MSS. have *αὐτῷ*, though its place varies: we can only keep *αὐτῷ* by reading *δεῖ* for *ἀεί*, and *ἐναντίου δεῖ τινος αὐτῷ*, 'it requires an opposite,' is so strange a way of expressing Plato's meaning (viz. 'that it imports the idea of some opposite') as to be impossible. Moreover, what does *δεῖ μοί τινος* mean? Can it possibly mean 'I am never without this'? Does it not rather suggest 'I am without this, and must get it'? which would make it nonsense here.

9. **ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον**: sc. 'to objects so informed,' as are *τὰ τρία* by the Idea of 'three.'

E 17. **ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι**: *ἔλεγον*, as often in Greek, used in the sense of *ἐκέλευον* (cf. the English 'I told you to do it'): cf. Eur. *Med.* 271–72 *σὲ τὴν σκυθρωπὸν καὶ πόσει θυμουμένην, Μήδειαν, εἶπον τῆσδε γῆς ἔξω περᾶν*: Aesch. *Ag.* 955 *λέγω κατ' ἄνδρα, μὴ θεόν, σέβειν ἐμέ.*

20. **τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει**: the subject is *ἡ τριάς*, and *αὐτῷ* is to be taken closely with *ἐναντίον*, 'for it (*ἡ τριάς*) always imports (*ἐπιφέρει*) the opposite to it' (viz. the opposite to *τὸ ἄρτιον*).

24. **ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ**: *ἐκείνῳ* goes with 105 A *ἐπιφέρῃ*, not with *ἐναντίον*.

26. **αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον**: 'the importing Idea itself will never admit the opposite of the imported Idea.' *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον* resumes *ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ*.

28. **ἀναμιμνῄσκου**: middle as in 72 E, 'call it to mind once more.'

οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον: litotes for *ἄμεινον*, as we should say 'there is no harm in hearing . .'

30. **τὸ διπλάσιον**: 'a multiple of two,' in apposition with *τὰ δέκα*.

31. **καὶ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον**: 'although not opposite to anything': *καί* has a concessive force: *οὐκ*, although not in the MSS., is absolutely necessary to the sense, as is shown by a comparison of 104 E *ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό*.

33. **τὸ ἥμισυ**: 'numbers whose denominator is two,' in E apposition to *τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα*, just as *τὸ διπλάσιον* above to *τὰ δέκα*: $\frac{3}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$ (i.e. fractions) will not admit the idea of 'the integer' (*τὸ ὅλον*).

CHAPTER LIV

105 B–D, *c.* liv. We are now enabled to advance beyond our first simple and safe hypothesis. When we are asked what by immanence makes a thing hot, we shall no longer answer heat, but fire: similarly we shall assign fever as the cause of sickness, not disease; the monad as the cause of numerical imparity, not oddness. Applying this rule, when asked what is the cause of life in the body, Kebes answers soul; for soul contains in her the principle of life which is opposite to death; whence soul can never combine with death.

We now see the significance of Plato's insistence on his point that some Ideas which are not opposites yet refuse to combine with certain opposites. Soul is not opposite to anything: but she stands in the same relation to the Idea of life as fire does to that of heat and the triad to that of oddness.

2. **μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου**: 'do not answer me in the

terms of my question, but in the manner I am going to indicate' (*μιμούμενος ἐμέ*): the manner indicated is the substitution of the *species* for the *genus*, *πῦρ* for *θερμότης*, *πυρετός* for *νόσος*, *μονάς* for *περιττότης*, and so, in the analogous case to which the whole argument is directed, *ψυχή* for *ζωή*.

3. **παρ' ἥν**: the precise force of *παρά* is difficult to determine: (i) 'side by side with' (i.e. 'in addition to'): (ii) 'different from' 'going beyond,' 'superior to' (cf. use of *κατά* in 94 E *καθ' ἁρμονίαν*).

4. **τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην**: cf. 100 E *ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά*, 101 D *τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως.*

6. **ᾧ ἂν τί σώματι ἐγγένηται**: lit. 'the body in which *what* is present?' an extremely neat idiom for *τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἐγγενομένου σώματι θερμὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα;* 'what is that which, by its presence in the body, makes the body hot?' *ᾧ* agrees with *σώματι*, and the form of the question is best understood by studying the answer to it, *ᾧ ἂν σώματι πῦρ ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται*, 'the body in which fire is present will be warm': in the question *τί* is substituted for *πῦρ*. The MSS. have *ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται*, which slightly complicates the construction, *ᾧ* being masculine, either going directly with *ἐγγένηται*, or being the dative of reference, equivalent to *οὗ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι*: literally—'the man in whose body what is present, will that body be warm?' which of course is not English, but perfectly good Greek: still on the whole *ἐν τῷ* is better omitted. Professor Geddes retains it, but goes entirely wrong in his interpretation: he analyses the sentence thus—*τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ᾧ, ἂν (τοῦτο) ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, (τὸ σῶμα) θερμὸν ἔσται*, taking *ᾧ* as instrumental dative—'what is it, whereby . . the body will be hot?' and below *ᾧ ἂν θερμότης* 'that it must be the means by which heat is produced.'

C 9. **κομψοτέραν**: cf. 101 C *τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας* (note): here the word is half-ironical.

13. **ᾧ ἂν μονάς**: *μονάς* is of course only an example: it might equally well have been *τριάς*, or any other of the series.

19. **ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ**: it is important to observe that Plato here slightly alters the application of his terminology from 104 D: there *κατέχω* was used (v. note) of the idea 'informing' the particulars, e.g. *ἡ τριὰς κατέχει τὰ τρία*, 'gives them their quality of *threeness*': we had then three terms—(A) *τὰ τρία*, (B) *ἡ τριάς*, (C) *περιττότης*: what are our three terms now? (B) is clearly *ἡ ψυχή*, (C) is *ζωή*: (A) is not simply *σῶμα*, but *σῶμα ζῶν*, for there is nothing in *σῶμα* that

involves ζωή, in the sense in which τὰ τρία involves περιττότης. This slight change of point of view is led up to by the examples at the beginning of this chapter, where we have (C) θερμότης, (B) πῦρ, (A) σῶμα θερμόν, and again (C) νόσος, (B) πυρετός, (A) σῶμα νοσῶδες.

Nor is this the whole difficulty: in the original formula (B) was ἡ τριάς, 'the Idea of three': what is ἡ ψυχή, which corresponds? The 'soul' which vivifies the body, and the soul which is to be proved immortal, is not ἡ ἰδέα τῆς ψυχῆς, 'soul' in the abstract, but the individual soul: so that the three terms of the original formula now become four: (A) σῶμα (i.e. σῶμα ζῶν): (B) ἡ ψυχή: (B^1) ἡ ἰδέα τῆς ψυχῆς: (C) ζωή. The particular soul, as well as the Idea of soul, ἐπιφέρει ζωὴν εἰς ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ, and therefore τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται.

19. **ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν**: this may be compared with 64 C καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἶναι. If we probe this dialectical argument of Plato's to its depth, we shall find it to be a somewhat glaring 'petitio principii,' turning upon a certain looseness in the meaning of ψυχή, which has the two distinct senses of (i) 'life,' (ii) 'soul,' the latter with various shades of connotation, man's intellectual, moral, emotional nature: cf. Soph. *Ant.* 559 ἡ δ' ἐμὴ ψυχὴ τέθνηκεν. Now, adhering rigidly to this latter meaning of ψυχή, as 'soul,' man's conscious intellectual, moral, and emotional nature, how are we justified in assuming as obvious that it is this which φέρει ζωὴν εἰς τὸ σῶμα: if we regard it as having a concrete existence apart from the body, are we not equally justified (from the point of view of the argument) in assuming that it is σῶμα which ἥκει φέρον ζωὴν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν? All we can say of ζωή by its definition is that it is 'the state of σῶμα and ψυχή in combination,' just as the definition of θάνατος (v. above quotation from 64 C) is the state of ψυχή and σῶμα apart. Happily the interest of the *Phaedo* does not rest entirely upon this dialectical 'proof of the unprovable': modern readers of the dialogue will be more in sympathy with his deduction of the immortality of the soul from 'mere arguments of probability,' its kinship with the Ideas, and with all that is noble and divine in life.

CHAPTER LV

105 D–106 D, *c.* lv. As then that which will not admit even is uneven, so that which will not admit death, namely soul, is deathless. Now if the negation of even or of heat or of cold

necessarily implied indestructibility, then three and snow and fire would not perish at the approach of the opposite to the Idea contained in them, but would merely withdraw from it. This however is not the case: these negations do not imply indestructibility; therefore three and snow and fire can cease to exist at the approach of the opposite. But the negation of death does imply indestructibility: soul therefore, on the approach of death, not only refuses to admit it, but also refuses to perish: soul is thus not only deathless but indestructible. Indeed if the eternal principle of life could perish, then there is nothing in existence that should not perish.

E 4. **ἄμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον**: the second question is first answered directly, and then the second with *τὸ δέ*, as though *τὸ μέν* had preceded.

7. **ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή;** we might at first imagine that the proof was now complete: but from the remainder of the chapter, and especially from 106 C *ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος*, we see that *ἀθάνατος* has a very precise meaning, viz. *τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον θάνατον*, as *ἀνάρτιον* meant 'not admitting evenness,' *ἄθερμον* 'not admitting warmth.' To appreciate the distinction here made between *ἀθάνατος* and *ἀνώλεθρος* we must look back to 102 D *ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, . . ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι.* Such things as *χιών* and *τρία*, on the approach of their opposites, hot and even, have two alternatives open to them, either to withdraw or perish: what they cannot do is *δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον.* Now, if *δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον* is identical with 'perishing,' then the one alternative, perishing, is impossible to them: 106 A *εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῄει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὖσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος*: they must, in that case, inevitably withdraw and be unaffected by their opposite. Now in the case of *ψυχή* this condition is fulfilled: the one alternative, *ἀπόλλυσθαι*, is precluded, because it is identical with *δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον* viz. *θάνατον*: therefore soul must, at the approach of death, *ὑπεξιέναι σῶς οὖσα.*

The difference in point of view, then, between *ἀθάνατος* and *ἀνώλεθρος* is not obscure: it is well expressed by Wyttenbach '*ἀθάνατον* hic dicitur *ὃ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται*: *ἀνώλεθρον*, quod superveniente contrario *οὐκ ἀπόλλυται.*' But is the conclusion justified? It is a very curious turn of logic by which Plato, having arrived at the conclusion that *ψυχή* is *ἀθάνατος* and wishing to prove that it is also *ἀνώλεθρος*, assumes, for the purpose of his proof, the very point he is proving, viz. that *τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν.* All that can properly be

deduced from the proposition *ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι*, adhering to the literal meaning of *ἀθάνατος* as parallel to *ἀνάρτιος*, *ἄθερμος* etc., is that the soul *οὐ μὴ δέξηται θάνατον*, that is to say *οὐκ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα* (106 B). Now *οὐκ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα* is a perfectly legitimate deduction from *ἀθάνατός ἐστι*, providing we keep to its literal meaning 'will not exist in a state of death.' The step from *ἀθάνατος* to *ἀνώλεθρος* is unwarranted: it may have probability on its side (*σχολῇ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται*, end of ch. 55), but logically it is worthless. It is an instance, not unlike the identification of *ψυχή* with the vital principle (mentioned above), of the Greek tendency to be led away by words, to identify ideas with words, a tendency to which the dialectic of the sophists was peculiarly prone, and against which the Socratic method was a protest.

8. **τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν**; the *μέν* marks that there is a farther step in the argument still to come.

12. **ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἤ**: for *ἄλλο τι ἤ*, 'is it not the case **106 A**
that?' cf. note on 79 A: and for the position of *τὰ τρία* cf. 106 E *ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἤ* . .

14. **ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι**: in relative and temporal clauses whose reference is 'general,' we sometimes find, instead of *ἄν* with the subjunctive (*ὃς ἄν*, *ὁπόταν*, and so on), the simple optative, even though the main verb is in the present: in Attic it is confined to the enunciation of a *γνώμη*, or general maxim, the reference being, not to any special time, but to all time: cf. 95 D *προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη*, with examples quoted at end of note on *ζώη* (95 D).

16. **οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε**: the change from imperfect to aorist is noticeable: it seems to suggest a reference back to the time when *χιών* was being discussed—'for she would not have perished' (which was a possible alternative open to her when we discussed the point in ch. 52, p. 103 D).

οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα: this is not logically an apodosis to the condition *εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν*, for it was admitted independently of that condition: literally it should be *οὐδ' ἐξῆν αὐτῇ δέξασθαι*, but it takes the form of *οὐκ ἂν ἀπώλετο*.

19. **ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπίοι**: all the MSS. except one have *ἐπῄει*, and that one has *ἐποίη*: but *ἐπῄει*, which is read by most editors, is very doubtful Greek, an unheard of attraction to the tense and mood of *ἀπεσβέννυτο*; cf. *ἐπαγάγοι* (supra).

B 30. **ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει . . ἄρτιον μὲν . . μὴ γίγνεσθαι**: *μὴ γίγνεσθαι* is of course not the regular *μή* with inf. following a verb of hindering: the case put by the objector may be considered for a moment without *τί κωλύει*: it would then be *ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ πέριττον οὐ γίγνεται ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γέγονεν*: 'the odd does not indeed (*μέν*) become even on the approach of even, but perishes and even has arisen in its place': this whole clause is then put in dependence on *τί κωλύει*, 'why may it not be the case that . .?' Observe that in the *μέν* clause *ἄρτιον* is predicate to *γίγνεσθαι*, in the *δέ* clause subject to *γεγονέναι*: the change of tense too, *γίγνεσθαι* to *γεγονέναι*, is significant: 'becomes . . has arisen.'

C 36. **εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο**: *τοῦτο* is *τὸ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι τὸ ἀνάρτιον*.

D 45. **σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν**: 'for it is very unlikely that anything else would refuse to admit destruction, if . .': for the form of the sentence cf. *Prot.* 330 D *σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται.* This use of *σχολῇ* is to be observed: *σχολῇ* is literally 'leisurely,' 'reluctantly' (cf. English 'I should not be in a hurry to do it' with *σχολῇ ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσαιμι*): cf. Soph. *Ant.* 390 *σχολῇ ποθ' ἥξειν δεῦρ' ἂν ἐξηύχουν ἐγώ*, with which Jebb compares Shaksp. *Titus Andronicus* i. 2. 301 'I'll trust by leisure him that mocks me once.'

μὴ δέχοιτο: this *μή* is what some scholars call the 'generic' *μή*; it puts the thing in a 'class,' instead of stating a 'fact' about it: it is typical of the main distinction between *μή* and *οὐ*, the former expressing 'a mental conception,' the latter a fact: as Mr. Archer-Hind suggests, *μὴ δέχοιτο* = *εἴη τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον*, 'would be the sort of thing to exclude death.' Any Greek play, indeed almost any considerable passage of Greek literature, will exemplify this distinction abundantly: to take a few examples chosen at random from Soph. *Philoctetes*:

253. *ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότ' ἴσθι μ' ὧν ἀνιστορεῖς.*

254. *ὦ πόλλ' ἐγὼ μοχθηρός, ὦ πικρὸς θεοῖς,*
οὗ μηδὲ κληδὼν ὧδ' ἔχοντος οἴκαδε
μηδ' Ἑλλάδος γῆς μηδαμοῦ διῆλθέ που.

(here *οὗ μηδέ* = 'quippe cuius nulla fama . . vulgata sit').

407. *ἔξοιδα γάρ νιν παντὸς ἂν λόγου κακοῦ*
γλώσσῃ θιγόντα καὶ πανουργίας, ἀφ' ἧς
μηδὲν δίκαιον ἐς τέλος μέλλοι ποιεῖν.

443. *ὃς οὐκ ἂν εἵλετ' εἰσάπαξ εἰπεῖν, ὅπου*
μηδεὶς ἐῴη.

46. **εἴ γε . . δέξεται**: 'if the deathless is to admit destruction': the common idiomatic use of *εἰ* with fut. indic. to express

εἰ μέλλει: cf. example quoted from *Prot.* in last note but one, and Ar. *Frogs* 1460 εὕρισκε νὴ Δί', εἴπερ ἀναδύσει πάλιν, 'you must find something, if you are to find your way up again.'

Mr. Archer-Hind briefly summarises the argument of chs. l.–lv. as follows. 'After agreeing that the truth of immortality will be best established if we can show that it is a legitimate deduction from the theory of Ideas, we set forth thus: (1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary Ideas, but the Idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes: and this applies both to Ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (2) there is a second set of Ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite Ideas: no such Idea can admit the opposite of the Idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; e.g. the triad contains the Idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of Ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained Idea; e.g. three things can never be even: (4) if in any such instance refusal to admit the opposite necessarily involved indestructibility, we could predicate immortality of that which refused to admit it; e.g. if refusal to admit evenness involved indestructibility, three would be imperishable: but since this is not so, three may perish at the approach of evenness: (5) but in the case of soul refusal to admit the opposite of its contained Idea does involve indestructibility, since the contained Idea is life, whose opposite is death: and that which will not admit death is imperishable: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, but must adopt the other alternative, ὑπεκχωρεῖν. Else, if the principle of life perished, nothing could be found to resist destruction.'

CHAPTER LVI

106 D–107 B, *c.* lvi. Thus from the general principle that all things which refuse to admit death are indestructible we infer that soul can never perish: when death comes upon a man, his mortal part perishes, but his soul withdraws, making way for death, while she herself is saved alive. It must be then that our souls live in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning of Socrates but still feels misgivings; whereupon Socrates encourages him to sift the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied.

3. **παρὰ πάντων**: this use of παρά, practically to express

the 'agent,' is strictly speaking 'local,' 'from the side of': cf. English 'on all hands,' Fr. 'de la part de.'

E 11. **ἀποθνῄσκει**: here used in its ordinary sense, 'perishes.'

107 A 16. **παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο**: here probably *παρά* = 'to contradict this': for the uncertainty of *παρά* v. note on *παρ' ἥν* 105 B.

19. **εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο**: for this 'deliberative optative' cf. note on 78 A *ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι ἀναγκαιότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα.*

23. **οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων**: notice the art with which the characters of Kebes and Simmias are kept up dramatically to the end: the logical and acute Kebes, who *οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι, ὅ τι ἄν τις εἴπῃ* 63 A, having found an argument in which he sees no flaw, accepts it absolutely: Simmias, who in 76 D *λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών*, though he cannot impugn the argument, still feels a vague unrest: he does not accept the issue of the argument whole-heartedly.

25. **τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων**: cf. *Leges* 854 A *ξύμπασαν τὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀσθένειαν εὐλαβούμενος*: 'from my poor opinion of human weakness.'

B 30. **ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον**: a somewhat violent anacoluthon, due (if it is what Plato wrote) to the intervening *καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν*: a confusion of *τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἐπισκεπτέον* and *αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἐπισκεπτέαι.* Mr. Archer-Hind accepts Schanz's correction *ἐπισκεπτέα* (equivalent of Latin 'gerund'), against which it is difficult to argue, for if we read *ἐπισκεπτέαι*, and admit that Plato was led into the discord by the intervening clause, it is impossible to deny that a fortiori the copyist may have been led into the mistake similarly. The MSS. all have *ἐπισκεπτέαι*: the choice must be a matter of taste.

31. **διέλητε**: 'analyse,' and so 'define,' 'establish.'

ὡς ἐγᾦμαι: refers to *ἀκολουθήσετε*, which is virtually an exhortation: 'you must follow up your reasoning . .'

33. **κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται**: 'and only when this itself is quite clear': *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* is the 'validity' of the *ὑποθέσεις πρῶται.*

CHAPTER LVII

107 B–114 C, *cc.* lvii.–lxii. Now follows the myth setting forth the conformation of the earth and the fate of souls in the underworld. Seeing that the soul is immortal, earnest indeed

should be the care we bestow upon her training; for upon that will depend her happiness and misery for all time. The ways of Hades are many and intricate; but the soul that has studied death will find herself at home there, and guided by her attendant genius to the place of judgment will pass her appointed sojourn in the companionship of gods: but the impure will be without friend or companion. To realise what regions the soul enters after death, we must understand the true form of the earth. It is a sphere in equilibrium at the centre of the heavens: the part we inhabit is but a small cavity on its surface, filled with the coarser sediment of air which gathers in it. We have no idea that we dwell in such a hollow, but fancy we are on the surface and that our atmosphere is the true air; but could we mount to the surface, we should see how murky and impure is our dwelling compared with that bright region. We should see the earth's surface splendid with zones of the most brilliant colours, of which ours are a faint image, glowing with flowers and trees and precious stones, all bathed in purest aether, untouched by decay; and the dwellers thereon are free from age and sickness, and the gods come to dwell among them. There are many other hollows on the earth besides ours, greater and less, having subterranean communication; but the greatest of all is called Tartaros, which is pierced right through the earth from side to side. From this all rivers issue forth, and into it they all return; and a great pulse sways up and down Tartaros, carrying with it all the air and liquid that are therein, and it replenishes now the rivers that are on one side the earth, now those on the other. All the rivers fall again into Tartaros at a lower point than they flowed out; but not lower than the centre, from which in all directions it is an ascent. Of these rivers the four greatest are Okeanos, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Styx, which flow in many tortuous windings, some beneath the earth and some on its surface. So when the souls of the departed come to judgment, they whose lives have been moderately good proceed to Acheron and dwell there till they are cleansed of any guilt that clings to them; but they whose wickedness is past cure are hurled into Tartaros, whence they come forth no more. All whose guilt is heinous but not yet beyond remedy dwell in Tartaros for a year, and then are cast forth by one of the rivers, on whose banks they meet those they have wronged. Then if they can win the pardon of these, they come forth and are purified; but if not, they return to Tartaros for another period; and this they continue to do until they have gained their pardon. But all that have lived in perfect holiness ascend to the earth's true surface, where they dwell henceforth in bliss and purity.

C 3. **ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται**: this is part of the original motive of the dialogue, to which the proof of the soul's immortality is subsidiary: for the thought cf. *Apol.* 30 A *πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς.*

4. **ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν**: an abbreviated form for *ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο ὃ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν*: cf. Hom. *Il.* xi. 757 *Ἀλεισίου ἔνθα κολώνη κέκληται*, 'where is the hill called the hill of Alisius': Pind. *Nem.* ix. 96 *ἔνθ' Ἀρέας πόρον ἄνθρωποι καλέοισιν.*

ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός: cf. *Rep.* 608 C *πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς τὸν πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη.*

8. **ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς**: *ἕρμαιον* is a 'windfall,' 'a stroke of luck' (*ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος*, as the schol. defines it): Hermes was the god of travellers, and so a lucky find by the roadside was attributed to him: in this capacity of luck-bringer he is called *ἐριούνιος.*

This view of death as *ἕρμαιον τοῖς κακοῖς* was held by the Epicureans, whose mouthpiece in Roman literature is Lucretius, the author of the poem 'de rerum natura,' the aim of which is to disprove the immortality of the soul. A very interesting historical appeal to this view is found in the speech of Caesar on the fate of the Catilinarian conspirators, recorded in Sallust's *Catilina*, ch. 51, § 20, 'de poena possum equidem dicere id quod res habet, in luctu atque miseriis mortem aerumnarum requiem non cruciatum esse, eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere, ultra neque curae neque gaudio locum esse.'

D 14. **οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται**: this is very much in the spirit of the scriptural *ἄφρων, ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ τὴν ψυχήν σου ἀπαιτοῦσιν ἀπὸ σοῦ· ἃ δ' ἡτοίμασας, τίνι ἔσται;* cf. too *Gorgias* 523 E *καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ.*

15. **πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς**: for the meaning of *τροφή* v. 81 D (note) *δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης*, and 84 B *ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα . . . τροφή* includes both ideas of (1) nurture, training; (2) the manner of life which results from this.

19. **ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει**: the phraseology here suggests the language of the Myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*, where Lachesis thus addresses the souls, *οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε.* There is no real con-

tradiction between the two: in the *Rep.* Plato has elaborated a myth of the 'destinies of human souls,' whereas here he is not dwelling on this particular point, and so uses the more familiar phrase: cf. Theocr. iv. 40 *αἰαῖ τῶ σκληρῶ μάλα δαίμονος ὅς με λελόγχει.* For the conception of the *δαίμων*, cf. *Rep.* 620 D *ἐκείνην δ' ἑκάστῳ ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων*: Menander *ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαραστατεῖ εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου*: Hor. *Ep.* II. ii. 187—

> scit Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum,
> naturae deus humanae, mortalis in unum
> quodque caput, voltu mutabilis, albus et ater:

the Roman identified it mainly with the brighter side of a man's life: cf. 'indulgere genio,' 'genialis.'

20. **εἰς δή τινα τόπον**: the effect of *δή* with *τις* is very much the same as the English 'no matter what place' (added parenthetically): cf. 108 C *ἕως ἂν δή τινες χρόνοι γένωνται*: 115 D *εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας*: 'to a certain place, I need not specify what place' is the real effect of *δή τινα.* This *δή* is particularly common in the Herodotean *ὅστις δή, ὅσος δή* (in Attic more usually *ὅστις δήποτε*): e.g. Hdt. i. 160 *ἐκδιδόναι τὸν Πακτύην παρεσκευάζοντο ἐπὶ μισθῷ ὅσῳ δή· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω τοῦτό γε εἰπεῖν ἀτρεκέως*: 'for a fixed sum, whatever it may have been': 100 D *ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως* . .

21. **οἷ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας**: the form of the adv. is determined by *συλλεγέντας*, though it does not go with it.

διαδικασαμένους: L. and S., and the editors who notice the word, give it the ordinary meaning of 'submit to judgment.' Now the ordinary meaning of *διαδικάζω* is 'to settle a dispute between two parties' (*δια-*), of *διαδικάζομαι* 'to have such a dispute settled for one's self,' 'to go to law against an adversary.' This is not appropriate here, nor, on the other hand, is it likely that the force of the preposition is in abeyance, so that the word could be used of 'standing a *criminal* trial.' We must take *δια-* in a different sense—'when they have received their *various* sentences' (*δια-* 'different'): this is still clearer in 113 D *πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή. καὶ οἳ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι . . ἀπολύονται . ., οἳ δ' ἂν δόξωσι . .*: and in *Rep.* 614 C *δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι, οὓς ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιὰν . . τοὺς δ' ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν*: the *μέν* and *δέ* clauses here show the force of *δια-*.

24. **τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν**: *ὧν* of course is neuter: E 'their appointed doom.'

26. **ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις**: in *Rep.* 615 A Plato speaks of a *χιλιέτης πορεία*, since every man must be requited tenfold for his deeds, good or evil, and 100 years is taken as the extreme of human life: the Egyptians, according to Hdt. ii. 123, put the time at 3000 years, and Empedocles even goes so far as 30,000 for a murderer—

εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίῃσι φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μιήνῃ,
τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι,
γεινόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρέω εἴδεα θνητῶν.

In the *Phaedrus* 248 E Plato says each soul must go through ten periods of 1000 years, except that of the philosopher, for whom three periods are sufficient: with this cf. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 68 *ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρὶς | ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν | ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν.*

108 A 28. **ἁπλῆν οἶμον**: the same proverbial saying is quoted from the lost Telephus, in slightly different forms, by various authors: our ignorance of the context makes it impossible to feel sure of the point of the remark in Aesch.: was it Virgil's 'facilis descensus Averno'?

31. **διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε**: 'go wrong in any direction.'

33. **ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων**: 'from the rites of burial performed on earth': a reference, as Olympiodorus tells us (*ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τριόδοις τιμῶν τῆς Ἑκάτης*), to the offerings made monthly to the dead on the shrine of Hecate at the cross-roads, from which Plato infers by analogy that there is a *τρίοδος* in Hades: so *Gorgias* 524 A *οὗτοι οὖν, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον.*

36. **οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα**: 'is familiar with the scene,' is at home in the *καθαρὸς τόπος*, inasmuch as its whole life has been devoted to cultivating 'purity.'

37. **ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον**: sc. 81 C *ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη.*

38. **περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη**: the editors either pass this over without comment, or merely refer to 68 C *τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι*: if this is in any proper sense a parallel, our phrase must stand for *ἅτε περὶ ἐκεῖνο* (sc. *τὸ σῶμα*) *πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη*, 'as having all its life been excited about the body': but in that case we should require either *καί* or *ἅτε* with *ἐπτοημένη*. If the allusion is to 81 C (quoted above) we must take *ἐπτοημένη* in a 'physical sense'—'flutter-

ing' or 'hovering' (possibly with the connotation of 'fear'), a meaning not recognised by the Lexicons, but clearly required here: *περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον* will then refer to *περὶ τὰ μνήματα καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη.*

43. **πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον**: sc. *ἀκάθαρτον*: cf. note on 58 D. B

48. **αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται**: *αὐτή* is 'by herself.'

56. **οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται**: 'not so small as is supposed': cf. C one interpretation of 83 B *οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν* (note).

57. **ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι**: Wagner is certainly wrong in taking *τινος* as neuter: he quotes in support of *ὑπό* with an impersonal noun *Gorg.* 526 D *ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι*: but it is contrary to Greek idiom to use the ambiguous form *τινος* (without noun) as 'neuter' after a preposition which almost invariably takes a masculine (personal) noun. We need not inquire, since we cannot discover, who *τις* is: it is merely meant, in all probability, to give an air of authority to the coming *μῦθος*. (Anaximander has been suggested for *τις*, partly as the first philosopher to make a map of the earth, and partly because the doctrine of Equilibrium in 108 E is almost exactly what Aristotle attributes to Anaximander.)

CHAPTER LVIII

5. **οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη**: the point of this proverb is D clearer than its origin—it means simply 'a difficult art': the two most favoured explanations are (i) a reference to Glaucus of Chios (or Samos), mentioned in Hdt. i. 25 as the inventor of the art of soldering metal: so Diogenianus, *Proverb.* iv. 8 *ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥᾳδίως κατεργαζομένων. ἀπὸ Γλαύκου Σαμίου, ὃς πρῶτον κόλλησιν ἐφεῦρε σιδήρου*: (ii) Glaucus, the sea-god, the home of whose worship was the Boeotian Anthedon, was regarded as a wizard, so that *Γλαύκου τέχνη* might be used of 'something requiring the insight of a wizard.'

6. **ἅ γ' ἐστίν**: 'what his account actually is,' *γε* contrasting it with *ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ* which follows.

7. **ἡ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην**: cf. 94 E *ἡ καθ' ἁρμονίαν* (note).

14. **πέπεισμαι ὡς . . δεῖν**: an anacoluthon due to the inter- E vening clause *εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα.*

16. **περιφερὴς οὖσα**: 'spherical in shape.'

19. **τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ**: this 109 A

theory, though it reminds us of Newton's theory of gravitation, is in point of detail the exact reverse of it: according to Plato it is the *absence* of impulse, rather than the balance of impulses, that enables the earth to remain stationary. By *ὁμοιότης τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* is meant homogeneity in substance, and especially, from this point of view, in density: did the substance of the heavens vary in density, the earth would naturally be moved by pressure from the denser towards the rarer: the pressure all round is equal. Not only so, but the earth itself is *ἰσόρροπον*, 'equipoised,' 'in equilibrium': its spherical shape and absolute balance prevent it deriving any impulse towards motion from itself: the point of *ἰσόρροπον* is perhaps more easily grasped from its opposites: e.g. if the earth were top-heavy, it might as a result originate for itself a rotation, or again, if it were pointed at one end, a motion in the direction of the sharp end. Aristotle, *de caelo* II. xiii. 295 b 11, attributes the doctrine to Anaximander: *εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά φασιν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος· μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἱδρυμένον, καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον, ἅμα δ' ἀδύνατον εἰς τἀναντία ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένειν.*

25. **πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό**: cf. 88 A where *αὐτό* refers to *ψυχήν* (v. note, with explanation suggested by Mr. Archer-Hind: so here *αὐτό* may be attracted to *πάμμεγά τι*).

26. **τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος**: a good general description of the world known to the Greeks, the land lying round the Mediterranean and its arm, the Black Sea, from the straits of Gibraltar to Colchis. The former regularly appear in Greek literature as the end of the world, or at least of the known world, in that direction: Plato himself in the *Timaeus* (p. 24) places his mythical island of Atlantis just outside the Pillars of Hercules. The conquests of Alexander widened the outlook of the Greeks eastward as far as India, so that in Arist. *de caelo* II. xiv. 9 India takes the place of Phasis in this formula: cf. Juv. x. 1 omnibus in terris quae sunt a Gadibus usque | Auroram et Gangen.

B 28. **ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα**: 'dwelling about this sea as ants or frogs about a pool': the point being to show the insignificance of what the Greeks regard as 'the earth' (viz. the shores of the Mediterranean) in comparison with the size of the real earth: frogs consider their own particular pool and its surroundings the world, so do we.

32. **καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη**: acc. of reference with *παντοδαπά*. *παντοδαπός* is a word which often has a suggestion

of contempt, something like our 'miscellaneous': e.g. *δοῦλοι καὶ ξένοι παντοδαποί*, Andoc. xxii. 30: *πολλὴ καὶ παντοδαπὴ ἄγνοια*, Plato *Soph.* 228 E: *ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί* (?), Arist. *Eth. Nic.* II. vi. 14: possibly in our passage we need not find this meaning.

33. **εἰς ἃ ξυνερρυηκέναι**: for the infinitive in a relative clause cf. 72 A *ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι.*

34. **αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαράν**: the real surface of the earth, as distinguished from these small 'hollows' or 'depressions' in the earth's surface which we inhabit.

36. **ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν**: *αἰθήρ* is regularly in Greek the 'upper, purer zone above the *ἀήρ*.'

38. **οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι**: 'of which these (viz. C *ὕδωρ καὶ ὁμίχλην καὶ ἀέρα*) are the sediment': for the word *ὑποστ.* cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 3 *ἐν τῇ Ῥωμύλου ὑποστάθμῃ*, a translation of Cic.'s 'in faece Romuli.'

41. **ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς**: 'up on the earth's surface.'

ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ: we are in the same relation to dwellers on the earth's surface as a dweller at the bottom of the sea would be to us: he would think the *θάλαττα* was *οὐρανός*, just as we think the *ἀήρ* is *οὐρανός*: if he came to the surface of the sea he would make the same discovery about the *ἀήρ* being purer than *θάλαττα* which we should make about the *αἰθήρ* being purer than the *ἀήρ*, if we could get on to the earth's real surface.

48. **ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας**: these participles are subordinate to D *ἑωρακὼς εἴη*, 'should never have seen, by emerging and raising his head above the sea to look upon this region we dwell in, how much . .'

50. **τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι**: the editors create a difficulty here about *σφίσι* following the singular *εἴ τις*: but surely *παρὰ σφίσι* means 'the world of himself and his fellows' (it is not that *εἴ τις* implies a plural, as the editors say).

54. **ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα**: 'as though this (*ἀήρ*) were the heavens and the stars moved across it.' This constr. *ὡς . . χωροῦντα* is the so-called accus. absolute, something of a misnomer: this accus., except when impersonal (e.g. *ἐξόν, δέον, εἰρημένον* and the like), always is preceded by *ὡς*, and always stands in the same relation to the main verb, expressing the impression concerning some person or thing in the mind of the subject of the verb, an impression under which the subject acts. This relation being invariably the same, and the case being preceded by *ὡς*, it is

doubtful whether we ought to call it an absolute case, as that implies a case out of relation to the verb. The following example will illustrate the point—*ἠξίωσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦ πεζοῦ ἄρχειν ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν κατὰ γῆν κρατοῦντες τοὺς δ' Ἀθηναίους τῷ ναυτικῷ πλεῖστον ἰσχύοντας*: this, without the *μέν* clause, is the regular type of the so-called accus. absolute, and is no more really absolute than is the *αὐτοὶ μέν* nominative absolute.

55. **τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταὐτόν**: this is the reading of all MSS., but most editors find a difficulty about retaining it: Heindorf suggests *τὸ δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον*, 'but the real truth is as follows': Hermann accepts Baiter's emendation *τὸ δὲ δεινότατον*, while Archer-Hind omits *εἶναι ταὐτόν*; this last gives perfectly good sense, 'but as a matter of fact (*τὸ δέ*) we are not able': Hirschig suggests *τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταἴτιον*. The reading of the MSS., however, though possibly a trifle awkward, is not so difficult as to demand alteration: it merely repeats *ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι*. The mis-impression of the man living at the bottom of the sea is expressed in two parts—(i) *οἴοιτο . . ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν* (the illusion), (ii) *διὰ δὲ βραδύτητα . . μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς εἴη . .* (the real state of the case). Our own case is similar: (i) we think we live *ἐπάνω αὐτῆς*: (ii) in reality *ὑπ' ἀσθενείας . . οὐχ οἷοι τε εἶναι . .*: the second half is introduced by *τὸ δ' εἶναι ταὐτόν*, 'but the real fact of the matter is the same' (as in the previous imaginary case). I think the MSS. reading may stand: of suggested alterations I prefer the omission of *εἶναι ταὐτόν* (possibly a gloss to explain the point of *τὸ δέ*). There is no grammatical difficulty about *τὸ δέ* being used outside the constr., as it would be if we omit *εἶναι ταὐτόν*: it is quite frequent in Plato.

E 58. **ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι**: sc. by climbing up to the rim (the pl. suggests the 'various points' of the rim) of the hollow, as contrasted with flying up on wings.

59. **κατιδεῖν <ἂν> ἀνακύψαντα**: *ἄν* is required here, in spite of its repetition with *οὕτως ἂν . . κατιδεῖν* below, and may easily have fallen out in such a position—ANANAK: no better illustration of the meaning of *ἀνακύπτω* could be given than that of the fish getting its head above water: cf. *Phaedrus* 249 C *τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα, ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄντως ὄν.*

110 A 65. **ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ**: 'what we call earth,' 'this earth of ours,' sc. *τὰ κοῖλα*.

71. **πηλὸς ἀμήχανος**: *ἀμήχανος* might refer here either to quality or quantity (*ἀμήχανος ὅσος*), or possibly suggest both, 'wide wastes of clay and mud.'

72. **ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ**: 'wherever there is earth' (as well as sea—*καί*) : i.e at the bottom of the sea and by the shore.

74. **ἐκεῖνα δ' αὖ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν**: 'whilst the upper world again would appear to have an even greater superiority to ours' (than ours has to the sea). The logical sequence of this long sentence has got somewhat out of joint: to balance *ἐκεῖνα δ' αὖ*, the *μέν* clause should logically be something like this—'our earth (*ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ*), although it is marred and eaten away, is still very superior to the world beneath the sea, which is all mud and clay': that is to say *αὖ* properly is not 'on the contrary,' but 'still more.'

CHAPTER LIX

3. **ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι**: 'like balls made of twelve different-coloured pieces of leather': the number 'twelve' is chosen because of the number of the 'signs of the Zodiac': cf. *Timaeus* 55 C *ἔτι δὲ οὔσης ξυστάσεως μιᾶς πέμπτης* (viz. the dodecahedron), *ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν*, i.e. God used the dodecahedron as a model for the division of the heavens by signs (*διαζωγραφῶν*). The allusion in our passage is to the variegated surface of the earth. Cf. the description of the ball given by Adrasteia to the infant Zeus: Ap. Rh. iii. 135— B

σφαῖραν ἐΰτρόχαλον, τῆς οὐ σύ γε μείλιον ἄλλο
χειρῶν Ἡφαίστοιο κατακτεατίσσῃ ἄρειον·
χρύσεα μέν οἱ κύκλα τετεύχαται· ἀμφὶ δ' ἑκάστῳ
διπλόαι ἀψῖδες περιηγέες εἱλίσσονται.

4. **χρώμασιν διειλημμένη**: 'picked out in various colours,' a definition of *ποικίλη*: for the word cf. 81 C *ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι* (sc. *τὴν ψυχήν*) *ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς*: the Lat. word would be 'distinctus': Hor. *Odes* II. v. 11 'jam tibi lividos distinguet Autumnus racemos purpureo varius colore.'

5. **ὥσπερ δείγματα**: does Plato mean by *δείγματα* here anything more than 'specimens,' the regular meaning? If not, why does he say *ὥσπερ*? We should rather have expected a word like *μιμήματα*, 'feeble imitations.' Can *δείγματα* possibly mean 'mere indications,' 'suggestions'? This would make *ὥσπερ* easier. If not, then what Plato says is 'that our purest colours, those viz. which the painter uses, are not more beautiful than the ordinary colours of *αὐτὴ ἡ γῆ*.'

6. **καταχρῶνται**: here only the synonym of the simple verb.

C 8. **ἢ τούτων**: *τούτων* by attraction for *ἢ ταῦτα* (*ἐστι*).

10. **τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκή**: 'another portion, as much as is white.'

12. **συγκειμένην**: refers to the 'whole surface of the earth.'

13. **καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα**: 'for even these hollows of the earth (like the one we dwell in), filled as they are with water and mist, present each a colour which gleams amid the diversity of the rest, so that the earth appears one unbroken surface of varied hues': to a spectator from above each hollow appears not as a hollow but as a patch of colour on the earth's smooth surface.

17. **συνεχὲς ποικίλον**: not to be taken asyndeton for *συνεχὲς καὶ ποικίλον*, but either *συνεχές* should be taken as an adverb with *ποικίλον*, or else, perhaps better, *ἕν τι εἶδος συνεχές* closely together, with *ποικίλον* qualifying the whole phrase.

D 19. **ἀνὰ λόγον**: 'in proportion,' i.e. as much more beautiful than our plants as is the surface of their earth more beautiful than the surface of our *κοῖλα*.

24. **ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα**: 'the stones that we prize,' i.e. our precious stones: cf. *Phil.* 62 D *διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην*.

E 29. **ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότων**: most of the editors have found an awkwardness in the double *ὑπό*, and various remedies have been suggested: (*a*) omit *ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης* as a gloss on *ὑπὸ τῶν δ. ξυν.* (Schanz): but it is an improbable gloss, because any explanation of *ὑπὸ τῶν δ. ξυν.* is unnecessary after 109 B *εἰς ἃ ξυνερρυηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα*: (*b*) insert *τε* after second *ὑπό* (Heindorf): (*c*) change second *ὑπό* to *ἀπό* (Stallbaum): (*d*) put comma after *ἅλμης*, and take *ὑπὸ σηπ. καὶ ἅλμης* with *οἱ ἐνθάδε*, and *ὑπὸ τῶν δ. ξυν.* with *διεφθαρμένοι* (Archer-Hind after Dr. Verrall): but this is surely illogical, for how could *τὰ δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότα* corrupt things on the surface? If this punctuation is right, there should be a marked contrast between the two *ὑπό* clauses, instead of their being practically identical. The MSS. reading may very well stand, the two *ὑπό*'s standing in a slightly different relation to *διεφθαρμένοι*, 'by corruption and brine owing to the action of . .': cf. *Symp.* 216 C *καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αὐλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ Σατύρου*.

111 A 36. **ἐκφανῆ**: 'on the surface.'

42. **ἃς περιρρεῖν**: just as with us *θάλαττα περιρρεῖ νήσους*.

49. **ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει**: cf. *Rep.* 367 C *οἷον ὁρᾶν* B
ἀκούειν φρονεῖν.

50. **τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει**: 'eodem intervallo.'

54. **φήμας**: the earliest meaning of this word is 'a mysterious and significant rumour,' 'a divine intimation,' identified with *κληδών*, and often coupled with *ἐνύπνια, οἰωνοί* etc. (v. L. and S., 1 and 2).

55. **αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν**: 'visions of the gods.'

56. **αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς**: the pronouns are emphatic, from C
αὐτός, 'self': 'face to face': *αὐτοῖς* is 'men,' *αὐτούς* 'gods.'

CHAPTER LX

6. **τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν**: this is the reading of all MSS. but one, the Codex Tubingensis, which has *αὐτῶν*: this Heindorf emends to *αὐτῶν*, followed by Archer-Hind. But there is no need to change *αὐτούς*: it is certainly a repetition of *τοὺς δέ*, but then the infin. *ἔχειν* is an anacoluthon for *καὶ ἔχοντας*, so that the strict grammatical form of the sentence is clearly lost sight of. For the repetition in *αὐτούς* Wyttenbach compares Xen. *Cyr.* I. iii. 13 *πειράσομαι τῷ πάππῳ ἀγαθῶν ἱππέων κράτιστος ὢν ἱππεὺς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ.*

9. **τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν . . συντετρῆσθαι**: 'and all D
these are connected by subterranean channels running in all directions, some narrower and some broader': the words *καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν* simply state the result of *συντετρῆσθαι* in another form. For *συντετραίνω* cf. Dem. 977. 22 *ἕτερον μέταλλον συντρῆσαι εἰς τὰ τῶν πλησίον*, 'to run a gallery into a neighbour's mine.'

13. **ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας**: it is a probable suggestion, made by Fischer, that Plato is thinking of stone basins filled by fountains. This is better, at any rate, than Gottleher's explanation of *κρατήρ* as the 'crater of a volcano': the subsequent mention of *ῥύαξ* is against this, as the two would not have been alluded to separately, if they both referred to a volcano.

ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη: 'perennial streams of incredible size,' a poetical phrase quite in keeping with the spirit of the *μῦθος*.

19. **ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους**: these are the 'hollows in the E
earth's surface,' alluded to as *τόποι* at beginning of chapter.

20. **ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ**: 'according as the flow of water

happens to reach each of them': ὡς is Stallbaum's corr. of MSS. ὧν. As ἑκάστοις is τόποις, ὧν must be ποταμῶν: 'those rivers whose flow happens to reach them.' But it is not to the point here to dwell on the question '*what rivers* fill the τόποι,' but only 'how the τόποι are filled.'

22. **ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ**: 'a sort of oscillation which exists in the earth': 'est quasi reciproca agitatio duarum lancium librae suspensae necdum quiescentium, sed invicem sursum ac deorsum fluctuantium,' Wyttenbach. The Greeks had a machine called *αἰώρα*, very like the modern 'swing': Olympiodorus defines *αἰώρα* as *ἀντιταλάντωσις*.

112 A 27. **ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε**: the line quoted is *Il.* viii. 14.

33. **γίγνονται τοιοῦτοι δι' οἵας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν**: i.e. *τοιοῦτοι οἵα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ γῆ δι' ἧς ἂν ῥέωσιν*, 'take their character from the earth through which they flow': Aristotle (v. quotation at end of ch.) represents *γίγνονται τοιοῦτοι* by *τοὺς χυμοὺς καὶ τὰς χρόας ἔχειν τὸ ὕδωρ*.

B 36. **πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν**: possibly we can trace a slight difference between the two words—*πυθμήν* being 'bed' or 'bottom,' and *βάσις* 'support,' the former being as a rule a part of the thing mentioned, the latter something outside on which it rests—'no bed or support'—it is free to move in any direction.

41. **ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων**: 'just as when men breathe the current of the breath is exhaled and inhaled in succession.'

C 45. **[ὁρμῆσαν]**: omitted by best MSS.

46. **τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον**: both *δή* and *καλούμενον* indicate that Plato does not accept the terminology: cf. *Tim.* 62 C *φύσει γὰρ δή τινας τόπους δύο εἶναι διειληφότας διχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς ὃν φέρεται πάνθ' ὅσα τινὰ σώματος ὄγκον ἔχει, τὸν δὲ ἄνω πρὸς ὃν ἀκουσίως ἔρχεται πᾶν, οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῇ νομίζειν.*

47. **τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα**: *τοῖς* is in all the MSS., and it is difficult to account for its interpolation, if it is an interpolation: if it is retained, it should be taken as a 'local' dative, 'it flows into (or through) the regions about the streams of the lower hemisphere,' certainly a very awkward phrase. Geddes takes it as instr., 'by means of the channels communicating with these rivers,' but what is the noun to be supplied with this instr. dative *τοῖς*? Wyttenbach reads *τότε*. On such a point it is impossible to dogmatise: it would certainly be easier without *τοῖς*: on the other hand *τοῖς* is not quite impossible.

53. **εἰς οὓς ἑκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται**: there is no need to alter the MSS. *ἑκάστους*, for the point of which cf. 111 E *ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ ἑκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη*: 'to which, in each particular case, they make their way.' *ὁδοποιεῖται* should probably be taken as middle—'viam sibi faciunt' [L. and S. say 'passive'].

59. **πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς**: Plato is here instinctively shadowing forth a theory of gravitation: once the impulse, which, derived from *αἰώρα*, has pumped the water from Tartarus into e.g. the northern hemisphere, has exhausted itself, the water by the force of gravity begins to find its way down again towards the centre of the earth into Tartarus. There is, however, no apparent logical or scientific reason why the water should re-enter Tartarus below where it left it, but only lower down than the point at which it begins to descend. Plato is not concerned here to work out in detail a theory of gravity: it is a mere rough generalisation, for a further criticism of which cf. note on *μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὔ* (below), with plan. D

60. **καταντικρὺ ᾗ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν**: an abbreviated form of *καταντικρὺ ἐκείνου τοῦ τόπου ᾗ εἰσρεῖ*, so that we need not emend to ᾗ or ᾗ ᾗ, though the latter would not be unnatural Greek: cf. *Symp.* 173 A *ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ᾗ ᾗ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυεν.* The meaning is that a river "may issue from Tartarus, e.g. on the West, and re-enter it from the East." Aristotle (v. quotation at end of ch.) explains Plato's meaning as follows—*τὰ δὲ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον εἰ ῥεῖν ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν ἐκβάλλειν* (*ἐκβάλλειν* = "discharge itself into Tartarus," and so *εἰσρεῖν*). This is almost certainly a misrepresentation of Plato, as *ἄνωθεν* and *κάτωθεν* would violate Plato's law—*μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὔ* (v. note on these words).

65. **καθέντα**: *καθιέναι*, like *ἐκβάλλειν*, of a river is used as an intransitive verb: originally *τὸ ὕδωρ* would be understood.

66. **ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ' οὔ**: the point of this will be more clearly seen by a reference to the accompanying rough plan of a *section* of the earth. A A′ represents Tartarus: in speaking of Tartarus Plato thinks mainly of the part of it near the centre of the earth—*τῆλε μάλ', ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον*: but as he says it goes *διαμπερὲς δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς* it must be represented more or less as it is in the plan—the direction of the *χάσμα* is not of vital importance. B B′ is the section of an imaginary plane dividing the earth into two hemispheres: D is *τὸ ἡμέτερον κοιλόν*: E E′ is a stream of 'our E

hemisphere.' The *αἰώρα* pumps the water up from O, the centre of Tartarus, and our stream finds its way out at E: it must find its way back to Tartarus at E′, *ὑποκάτω τῆς ἐκροῆς* (v. note). This is due to gravitation: now if gravity is a force acting towards O, the centre of the earth, E′ ought to be any point of Tartarus lying within the circle E F F″, any point between E

and G; it might re-enter Tartarus at E″. But Plato says it can descend *μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ' οὔ*, i.e. it cannot cross the line B B′. This, if analysed, implies that gravitation acts not along the radii of the earth's sphere, directly on O, but perpendicularly to the plane which divides the earth into two hemispheres, the plane represented in section by B B′: gravitation acting from A to B B′ carries the water downwards towards B B′, but a corresponding gravitation from A′ to B B′ prevents it from crossing the plane B B′. This again implies that the plane B B′ is fixed, i.e. that there are really in the

nature of things two hemispheres. [It would be just possible to avoid this conclusion by taking *μέχρι τοῦ μέσου* to mean, not a point between E and O, but a point between D′, where the stream leaves the earth's surface and begins to descend, and O: i.e. that it cannot cross the plane C C′—the plane perpendicular to D′ O: the objection to this is that Plato's language does not suggest that he had in his mind any such point as D′, but only E.] It would be unreasonable to expect elaborate and exact scientific accuracy in a myth of this nature: the direction of gravitation is only roughly generalised.

Aristotle has a criticism of Plato's theory in the *Meteorologica* ii. 2 *τὸ δ' ἐν Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένον περί τε τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἅπαντα μὲν εἰς ἄλληλα συντέτρηται ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀρχὴ δὲ πάντων εἴη καὶ πηγὴ τῶν ὑδάτων ὁ καλούμενος Τάρταρος, περὶ τὸ μέσον ὕδατός τι πλῆθος, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὰ ῥέοντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ῥέοντα ἀναδίδωσι πάντα· τὴν δ' ἐπίρρυσιν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ἕκαστα τῶν ῥευμάτων διὰ τὸ σαλεύειν ἀεὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. οὐκ ἔχειν γὰρ ἕδραν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον εἱλεῖσθαι· κινούμενον δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποιεῖν τὴν ἐπίχυσιν τοῖς ῥεύμασιν. τὰ δὲ πολλαχοῦ μὲν λιμνάζειν, οἵαν καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι θάλατταν, πάντα δὲ πάλιν κύκλῳ περιάγειν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅθεν ἤρξαντο ῥεῖν, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον εἰ ῥεῖν ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν εἰσβάλλειν. εἶναι δὲ μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τὴν κάθεσιν· τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν πρὸς ἄναντες ἤδη πᾶσιν εἶναι τὴν φοράν· τοὺς δὲ χυμοὺς καὶ τὰς χροὰς ἴσχειν τὸ ὕδωρ δι' οἵας ἂν τύχωσι ῥέοντα γῆς. συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς ποταμοὺς ῥεῖν οὐκ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰς τὸ μέσον εἰσρέουσιν, ἀφ' οὗπερ ἐκρέουσιν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ῥευσοῦνται κάτωθεν ἢ ἄνωθεν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὁπότερα ἂν ῥέψῃ κυμαίνων ὁ Τάρταρος, καίτοι τούτου συμβαίνοντος γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον "ἄνω ποταμῶν", ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.* A strange criticism, as the proverb *ἄνω ποταμῶν* can only refer to the impossibility of rivers flowing uphill on the earth's surface: and Plato's *αἰώρα* is a force strong enough to overcome gravitation, which only begins to act when the impulse of the *αἰώρα* is exhausted.

67. **ἄναντες γὰρ πρόσω**: the MSS. have *πρός*: *πρόσω* is Heindorf's suggestion, Hermann reading *πως*: *πρόσω* must be taken as though it were *πρόσω ῥέουσι*: 'for to both sets of streams the opposite half of the globe is uphill against their further progress.'

CHAPTER LXI

3. **τέτταρ' ἄττα ῥεύματα**: the four rivers are from Homer, *Od.* x. 511—

νῆα μὲν αὐτοῦ κέλσαι ἐπ' Ὠκεανῷ βαθυδίνῃ,
αὐτὸς δ' εἰς Ἀΐδεω ἰέναι δόμον εὐρώεντα·
ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσιν
Κωκυτός θ', ὃς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρώξ.

4. **ἐξωτάτω ῥέον**: what is *ἐξωτάτω*? does it mean 'it makes the widest circle of the earth'? (i.e. nearest to the plane B B′): this seems the best interpretation.

5. **[περὶ] κύκλῳ**: the MSS. *περί* is suspicious: *κύκλῳ περί* with accus. is common, but without a case *περί* adds nothing to *κύκλῳ*, and would more naturally be attached to *ῥέον—περιρρέον κύκλῳ*. Heindorf reads *πέριξ*, which may be right—*κύκλῳ πέριξ* is found elsewhere. At any rate we cannot make *περί* govern *κύκλῳ*.

6. **τούτου δὲ καταντικρύ**: i.e. it flows out of Tartarus from the side opposite to Oceanus, and flows the other way round.

113 A 7. **ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καί**: cf. 116 C *καὶ ἄλλως . . καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν* . ., for the more usual *ἄλλως τε καί*.

10. **τῶν πολλῶν**: limits *τῶν τεθνηκότων*—'the majority of them,' those viz. who have not lived the philosophic life.

13. **τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις**: 'the generations of living things.'

14. **τούτων κατὰ μέσον**: between Oceanus and Acheron.

ἐκβάλλει: = *ἐξέπεσεν* of 112 D, as *ἐκβολῆς* = *ἐκροῆς*: L. and S. quote this passage in the sense of 'empty, discharge itself' (the regular meaning of *ἐξίημι*, *ἐκδίδωμι*), which, of course, makes nonsense. Plato here adapts his compounds to the special theory of Tartarus.

17. **ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ**: the genitive is the primitive genitive of 'material' (a branch of the partitive?), like that following *πλέως*: cf. *Anthol.* *καὶ πεδία ζείοντα πολυσπερέων Αγαρηνῶν*: *Phaedr.* 230 B *ἥ τε αὖ πηγὴ ῥεῖ μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος*: Luc. Alex. 59 *σκωλήκων ζέσας*.

B 19. **περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ]**: the MSS. reading *τῇ γῇ* should mean 'circling round the *surface* of the earth,' and if that is so, what are we to make of *παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερ. λίμνης*? In 113 A we are told that the *Ἀχερ. λίμνη* is underground, and to explain *τῇ γῇ* here Wohlrab resorts to the improbable hypothesis that there is another Acherusian lake on the surface of the earth, connected with and bearing the same name as the under lake. Although the phraseology of 113 C D rather suggests that all the rivers come to the earth's surface, it seems more probable that Plato, in speaking of Pyriphlegethon, thinks only of its sub-

terranean course, so that *τῇ γῇ* is probably an unintelligent marginal note.

21. **οὐ συμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι**: it only skirts the end of the lake.

22. **κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου**: *τοῦ Ταρτάρου* is partitive genitive, not comparative: there is no such thing as 'lower than Tartarus': 'into a lower depth of Tartarus.'

24. **οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν**: 'fragments of which are heaved up by lava-streams.'

25. **ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι**: sc. *ἀναφυσῶντες.*

28. **οἷον ὁ κυανός**: whatever the substance indicated by *κυανός*, whether, as more usually, a metal (possibly steel), or lapis lazuli, the colour is 'dark-blue.'

29. **καὶ τὴν λίμνην . . Στύγα**: for the combination of C
relative and independent clause with the same verb cf. *Laws* 683 A *εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἣν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς ἔφατε κατοικεῖσθαι καὶ Κρήτην ὡς ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις.* Homer and Hesiod make Styx not a lake, but a river.

CHAPTER LXII

3. **διεδικάσαντο**: cf. note on 107 D. D

6. **ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν**: Archer-Hind translates 'which, it is said (*δή*), are provided for them': would it not be better to take it as in 107 D *εἰς δή τινα τόπον*, that Plato does not specify the particular vessel or conveyance?

11. **οἳ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν**: the punishment of these E
incurables is not for the sake of retribution, but of warning to others: cf. *Gorg.* 525 C *οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδὲν ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα.*

13. **ἱεροσυλίας**: for the special heinousness of this offence cf. *Laws* 854 A *ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θεῖον κινεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν προτρέπον ἰέναι, οἶστρος δέ σέ τις ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης.*

16. **τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει**: this *δέ* is like

the early Greek '*δέ* in apodosi': in Attic it is most frequent in sentences of this kind, where two classes of persons are referred to, each described by a relative clause, introduced by *μέν* and *δέ*: the *δέ* of the second relative clause is repeated with the demonstrative to emphasise the contrast: so in the next clause —*οἳ δ' ἂν . . τούτους δέ . .*; cf. 78 C, 80 D.

20. **καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς . . βιῶσιν**: *μεταμέλον* is used absolutely, in an adverbial relation to *βιῶσιν*: 'and live the rest of their days in repentance.'

114 A 22. **τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ**: referring to the previous *ὑπ' ὀργῆς*, and so contrasted with the *φόνοι ἄδικοι καὶ παράνομοι* of the *ἀνίατοι*: practically 'homicide,' as contrasted with 'murder.'

25. **τὸ κῦμα**: i.e. owing to *ἡ αἰώρα*.

26. **κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν**: 'to be borne along the stream of Cocytus.'

πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας: the same as above, *πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες*, not necessarily parricides and matricides: cf. Lysias 116. 43 *οὐ γὰρ δήπου, εἰ μέν τίς σ' εἴποι πατραλοίαν ἢ μητραλοίαν, ἠξίους ἂν αὐτὸν ὀφλεῖν σοι δίκην, εἰ δέ τις εἴποι ὡς τὴν τεκοῦσαν ἢ τὸν φύσαντα ἔτυπτες, ᾤου ἂν αὐτὸν ἀζήμιον δεῖν εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀπορρήτων εἰρηκότα*: cf. *Aen.* vi. 609 'pulsatusve parens.'

28. **κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα**: in the last chapter both Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon are made to skirt the Acherusian lake at opposite ends.

B 37. **πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν**: a clear allusion to the Athenian law which enacted that an involuntary homicide might not return from exile (*ἀπενιαυτισμός*) till he appeased the family of the deceased: cf. Dem. 983. 13 *ἀλλ' ὅμως ἁπάντων τούτων ὅρος καὶ λύσις τοῖς παθοῦσι τέτακται τὸ πεισθέντας ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον ἐν πᾶσιν ἰσχύει ὥστ' ἐὰν ἑλών τις ἀκουσίου φόνου καὶ σαφῶς ἐπιδείξας μὴ καθαρόν, μετὰ ταῦτ' αἰδέσηται καὶ ἀφῇ, οὐκέτ' ἐκβαλεῖν κύριος τὸν αὐτόν ἐστιν.*

39. **πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι**: Archer-Hind finds an insuperable difficulty in the MSS. reading, with which an infin. must be supplied for *ὁσίως* from *βιῶναι*: Stallbaum says it stands for *διαφερόντως βιῶναι πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι*, quoting *Phileb.* 61 D *ἆρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονήσει μιγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς* (sc. *μιγνύναι*) *μάλιστ' ἂν ἐπιτύχοιμεν*; *Symp.* 181 B *πρὸς τὸ διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες, ἀμελοῦντες δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μή*: *Euthyd.* 281 A *ἀλλὰ μήν που καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τὰ σκεύη ἐργασίᾳ τὸ ὀρθῶς* (sc. *χρῆσθαι*) *ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπεργαζομένη.* But in all these cases the infin. to be supplied has already been used

in the same or the previous sentence, which puts them in a different class from our example. I should rather be inclined, instead of actually supplying *βιῶναι*, to say that *ὅσιον* (of *πρὸς τὸ ὅσιον*, which we might have expected) has been drawn into the adverb by the proximity of *βιῶναι*: Greek is so extremely flexible, so little tied down by grammar as compared with logic, that the phrase *πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι* does not appear to me to present any difficulty whatsoever, though I quite agree with A.-H. that Stallbaum's examples are not to the point: any page of Thuc. will furnish cases of constructions as little 'grammatical' as this. Of course it is impossible to refute A.-H.'s suggestion that a word like *ἔχειν* may have fallen out after *διαφερόντως*, but the gratuitous insertion of a word should be a last resort. [N.B.—Theodoret quotes this with *προκεκρίσθαι* after *βιῶναι*, and Clement of Alex. has *προκεκλῆσθαι*: the latter is certainly not Plato, and the former looks like a correction of the latter.]

43. **ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι**: i.e. on the real, upper surface of the earth, not in one of the 'hollows.' C

45. **καθηράμενοι**: one of the rare direct reflexive middles, like *λούομαι*.

ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι: Plato is thinking of the 'bodily passions' from which the soul is liberated: it is not quite the same as the *χωρὶς σωμάτων* (76 c) of the soul's prae-natal condition, for these souls of the *καθαροί* are not to be born again, as are those of 76 c. In the *Phaedr.* 246 c Plato speaks of some sort of *σῶμα* even for the highest existences—*ἀθάνατόν τι ζῷον ἔχον μὲν ψυχήν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα ξυμπεφυκότα.*

47. **ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι**: cf. 1 Cor. ii. 9 'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him."

50. **πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε . .**: the moral of the whole dialogue.

CHAPTER LXIII

114 d–115 a, *c.* lxiii. To insist that all these details are strictly accurate were folly; yet something like this is the fate of the soul and her habitation after death. Wherefore it is well worth while for a man to bestow all care upon his soul during this life, that she may be free from bodily passions and adorned with true virtue. And now, continues Socrates, my hour is at hand; and I will go to bathe my body for my burial.

D 6. **τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ**: with *πρέπειν* we are to supply *διϊσχυρίσασθαι*: the following clause is different, *οἰομένῳ* going closely with *κινδυνεῦσαι*, 'to run the risk of holding this opinion.' Whether we are to continue the *νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί* to *πρέπειν*, or to both *πρέπειν* and *κινδυνεῦσαι*, or to understand *οἰομένῳ* as of quite general reference, is uncertain: it makes no difference to the sense. Wagner analyses it wrongly: he says it = *τοῦτο καὶ δοκεῖ μοι πρέπειν οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν.*

8. **τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ**: cf. 77 E *ἀλλὰ χρὴ ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε.*

E 14. **πλέον θάτερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι**: 'do more harm than good.' Some of the editors take *πλέον* as neut. adj., secondary predicate with *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*: so Prof. Geddes, 'make bad worse.' But the phrase does not sound as if it meant that (especially *θάτερον*): *ἀπεργ.* must be taken absolutely with *θάτερον*, 'produce an evil effect,' and *πλέον* adverbially (even if *πλέον* is adjectival, it is not a secondary predicate). Another question arises as to whether *θάτερον* is here a euphemism for *τὸ κακόν*: my own opinion is that it is helped out here by *ἀλλοτρίους ὄντας*, which means *οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεργαζομένους*. On the view of *θάτερον* as a euphemism, Prof. Geddes says: 'The origin of this euphemism was probably deeper than a mere feeling of politeness can explain, and is to be traced to the influence of Pythagoreanism, as first permeating Platonism, and thereby the subsequent periods of ancient literature. In a dualistic system, such as that of Pythagoras, *ἕτερος* came easily to be a synonym for *κακός*. The earliest traces of such an absolute use of *ἕτερος* are found in the Pythagorean poets: Pindar *Pythian* iii. 34 *δαίμων δ' ἕτερος ἐς κακὸν τρέψαις ἐδαμάσσατό νιν*: Aesch. *Ag.* 151 *σπευδομένα θυσίαν ἑτέραν, ἄνομόν τιν', ἄδαιτον.* The other Platonic passages quoted by the editors for the absolute euphemistic sense of *θάτερον* bear out the suggestion made above that it is helped out by the context: e.g. *Euthyd.* 297 D *ὁ δ'* (sc. *Ἰόλεως*) *αὐτῷ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν. ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως Πατροκλῆς εἰ ἔλθοι πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν* (sc. *θάτερον τοῦ ἱκανῶς βοηθῆσαι*).

16. **τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε . .**: cf. 1 Peter iii. 3 'Whose adorning let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel; but let it be the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not corruptible, even the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit.'

115 A 23. **φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός**: with reference to the grandilo-

quent language of dying heroes of tragedy, Socrates mocks gently at his own 'fine phrase,' καλεῖ ἡ εἱμαρμένη: nothing could better suggest Socrates' entire cheerfulness in the prospect of death. The phrase itself is in keeping with the lofty thought of its context: but as applied to himself it has a suggestion of bombast, and Socrates, with his wonted εἰρωνεία, at once drops to a more homely level, ἀλλ' ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν.

25. **λουσάμενον πιεῖν**: 'not to drink . . till I have bathed.'

CHAPTER LXIV

115 A–116 A, *c.* lxiv. Kriton now inquires of Socrates what are his last injunctions. Only that you will take good heed to yourselves, he replies, and put into practice the principles affirmed in our late discourse. But how are we to bury you? asks Kriton. Socrates answers with a smile, As you please, provided you can catch me. It would seem that all my words have been thrown away, and I fail to persuade you that this Socrates who now speaks to you will presently take flight to the company of the gods, and that all you will bury is his forsaken body. So, my friends, be surety for me to Kriton, not this time that I shall stay, but that I shall verily depart. But seriously such incorrect language is mischievous: say then that it is my body which you bury, and bury it as seems to you best.

3. **ἐπιστέλλεις**: 'proprium de extrema morientium volun- B
tate' (Heindorf): cf. 116 B ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο.

6. **οὐδὲν καινότερον**: the force of the comparative is practically in abeyance; we are not necessarily to understand καινότερον ὧν ἀεὶ λέγω: the commonest example is νεώτερον in such phrases as μηδὲν νεώτερον ποιεῖν, 'to do nothing unconstitutional,' where the comp. slightly emphasises the depreciatory sense of νέον.

ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι: the real 'you,' i.e. the soul: cf. *Apol.* 29 E φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;

7. **καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς**: apparently neuter—'to me and mine,' with reference mainly to his children, though it might well be extended to include his 'disciples,' his spiritual children: cf. the use of τὰ φίλτατα and τὰ ἐμά in Tragedy: e.g. Soph. *El.* 537

> ἀλλ' ἀντ' ἀδελφοῦ δῆτα Μενέλεω κτανὼν
> τἄμ' οὐκ ἔμελλε τῶνδέ μοι δώσειν δίκην;

9. **κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε**: 'even though you do not at the moment agree with my argument': we might have expected *τοῖς εἰρημένοις*, and Wohlrab takes it to mean 'even though you make no promise at the moment,' but this, besides giving a forced meaning to *ὁμολογήσητε*, is not the proper contrast required, which is surely that between 'consent to a theory' and 'the philosophic *life*.'

C 13. **οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε**: 'it will profit you nothing': for the phrase cf. *πλέον ἔχειν*, *πλεονεκτεῖν*.

19. **ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης**: Prof. Geddes is clearly wrong in taking *ἐγώ* as predicate—'constitutes the being I call I': Crito has said *πῶς θάπτωμέν σε;* to which Socrates replies 'Bury me as you please, if you can catch me,' and then goes on to show that the real 'I' cannot be buried: 'the real I is this Socrates who is conversing with you.'

D 26. **εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας**: *δή* is not ironical (as Wohlrab suggests): it is rather either (*a*) 'deictic,' 'such as you remember I spoke of,' or (*b*) going closely with *τινας*, not specifying the particular *εὐδαιμονία*, for which cf. 113 D (note).

ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ: I see no reason for Archer-Hind's change of *μοι* to *μή*: *μὴ . . ἄλλως λέγω* would be natural enough, but does not *μοι δοκῶ . . ἄλλως λέγειν* express just the same thing? *μὴ δοκῶ* seems to me illogical; it would be in English 'I am afraid it looks as if . .'

30. **ἣ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο**: Crito, along with Plato, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, was Socrates' surety on his trial: cf. *Apol.* 38 B Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυᾶσθαι.

31. **ἦ μὴν παραμενεῖν . . ἦ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν**: 'for my appearance . . for my disappearance.'

E 36. **ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει**: 'that it is Socrates that he is laying out for burial or following to the grave or burying': the middle *προτίθεται* is naturally used of the person superintending the arrangements: cf. Thuc. ii. 34 *τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ προτίθενται τῶν ἀπογενομένων πρότριτα σκηνὴν ποιήσαντες . . . ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ᾖ κτλ.*

38. **τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές**: 'inaccuracy of speech is not only wrong in itself, but engenders evil in the soul.' *εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο*—'as far as concerns the actual inaccuracy,' i.e. as calculated to mislead the hearer. The evil engendered in the soul is inaccuracy of thought, e.g. thinking the 'body,' as remaining in the form of *νεκρός*, is the actual

Socrates. The Socratic teaching aimed above all at definiteness and accuracy in language and thought (v. Introd. B).

42. **καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως**: this second *θάπτειν* should be taken as depending on *χρή*, not on *φάναι*.

CHAPTER LXV

116 A–117 A, *c.* lxv. Socrates retires to the bath, and on his return takes leave of his children and household. After a little further conversation with his friends he is warned by the servant of the Eleven that the hour of his death is at hand. The man warmly testifies to the noble character of Socrates and departs in tears. Socrates, after a few kind words concerning him, bids the poison be brought. Nay, remonstrates Kriton, the sun is yet on the mountains; many prisoners have put off drinking the hemlock till far on into the evening: there is no haste. They acted after their kind, answers Socrates; but I were false to myself, were I so covetous of the little remnant of my life: therefore bring the poison.

1. **ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημα**: a very common use of *εἰς* with a 116 A
verb not expressing motion towards: cf. *Prot.* 311 A *ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν*: so conversely *οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως*.

2. **ὡς λουσόμενος**: for this calm preparation for death cf. Eur. *Alcestis* 158—

> *ἐπεὶ γὰρ ᾔσθεθ' ἡμέραν τὴν κυρίαν*
> *ἥκουσαν, ὕδασι ποταμίοις λευκὸν χρόα*
> *ἐλούσατ'.*

5. **ἀνασκοποῦντες**: 'reviewing': *ἀνα-* as in *ἀναλαμβάνω*.

7. **ἀτεχνῶς**: cf. note on 82 E.

10. **δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ**: cf. note on *τὸ παιδίον* 60 A. B

11. **αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες**: 'the women of his family.' Archer-Hind says 'some suppose that this expression gave rise to the absurd fable that Socrates had two wives living at the same time; of whom the second, Myrto, daughter or grand-daughter of the famous Aristides, was the mother of his two younger children: see Diog. Laert. ii. 26.'

19. **στὰς παρ' αὐτόν**: cf. note on 57 A *ἐπιχωριάζει Ἀθήναζε*.

20. **οὐ καταγνώσομαί σου**: 'I shall not find the same fault C
with you that I find with most.'

24. **ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ**: i.e. during your imprisonment.

29. **ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων**: there is no need for Schanz's emendation ἀγγελῶν: cf. *Crit.* 43 C *ἀφῖγμαι ἀγγελίαν φέρων χαλεπήν*: Soph. *Ant.* 1172 *τί δ' αὖ τόδ' ἄχθος βασιλέων ἥκεις φέρων;*

D 34. **ὡς ἀστεῖος ὁ ἄνθρωπος**: 'what a charming fellow he is.'

38. **με ἀποδακρύει**: cf. 117 C *ἀπέκλαιον ἐμαυτόν.*

40. **τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος**: not the gaoler, but the 'servant' whose business it is to prepare the poison: there is no occasion to specify the individual.

E 46. **ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες**: = *τούτοις ὧν ἄν . .*

48. **ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ**: 'there is still time to spare.'

117 A 54. **φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος**: an allusion to a familiar Greek proverb—'stinting when the jar is empty': cf. Hesiod *Works and Days* 367 *μεσσόθι φείδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδώ*, and Latin 'sera in fundo parsimonia.'

55. **ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ**: 'go then and do as I ask you, and do not refuse me': the subject of *ἔφη* is Socrates.

CHAPTER LXVI

117 A–118 A, *cc.* lxvi. lxvii. The last moments of Socrates.

B 9. **καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει**: 'and then the poison will act of itself.' The editors quote medical writers for the use of *ποιεῖν* of medicine taking effect, Dioscorides i. 95 *ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα*, 'is efficacious against poison': Strabo 234 *λοῦτρα κάλλιστα ποιοῦντα πρὸς νόσους*: in our passage the word is chosen with reference to the preceding *τί χρὴ ποιεῖν;* 'the poison will do the rest without your help' (*αὐτό*). The matter-of-fact manner of the attendant who administers the poison gives to the closing scene a strong impress of historical truth: he is clearly not the same man as the friendly gaoler, and to him Socrates is no different from the ordinary criminal.

14. **ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας**: the *ὑπο-* suggests the glance from beneath bushy eyebrows, the whole phrase indicating a 'fixed, penetrating look': cf. *ἐπιβλέψας* 63 A: for *ταυρηδόν* cf. the verbs *ταυροῦσθαι, ἀποταυροῦσθαι*: Eur. *Med.* 92 *ἤδη γὰρ εἶδον ὄμμα νιν ταυρουμένην*: 188 *τοκάδος δέργμα λεαίνης ἀποταυροῦται δμωσίν.* For this manner of Socrates cf. *Symp.* 221 B *βρενθυόμενος καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλων, ἠρέμα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φιλίους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, δῆλος ὢν παντὶ καὶ πάνυ πόρρωθεν ὅτι εἴ τις ἅψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται*: and an almost identical description in Ar. *Clouds* 362 *βρενθύει τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλεις.*

16. **πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι**: this playful allusion to the Greek custom of pouring a libation to some deity before drinking reminds us of the similar scene recorded in Xen. *Hell.* I. iii. 56, the death of Theramenes: *καὶ ἐπεί γε ἀποθνῄσκειν ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ κώνειον ἔπιε, τὸ λειπόμενον ἔφασαν ἀποκοτταβίσαντα εἰπεῖν αὐτόν,* Κριτίᾳ *τοῦτ᾽ ἔστω τῷ καλῷ.*

23. **ἐπισχόμενος**: 'holding it to his lips': cf. Apoll. Rhod. C
i. 472—

> *ἦ καὶ ἐπισχόμενος πλεῖον δέπας ἀμφοτέρῃσιν*
> *πῖνε καλίκρητον λαρὸν μέθυ:*

it seems to suggest 'drinking at one draught.'

36. **κατέκλασε**: cf. the Homeric *κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ.* D

40. **πλημμελοῖεν**: observe how close this is to the original use of the word, of something 'discordant,' 'out of harmony.'

ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν: Olymp. 171 *ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ* E
τελευτᾶν ἠξίουν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι *ὡς ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ ἱεροῦ τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, εὐφημία* being the silence observed at sacrifices and other religious ceremonies.

52. **πηγνῦτο**: for this form cf. *διασκεδαννῦται* 77 B. 118 A

καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο: I think it is impossible to say with certainty whether *αὐτός* here is Socrates or *ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον*: the former is the more obvious interpretation of the word *αὐτός* taken by itself, but the use of *αὐτῷ* after *γένηται*, and the whole tone of the sentence *ἐπειδὰν . . οἰχήσεται*, suggests that the speaker is the prison official, in which case *αὐτός* must be taken as contrasted with *ἐπεδείκνυτο*, 'made us feel.'

57. **τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα**: a 'cock' was the customary offering of a person recovered from sickness to Aesculapius, the god of healing. Prof. Geddes says: 'In ancient art the cock soon took its place as a symbol of the god of day: Plutarch (*Mor.* 400 C) refers to a painter who symbolised morning by a figure of Apollo with a cock upon his hand. . . From the worship of Apollo it naturally descended to that of the son of Apollo, Aesculapius, who was supposed to execute in one of its departments the restorative function of the healing God.' On the lips of Socrates this injunction to 'pay a cock to Aesculapius' is very clearly an allusion to the philosopher's view of life as a sickness of which death is the final healing. Prof. Geddes compares several passages: Aesch. *fr.* *ὦ θάνατε* Παιάν, *μή μ᾽ ἀτιμάσῃς μολεῖν*: Soph. *Ajax* 692 *καὶ τάχ᾽ ἄν μ᾽ ἴσως πύθοισθε, κεἰ νῦν δυστυχῶ, σεσωσμένον*: the prayer 'Iovi Liberatori' on the lips of Seneca and Thrasea

at death: Shaks. *Timon* v. 1 'My long sickness Of health and living now begins to mend.'

63. **καὶ ὃς**: Socrates: 'and his eyes had become fixed.'

64. **συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα**: cf. Hom. *Od.* xi. 426 *χερσὶ κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς ἑλέειν σύν τε στόμ' ἐρεῖσαι.*

CHAPTER LXVII

3. **τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν**: *τῶν τότε* with a superlative is the regular formula in such eulogies: *τότε* need create no difficulty, as it is looked at from the point of view not so much of Phaedo, telling his story soon after Socrates' death, as of Plato at the time of writing. Wyttenbach proposes *τῶν πώποτε*, but that is quite out of keeping with the studiously modest tone of *ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν.*

4. **καὶ ἄλλως**: refers to *ἀρίστου*, 'and in other ways . .' i.e. practically 'and besides,' or 'and in every way . .'

INDEX TO NOTES

[The numbers indicate the pages of the Platonic text.]

ἀδολεσχῶ 70 C
ἀδόξαστος 84 B
ἀειδής 79 A
ἀηδών 85 A
ἀήρ 96 B
ἀθάνατος 105 E
Ἅιδης 80 D
αἰθήρ 109 B
αἷμα 96 B
αἰνίττομαι 69 C
Αἴσωπος 60 C
αἰώρα 111 E
ἀλαζών 92 D
ἀλλαγή 69 A
ἀλλὰ μὲν δή 75 A
ἀλλ' ἤ 81 B
ἀλλ' οὖν δή 100 A
ἄλλο τι 79 A
ἄλλως 76 E
ἀμέλει 82 A
ἀμύητος 69 C
ἀνακάμπτω 72 B
ἀνακύπτω 109 E
ἀναμάχομαι 89 C
ἀνάμνησις 72 E
ἀνάντης 112 E
ἀνατίθεμαι 87 A
Anaxagoras 97 C
ἀνδραποδώδης 69 B
ἀνευφημεῖν 60 A
ἀνόητος 80 B
ἀνταποδοῦναι 72 A
ἀντιλαβή 84 C
ἀντιλαμβάνομαι 88 D
ἀντίληψις 87 A
ἀντιλογικός, 90 C
ἄνωθεν 101 D
ἀνώλεθρος 105 E
Aorist, gnomic 73 D
ἁπλῇ οἶμος 108 A
ἁπλοῦς 62 A
ἀποδοῦναι 63 E
ἀπολαμβάνω 58 C
Apollodorus 59 A
ἀπομανθάνω 96 C
ἀπόρρητα 62 B
ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι 117 B
ἄρα 68 A, 70 C, 80 D
ἄρ' ἦν 68 B
Ἀργεῖοι 89 C
Ἁρμονία 95 A
Ἀσκληπιός 118 A
ἀστεῖος 116 D
ἀσχολία 66 B
ἀτεχνῶς, 82 E, 90 C
ἀτέχνως 100 D
Ἄτλας 99 C
ἄτοπος 60 B
ἀτραπός 66 B
ἄττα 66 B
αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα 74 B
αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν 74 D

αὑτοῦ for σαυτοῦ 78 B, 92 A, 101 D
ἀφοσιοῦσθαι 60 E

βάσις 112 B
βασκανία 95 B

γάρ, elliptical 87 D
γελασείω 64 B
Genitive:
(1) Absolute 77 E, 98 D
(2) After τί δέ; 78 D
(3) Definition 78 D
(4) Material 113 A
Γλαύκου τέχνη 108 D

δαίμων 107 D
δέ 'in apodosi' 78 C, 80 D, 113 E
δεῖγμα 110 B
δέον 99 C
δεύτερος πλοῦς 99 D
δή 100 D, 107 D, 113 C, 115 D
διὰ τοῦ σώματος 65 A
διαβλέψας 86 D
διαγράμματα 73 B
διαδικάζομαι 107 D, 113 D
διανοεῖσθαι 65 E
διάνοια 79 A
διαπραγματεύομαι 77 D, 95 E
διατρίβειν 59 D
διαφέρειν 64 D
διαφυή 98 C
διειλημμένος 81 C, 110 B
δίνη 99 B
δόξα 96 B
δυσεξέλεγκτος 85 C

ἐὰν ἄρα 64 C
ἐγγυᾶσθαι 115 D
ἐγγὺς ἰόντες 95 B
ἐγγὺς τείνειν τινός 65 A
ἐγκέφαλος 96 B
εἰ δὲ μή 63 E, 88 B
εἴδωλον 66 C
εἰκών 100 A
εἶναι = 'to be true' 90 B
εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος 58 E, 63 C
εἰ πολλάκις 60 E
ἐκβάλλειν 113 A
ἐκεῖσε 61 D
ἐκφέρειν 66 B, 115 E
ἐν 'engaged in' 59 A, 68 D, 84 A
Ἐνδυμίων 72 C
ἐνδύομαι 89 D
ἐννοῶ 73 C
ἐντείνω 60 D, 86 B
ἐξᾴδειν 85 A
ἐξεπᾴδειν 77 E
ἐπαχθής 87 A
ἔπειτα 82 C
ἐπιβλέψας 63 A
ἐπιστέλλειν 115 B
ἐπιστήμη 74 B
ἐπισφραγίζομαι 75 D
ἐπίσχομαι 117 C
ἐπιχωριάζει Ἀθήναζε 57 A
ἔποψ 85 A
ἐπτοῆσθαι 68 C, 108 A
ἕρμαιον 107 C
ἐρρῶσθαι 61 B
ἔσχατα 90 A
ἑταῖρος (adj.) 89 D
Εὔηνος 60 D
εὐθύς with ptcp. 70 A
Εὔριπος 90 C
εὐφημία 117 E

ζωή, 105 D

ἥκειν 59 D
ἡμισύς 104 A
Ἡράκλειαι στῆλαι 109 B
Ἡρακλῆς 89 C

θάτερον 114 E
θεραπεία 64 D
θέσθαι 91 A, 93 C
θεωρία 58 B
θράττω 86 E
θρυλεῖν 65 B

ἰδέα 104 D
ἱεροσυλία 113 E
ἵλεως 95 A
Indic. with μή after verb of fearing 77 D, 84 E
Infinitive:
(1) of purpose, = Latin gerundive 84 A
(2) epexegetic 84 C
(3) in relative clause 72 A, 109 B
ἴττω Ζεύς 62 A

κάθαρσις 69 C
καθίημι 112 D
κἂν εἰ for καὶ εἰ 71 B
κάρδοπος 99 B
κατά with acc. 94 E, 108 D
κατακλάω 117 D
κατὰ νοῦν 97 D
κατέχειν 104 D
κατηγορεῖν 73 B
κεφάλαιον 95 B
κινδυνεύω 64 A
κομψεία 101 C
κομψός 105 C
Conservation of energy 72 A
κόπτομαι 60 A
κορυφή 60 B
κρατήρ 111 D
κυανός 113 B
κυλινδεῖσθαι 82 E
κωμῳδοποιός 70 C

λαγχάνω 107 D
λέγειν = κελεύειν 104 D
λέγειν τι 63 A
λογίζομαι 65 C
λόγος θεῖος 85 D

μέθοδος 79 E, 97 B
μέλιττα 82 B, 91 C
μὲν . . δέ 60 B, 84 A, 86 A
μέν without δέ 64 B
μέντοι 65 D, 81 D
μετά = among 78 A
Metempsychosis 70 C
μέτριος ἀνήρ 82 B
μή with negative force after κωλύω 106 B
μή generic 64 D, 65 A, 73 C, 106 D (note)
μὴ οὐ with subj. 67 B, 69 A
with inf. 72 D, 85 C, 88 A
μητραλοίας 114 A
μορμολυκεῖον 77 E
μορφή 103 E
μουσική 61 B
μυθολογεῖν 61 D
μῦθος 61 B
μῶν μή 84 C

Negative repeated for emphasis 89 E, 90 C
νεῦρα 98 C
Neuter plur. of rel. pron. as Cogn. Acc. 94 C
νὴ τὸν κύνα 99 A
νοῦς 97 C

ξυγγραφικῶς 102 D
ξύμφυτος 81 C

οἰκεῖος 75 E
οἷον 64 D
ὅλῳ καὶ παντί 79 E
ὁμοιομερῆ 96 D
ὁμοιότης 109 A
ὁμώνυμος 78 E
Optative:
(1) by attraction 65 E, 93 E, 94 C
(2) combined with subj. in depend. clause 88 C
(3) deliberative after pres. tense 78 A, 108 A
(4) in O.O. without ὅτι 87 E, 95 D, 96 B
(5) in depend. clauses of γνῶμαι 106 A
(6) contracted form 118 A
ὀρθῶς 69 D

ὅς γε 96 E
ὅτε γε 84 E
ὁτὲ μὲν . . . ἐνίοτε δέ 59 A
ὅτι μή 67 A
οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεσθαι 72 C
οὐδὲ δι' ἕν 100 C
οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ 76 A
οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή 84 B
οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις 100 C
οὐ μή 66 B
οὐ πάνυ 100 A
οὐσία 65 E
οὕτως following ptcp. 61 D, 83 B, 86 E
οὐ χεῖρον 105 A

παρά with acc. 105 B, 107 A
with gen. = ὑπό 106 D
παραγγέλλειν 59 E
παρακελεύομαι 60 E
παραλαμβάνω 82 D
παραλυπεῖν 65 C
παραμυθία 70 B
παραπίπτειν 66 D
παρέχομαι 81 D
παρίστασθαι 66 B
Participle as protasis of conditional sent. 69 B, 70 D
πατραλοίας 114 A
πέμπειν 58 B
πεπονθέναι 98 C
περὶ κύκλῳ (?) 112 E
περιμένειν 59 E
Πηνελόπης ἱστός 84 A
πίστις 70 B
πλημμελεῖν 117 D
ποιεῖν 60 D, 94 D
πολλοῦ δεῖ 93 A
πραγματεία 63 A
Preposition repeated with ὥσπερ 67 B, 82 E, 115 B
πρίν with subjunctive without ἄν 62 B
προοίμιον 60 D
προσᾴδειν 86 E
προσηλοῦν 83 D
προσίεμαι 97 B
πρός τινι εἶναι 84 C
Protasis, double 67 E
προτίθεσθαι 115 E
πυθμήν 112 B
πῦρ 96 B

Relative clause in place of τό with inf. 68 B
Relative to be supplied in fresh case 65 A, 81 B

σηπεδών 96 B, 110 E
σκιαγραφία 69 B
σκιάν, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δεδιέναι 101 D
στίχος 104 B
Στύξ 113 C
Subjunctive:
deliberative 64 C, 79 A
contracted form 77 B
συγκεῖσθαι 92 A
συμπαραλαμβάνω 65 A
συντετραίνω, 111 D
σφαῖραι δωδεκάσκυτοι 110 B
σφᾶς 64 B
σχεδία 85 D
σχεδόν τι 63 E
σχολῇ ἄν 106 D
Swan, the bird of Apollo 85 A
Swan's song 84 E

τὰ ἐμά 115 B
ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέπειν 117 B
τεθνάναι 64 A, 71 C
τείνειν εἴς τινα 63 B
τελεταί 69 C
τέλμα 109 B
τέχνη 89 B
τί in rel. clause 105 B
τί ἄλλο ἤ; 63 D
τί δέ; 71 A
τὸ δέ 87 C, 109 D
τοιοῦτος 58 D, 63 D, 66 B, 70 E, 79 C, 80 D, 108 B
τὸ λεγόμενον, 66 C
τραγικὸς ἀνήρ 115 A

τροφή 81 D, 84 B, 107 D
τυγχάνω 65 E

Uniformity of Nature 71 E
ὑπακούειν 59 E
ὑπάρχειν 78 A
ὑπερφυῶς ὡς 66 A
ὑπόθεσις 101 D
ὑποστάθμη 109 C

Φᾶσις 109 A
φείδεσθαι οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος 117 A
φήμη 111 B
φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν 61 D
Φιλόλαος 61 D
φιλομαθής 82 C
Φλιάσιοι 57 A
φλυαρία 66 C
φοιτᾶν 59 D
φρόνησις 65 A, 69 B
φρουρά 62 A
φύρω 97 B
φύσις 78 C, 80 A, 87 E

Chaos 72 C
χελιδών 85 A
χρόνου συχνοῦ 57 A

ψηλαφᾶν 99 B

ὠνεῖσθαι (passive) 69 B
ὡς ἀληθῶς 66 C, 77 D
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν 78 E
ὡς οὐδενί 92 A, 96 C
ὥσπερ οὖν 60 C

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